The Second Battle of Britain - a Soviet Sealion

29 – Blitzkrieg


Among the invading Iraqi forces which had gone into Kuwait & Saudi Arabia, who at first had orders to go as far as Bahrain (impossible now), Qatar & the UAE, there were foreign military observers and advisers. The majority of them came from the Soviet Union and East Germany though there was a scattering of a few other nationalities too from across the Eastern Bloc countries. From Moscow and East Berlin, the instructions to their personnel deployed into the warzone were many yet at the very top was the priority given to not be captured… being killed wasn’t mentioned. They weren’t to go on combat missions no matter what the excuse where that could expose them to ending up in custody with that being milked for all that it was worth. There were no men captured yet deaths did occur among the military officers from overseas during the first days of Operation Lion 4. A Czechoslovak ground technician helping to keep Iraqi planes in the air was killed during an air attack when the Saudis struck at a target inside Kuwait, two East Germans were killed in an accidental explosion of captured ammunition stocks inside Saudi Arabia and there were a pair of Soviets lost too. One of the latter was killed by Iraqi heavy guns opening fire on their own side by mistake while the other lost his life when the Americans started using their naval air power over occupied portions of Saudi Arabia.

Other foreign observers and advisers were witness to the stalling of the Iraqi Blitzkrieg starting on the war’s sixth day. The rate of Iraqi military advances across significant distances through the desert was cut dramatically. There were many factors involved in this. Iraqi supply issues were always going to be a big deal but once the Americans joined with the Saudis and the Gulf Arab Monarchies in making series air attacks, these became crippling. The opponents of the Iraqi Army were wising-up too. Road signs along the highways which had been used had at first been left in-place – significantly aiding Iraqi navigation – but now came down ahead of their tanks. Many times when facing certain defeat, those in the way of the Iraqi Army juggernaut had concentrated on saving themselves and their warfighting equipment from capture if possible: now there was an effort to blow up fuel stocks & empty fresh water tanks ahead of disabling heavy gear. The terrain was changing too. The Iraqi offensive was still in the main concentrated in the Saudi’s Eastern Province, where the ad-Dahna Desert lay near to the Persian Gulf, but their now long, exposed inner flank faced the higher ground of the Najd. The Saudi inner uplands, the heart of the ‘old’ Saudi Arabia long before oil extraction made the coast so important, was held by Saudi forces in good defensive positions while orders from Baghdad had the Iraqi Army keep on lengthening that flank. The shoreline on the other flank became rather unfriendly too. If the island of Bahrain had been seized matters here might have been different. More than that though, the Iraqi Navy had already taken many losses from the Kuwaiti & Saudis before the Americans got involved. They were scouring the Gulf of all Iraqi warships and making that flank to the east look as exposed as the western one.

Rashid could read the map like his generals in the field could. He saw the danger of his forward spearheads going as far forward as they did. Yet, after his tanks took control of Dammam and Dhahran, he wanted them to strike south and southwest with the advance continuing. An attack southwards would head for the crossroads & communications centre of Hofuf (also known as Ahsa) to take control of that city and the nearby Ghawar oil field too. This would be as far now as that advance would go instead of any further towards the smaller nations up ahead. Striking southwest would now become the main effort. His tanks would follow Highway-40 right across the desert towards Riyadh. It sat in the Najd but close to the edge of that mountainous plateau. A seeming Iraqi intention to approach the Saudi capital from the north, after King Khalid Military City had been taken, was halted at the Iraqi leader’s direction rather than due to the mass of Saudi troops sent there. His current belief was that Riyadh could be taken by the ‘back door’ after the Saudis had their army drawn off like they had. Rashid wanted King Fahd’s capital city now rather than the Gulf coastline cities.

In encoded messages sent from the senior observers and advisers on the ground with the Iraqis, those foreign military officers close to the fighting reported back messages which, when collated, showed a near unanimous belief that while Hofuf and Ghawar might be possible to do, there was no chance that the Iraqis could take Riyadh. They were slowing down and didn’t have the momentum anymore. The Blitzkrieg wasn’t going to get Iraqi tanks into Riyadh almost everyone said.


Into Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and also now Oman – that latter country’s pre-war cautionary approach to Iraq had been overturned following the start of the Second Gulf War – came what would later be called ‘Coalition forces’. A formal alliance against Iraq was still being organised yet when it was, it would be deemed the Coalition. It was the Americans who were arriving in these countries first ahead of forces from Britain and France. The remainder of the 1st Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division – which had lost a battalion at Dhahran – was now making its arrival in Bahrain. There were Iraqi missile attacks there and also serious domestic troubles (the Emir had fled to Dubai though was considering returning) on the island with blame for that lay upon Iranian agents. The American paratroopers landed alongside heavy guns, armour and helicopters: firepower that the men who had been overrun at Dhahran really could have done with on-hand there. The rest of the division was landing in both Qatar and the UAE. US Marines were arriving too. The lead elements of the 1st Marine Division reached Oman and the UAE during June 16th. It would be some time before they could fight, these paratroopers and marines, but they were on the ground and getting ready as well.

The US Air Force was here along the Gulf now too. It had been to King Abdulaziz Airbase outside Dhahran where there was supposed to be an operational base for combat aircraft with Bahrain too hosting them. These locations were either in Iraqi hands now or too close to the frontlines. Prince Sultan Airbase, south of Riyadh in the Najd, had been a fullback option but that also was now somewhere that the US Air Force didn’t want to deploy to when faced with the risk of Iraqi tanks rolling along the runways or a worrisome local situation. The Saudis were concentrating aircraft there themselves and the place wasn’t that big. Therefore, American air power would concentrate further back in Oman and in the UAE. They were bringing not just the F-15s and F-16s sent first but so much more in terms of combat and support aircraft. Many sites would be needed with urgent work done on infrastructure. The term ‘desert hose’, spraying the desert with money and watching what spouted in terms of military basing, would come about later.

Other countries were sending military forces to the Gulf with Britain and France working up a combined force to most likely join with the Americans there. Moreover, Saudi Arabia had gained the support of others from elsewhere too. They had allies who had a mutual opponent in Rashid-led Iraq and also the ability to effectively buy the friendship of several nations at their time of need. There would be token support given by many of these who lacked the ability to do what bigger powers were able to yet that wasn’t the case when it came to Egypt. President Mubarak had been waiting for Emir Jaber at the airport back on June 7th when Kuwait’s then ruler was assassinated on the way. He had then watched as days later Iraq’s armies went on the rampage. Preparations to fight Iraq had begun right away. Those were paying off with the start now of Egypt’s own military deployment into Saudi Arabia. The two countries were almost neighbours and relations hadn’t always been good between them yet Mubarak and King Fahd were together when it came to stopping Iraq.

Initial Egyptian arrival in Saudi Arabia was near to the northwestern city of Tabuk. King Faisal Airbase was here and there was the airlifting in of Egyptian paratroopers first for security purposes. Behind them came Mirage-5s and also F-16s. These would fly combat missions in Saudi skies. Israel got wind of this all before it began and kicked up a stink in Washington at the Egyptian’s actions. They too were opposed to Rashid’s Iraq, especially how the Soviets looked to be trying to create a bloc of friendly states from Syria through Iraq to Iran, but didn’t like the idea of the Egyptians being at Tabuk due to the strategic situation of that deployment putting them aside what Israel considered its flank. Regardless of Israeli complaints, it went on with American approval given to Cairo and reassurances sent to Tel Aviv. Military transports were also making flights in and out of King Faisal as they helped extend the Egyptian build-up. There were Egyptian ships and aircraft also crossing the Red Sea while more paratroopers flew to Riyadh to help the defences of that city, ones positioned to the north though and not to the east.

Later discovered by Israeli intelligence, much to their discomfort, Mubarak was also intimately involved in the Saudi missile attack against Iraq in the early hours of June 17th. American self-imposed restrictions on hitting Iraq itself for fear of striking Soviet forces in-country by accident had stopped them from launching Tomahawks from their warships & submarines but the Saudis had a different kind of missile in service and also the willingness to use such a weapon. From a still-incomplete site inside the Najd, the Saudis launched a trio of ballistic missiles with Baghdad as the target for them. These were Chinese-manufactured DF-3s (NATO designated them as the CSS-2) which could have contained thermonuclear warheads. They only had a conventional one though. Two missiles hit the Iraqi capital with the other going far astray into the desert – the missiles had only been purchased late last year and weren’t that reliable – as Saudi Arabia launched its own Blitzkrieg. The reactions in many countries to this missile strike, using such a weapon that it was considered possible that the Saudis possibly could attain a nuclear warhead for using Pakistani connections (speculation but not impossible), were those of grave concern. The military impact of the missile strikes was negligible but the political ones were big.

The war here was expanding worryingly beyond the projections of observers. No one knew what was going to happen next.

Good work. I can't see the US holding off on striking Iraq proper for long with the losses taken already: last year's airstrikes against Assad were pulled off without Russian forces getting it (though it may have been a close run thing) so the military capability is probably there with smart weapons etc. B-52s flying out of Egypt and Tomahawks from ships in the Gulf could make life pretty difficult for Rashid.

James as usual with all of your stories another great chapter you have a very good writing style. The only other thing I can say is more please.

31 – Line in the sand


The Saudis had drawn a line in the sand. It ran across the desert north of where Hofuf lay. Behind it was that city and also the Ghawar oil field in addition the road leading to both Qatar and the UAE. The line was as far as the Saudis declared they would allow the Iraqis to advance. No more would they fall back and give over more of their country to the invaders. This attitude either impressed or appalled others. The determination to make a stand was something that many wanted to hear. Yet there were those who upon hearing this feared the worst: that the Saudis would throw everything away trying to defend a position leaving them unable to fight elsewhere.

The Iraqis moved down Highway-15 and into the Saudi line. Hundreds of Iraqi tanks and armoured vehicles were left out of the attack by the II Corps. They had been knocked out of action in ground combat, broken down due to crippling supply issues or been hit by air attacks. What the Iraqis were able to push into the fight in terms of armour was much less than they had first conquered Kuwait with. Regardless of the weakening of the force, the attack went ahead. Any delay was considered likely to weaken the attack rather than see it strengthened. The Iraqis were aware that the Saudis concentrated their forces here and went at them with the full knowledge that their opponents were making a stand. It was a battle that the Saudis wanted and the Iraqis gave them one.

The line in the sand held.

Iraqi air power was unable to influence the fight. It would be said afterwards that that was the defining factor in the failure of the II Corps to achieve its objectives. The line in the sand held because the Saudis and their Coalition allies were able to control the skies. They threw in a lot of that air power. Brand-new Saudi Tornado strike-bombers, still not that many in service after initial introduction only last year, conducted low-level air attacks to influence the fight close to the frontlines rather than hitting targets far behind the lines as had been seen before. The US Navy had brought their carrier USS Constellation up close to land, less than fifty miles off the coast of Oman, to add to the range and payload of its mass of aircraft which took part alongside the Saudis in engaging the Iraqis from above. The Gulf Arab Monarchies brought in their aircraft too, especially helicopters armed with whatever they could carry. Iraq’s mobile IADS (Integrated Air Defence System) was already in a sorry state. When fighting near Hofuf, the Americans focused particularly on hitting SAM-launchers and mobile anti-aircraft guns as well as the radars and command vehicles for the IADS. There was one squadron of their US Air Force F-16s combat capable now out of their UAE base and they were given the task of hitting air defences rather than tanks.

With the skies completely in enemy hands, the Iraqis took a beating from above. On the ground too, they ran into more of the enemy than expected. The Saudis were anticipated to be there but it was believed that the II Corps wouldn’t have to fight many troops from the GCC countries. In earlier fights, there had been cowardice shown where troops from both Qatar and the UAE fighting so far from home had either surrendered or fled. That wasn’t the case near Hofuf. There were different commanders, better discipline and also the realisation that they were close to home: if they didn’t stop the Iraqis here, soon the fighting would be in their homelands. Oman had sent troops to this fight as well. Their 23rd Brigade showed up midway through the fight with their British-built Chieftain tanks. Two dozen tanks shouldn’t have made much of a difference when there was already a big clash of armour going on, but the Omanis used them in the right place at the right time. A hole was torn between the two attacking divisions of the II Corps. The Saudis pushed their 2nd Brigade of their National Guard into that gap that their allies open up and successfully swung to the east while guarding their western flank. They’d gotten behind the Iraqi division on the eastern side and started attacking them from all sides. Other Iraqi forces, pinned down by air attacks, were unable to come to their aid. Once done with one, the Saudis and their allies turned on the other.

The armies of the Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia all operated versions of French-supplied AMX-30s which they used at Hofuf. These tanks held their own against Chinese-supplied Type-69s in Iraqi service. Iraq was known to operate better tanks though, ones which they had received from the Soviets (and Poles too who built these as well) in the form of T-72. That second Iraqi division operated many of these and they gave the Coalition forces a tough time. Only poor Iraqi handling of these tanks allowed for their opponents to survive. Then there was that air power called in once again, especially with armed helicopters in the service of several countries firing anti-tank missiles at the T-72s. The Iraqis, what was left of them, started to pull back. Coalition ground forces didn’t give chase. They let their air power do that. Those who’d held the line in the sand were unable to head north at the current time. Among these Arab troops, there were foreign military officers. The Americans, the British, the French and Egyptians all had key personnel present to witness the fight. They were sending their own ground forces to the Arabian Peninsula and wanted to know what kind of enemy they would face. They saw a lot at Hofuf but would have learnt more had they been just a little further to the west, over on Highway-40 which linked Dammam on the Gulf to Riyadh inland.

Iraq’s IV Corps went down that road. They made slow but steady progress as they pushed the Saudis back towards their capital. Despite this being the main Iraqi attack as far as Rashid back in Baghdad was concerned, it was dismissed by the Coalition as a diversionary effort. Even the Saudis didn’t believe that the Iraqis were serious here. They noted Iraq’s main strengths with their ground forces being far to the north of Riyadh close to King Khalid Military City (that being the I Corps) and the over to the east near Hofuf with their II Corps. An attack down this road was just supposed to distract Saudis efforts to complete their blockage outside of Hofuf. The town of Judah along the highway was as far as the Iraqis initially looked capable of getting as far as. They crashed through there and the Saudi troops in-place. And on they went further.

There would be no line in the sand to stop the IV Corps as they charged onwards. Rashid had his tanks heading towards King Fahd’s capital. Could they be stopped? Or were some unwelcome visitors about to take a tour of Riyadh?

Thanks.
The Iraqis have to get their first though.
The Saudis also promote themselves as defenders of Mecca and Medina as strong and custodians. They will be letting armed non-Muslim foreigners into the country and that will not play well in many places either.

   James