Post by lordroel on Feb 9, 2019 11:47:06 GMT
What if: German naval plan 1918
Nearly a century ago, the Grand Fleet of the Royal Navy and the High Seas Fleet of the German Imperial Navy very narrowly avoided a battle that would have exceeded even Jutland in size and scope. Between them, the British, the Americans and the Germans fielded nearly seventy battleships and battlecruisers, the greatest concentration of firepower and tonnage until the great battles of World War II. The battle didn’t happen for the simplest of reasons; German sailors didn’t want to die for a lost cause.
The Plan:
On October 24, 1918, the German high command ordered the High Seas Fleet to prepare to sortie in the direction of the Thames estuary, with the objective of drawing the Grand Fleet out and destroying it in open battle. While even such a victory would not turn the tide of war (the situation on the Western Front was basically irreparable by this point), the Germans believed that the defeat of the Royal Navy would force the British to accept more lenient peace terms. In any case, the Germans expected that Britain might demand the fleet during peace negotiations, and thus that very little was at risk beyond the lives of many thousands of sailors.
By October 1918 the High Sea Fleet was built around the core of 18 battleships and 5 battlecruisers, most of which had been completed before the outbreak of war. Since the Battle of Jutland in May 1916, the obsolete pre-Dreadnoughts had been de-commissioned, two new battleships with 15-inch guns (SMS Baden and SMS Bayern) and the new battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg had joined the fleet, but one Dreadnought battleship SMS Rheinland had been damaged beyond repair by running aground in the Baltic. The fleet had undertaken only three sorties into the North Sea at full strength since June 1916 and April 1918.
The order of 24 October for the High Seas Fleet's attack is as follows:
Commander of the High Seas Fleet
Op. 269/A I
SMS KAISER WILHELM II, 24.10.1918
VERY SECRET
O. MATTER
O.-COMMAND No.19.
A. Information about the enemy
It is to be supposed that most of the enemy forces are in Scottish east coast ports, with detachments in the Tyne, the Humber and the Channel.
B. Intentions
The enemy will be brought to battle under conditions favorable for us.
For this purpose, the concentrated High Seas forces[d] will advance by night into the Hoofden, and attack combat forces and mercantile traffic on the Flanders coast and in the Thames estuary. This strike should induce the enemy to advance immediately with detachments of his fleet[e] toward the line Hoofden/German Bight. Our intention is to engage these detachments on the evening of Day II of the operation, or to have them attacked by torpedo-boats during the night of Day II or III. In support of the main task the approach routes of the enemy from east Scottish ports to the sea area of Terschelling will be infested by mines and occupied by submarines.
C. Execution
i) Departure from the German Bight by day, out of sight of the Dutch coast;
ii) Route through the Hoofden so that the attack on the Flanders Coast and the Thames Estuary takes place at dawn on Day II;
iii) The Attack:
a) against the Flanders coast by the commander of the 2nd Torpedo-Boat Flotilla with Graudenz, Karlsruhe, Nürnberg and the 2nd Torpedo-Boat Flotilla.
b) against the Thames estuary by the 2nd Scouting Group with Königsberg, Köln, Dresden, Pillau and the 2nd Torpedo-Boat Half-Flotilla
Covering of a) by the fleet and b) by the C-in-C of the Scouting Forces;
iv) Return so as to reach the combat area favorable to us, near Terschelling, one or two hours before nightfall on Day II.
v) Protection of the return (Day II) by part of the 8th Flotilla
vi) Mine laying by the leader of 4th Scouting Group with 4th Scouting Group (supported by minelayers by Arkona[f] and Möwe[g]) and the 8th Flotilla, on the approaches of the enemy, in accord with plan No. I.
vii) Disposition of submarines on the enemy routes in accord with plan No. III
viii) Attack by torpedo-boats during the night of Day II to III, in case an encounter has already taken place, from near the Terschelling Light Vessel towards the Firth of Forth, in accordance with the orders of the commander of torpedo-boats. On the meeting of the torpedo-boats with the fleet in the morning of Day III, see the following order;
ix) Entrance into the German Bight by departure route or by routes 420, 500 or 750, depending on the situation;
x) Air reconnaissance: if possible.
Map showing schematic of proposed German Fleet raid of October 1918.
U boat operations
The plan called for 25 U-boats to be deployed in six lines in the southern North Sea, in the hope of ambushing British ships sailing to counter-attack the German Fleet raiding forces. Other U-boats were to undertake special operations involving British Naval Bases. On 23 October seven U-boats at large in the North Sea (U-108, UB-86, UB-121, UB-125, UB-96, UC-58 and U-60) were diverted by wireless signals to take up positions off Rosyth, in order to give the alarm when the British Fleet sailed, and hopefully launch attacks. In addition, U-43, also at sea, was directed to take up a watching position near the Tyne. Starting on 24 October, the other U-boats began departing from their base at Heligoland to their patrol areas.
Two of these U-boats were lost. The first, U-78 (Oblt. Johann Vollbrecht), sailed on 27 October from Heligoland for a minelaying mission off the Scottish East Coast, but she was torpedoed and sunk the same day by the British submarine G2 in the central North Sea, roughly 280 nautical miles (520 km; 320 mi) east of the Firth of Forth. All 40 crewmen were lost.
The other submarine to be sunk was UB-116, which sailed from Heligoland on 25 October with special orders to attack the British fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow. She was commanded by the 26-year-old Oberleutnant zur See Hans Joachim Emsmann who, since first becoming a U-boat captain in February 1918, had sunk a total of 26 ships. She attempted to enter Scapa Flow submerged by the southern passage, Hoxa Sound, on the evening of 28 October. Hydrophones mounted ashore at Stanger Head, Flotta, alerted the British defenses, and the sea-bed magnetometer loops, designed to detect the magnetic signatures of incoming vessels and thus trigger remote-controlled mines, were activated. Emsmann raised his periscope at 11:30 pm, presumably to check his position, and was spotted by look-outs on shore; the mines detonated shortly thereafter, leaving the submarine disabled on the sea bed. She was finished off by depth charges from defense trawlers shortly thereafter; all 37 crew members were lost.
Two other submarines, UB-98 and UB-118 were damaged in collision with each other on 28 October, and had to return to port. Two others, UB-87 and UB-130 also aborted their missions due to breakdowns.
British reaction
In late October 1918 the British Grand Fleet, based at Rosyth in the Firth of Forth, had some 35 Dreadnought battleships and 11 battlecruisers (including two of the very lightly armored Courageous class). Twenty of these ships had been completed since the outbreak of war, and a third of them were armed with the highly effective 15-inch gun. The oldest capital ship in the fleet was Indomitable (commissioned in June 1908). Five of these ships were from the United States Navy and one from the Royal Australian Navy. The materiel problems which beset the Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland and beyond, (i.e. poor flash-protection in ammunition handling, lack of deck armour over magazines, deficient armour-piercing shells, and too few destroyers) had all been remedied to various extents.
In particular, the newly designed "Green Boy" shells for the fleet's heavy guns were thought to be such a great improvement in offensive power that they nullified the advantage of the heavier armour protection of German battleships. Moreover, the fleet possessed new weapons (such as ship-borne torpedo aircraft, and fast steam-driven submarines) for which the German fleet had no match.
The Spanish Flu reached its peak in the Grand Fleet in October 1918; for example, sick list of the light cruiser HMS Cardiff peaked at 19 people (6% of her complement) on 23 October 1918. It had returned to its usual level (2 persons) by 31 October. The morale in the British Fleet was high in anticipation of a re-match for Jutland, the personality and leadership of the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir David Beatty, being an important reason for this. Admiral Beatty was anticipating action, and warned the fleet to make preparations as early as 14th October 1918.
Intelligence
In the First World War British Naval Intelligence in general, and code-breaking in particular, was highly efficient. It played a very important role in the battles of Dogger Bank and Jutland, in the American entry into the war on the Allied side, and the defeat of the U-boats in 1917-18.
By late 1917 improvements in German communications security had made intelligence gathering more difficult, at least as far as the High Seas Fleet was concerned. Between October 1917 and April 1918, the Germans were able to launch three surprise sorties into Norwegian waters against mercantile traffic. On the last occasion (22 and 25 April 1918) employing their whole fleet. Each time the British did not receive sufficiently timely warning to mount an effective counter-attack. High-power wireless communications were essential for the control of U-boats at sea; but this also allowed efficient triangulation-based location of the U-boats by the Allies. In addition, U-boats employed a simpler cypher system than that used by the surface fleet, which Room 40, the British Admiralty's code-breaking section, could usually read with few difficulties. In October 1918 these methods allowed the Admiralty to track the U-boats sent to blockade Rosyth. As early as the afternoon of 23 October the Admiralty alerted Admiral Beatty that the situation was abnormal and that they would reinforce him by sending destroyers from the anti-submarine Flotillas based at Plymouth and Buncrana. By late on 28 October the situation was reaching a climax, and Vice Admiral Sydney Fremantle, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff and Rear Admiral Reginald Hall, the Director of Naval Intelligence sent Beatty a full appreciation which read, in part:
Dispositions of enemy submarines combined with positions of their large minefield recently laid and now clear constitutes fairly decisive evidence of his desire to draw the Grand Fleet out. No evidence of how he proposes to achieve this object but evidence that no move of his battlefleet can take place before tomorrow night. No objective of the enemy is apparent that will not involve great risk for him. Therefore he may confine himself to emerging from the Bight and returning after making us aware of his exit by W/T signals. Unlikely the enemy will risk fleet action until the Armistice negotiations are settled one way or another. Press reports of German submarines proceeding home via the Norwegian Coast probably emanate from Germany and are intended to conceal existence of submarine trap.?
Throughout the following 48 hours, Fremantle was able to keep Beatty well informed of developments in a timely manner, correctly describing the concentration of the High Seas Fleet at Schillig Roads on the evening of the 29 October, and its intention to sail on the 30 October. Hipper's unexpected postponement of the operation on 30 October was initially ascribed to fog.
Comparison of forces
The detailed orders of battle are summarized in the table below. The disparity in forces was roughly 2-to-1 in favour of the British. Had the battle been joined, it would have involved some 69 capital ships (in comparison with 58 involved at Jutland).
Dreadnought battleships: British (35) German (18).
Battlecruisers: British (11) German (5).
Armored Cruisers: British (4) German (0).
Light cruisers: British (37) German (14).
Aircraft carriers: British (3) German (0).
Flotilla leaders, destroyers and torpedo-boats: British (160) German (60).
Submarines: British (14) German (25).
The Ships:
There is no question that the Allies had a massive advantage over the Germans in the North Sea. That advantage had grown since Jutland, as the British had added new battlecruisers, new battleships and a squadron of American dreadnoughts. For their part, the Germans had added two new super-dreadnoughts, each carrying eight 15” guns, that were roughly comparable to the most formidable of the British ships. But Allied advantages remained overwhelming. The Grand Fleet possessed thirty-five dreadnoughts (including twenty-three super-dreadnoughts), eleven battlecruisers and a wealth of support vessels. The High Seas Fleet had only eighteen dreadnoughts (of which only Baden and Bayern could properly be termed “super”) and five battlecruisers.
A realistic plan ore pointless sacrifice
Writing after the war, Admiral Scheer asserted that "it was highly probable an expedition of the Fleet might achieve a favourable result. If the Fleet suffered losses, it was to be assumed that the enemy's injuries would be in proportion, and that we should still have sufficient forces to protect the U-boat campaign in the North Sea, which would have to be resumed if the negotiations should make imperative a continuation of the struggle with all the means at our disposal." The High Seas Fleet had undertaken similar diversionary attacks intended to draw British units into a submarine/mine ambush before: the Action of 19 August 1916 was the one occasion when this tactic came closest to succeeding. On 27 October, the German Government had agreed to surrender the fleet as part of the armistice; thus in strictly material terms, the German Navy had nothing to lose.
Admiral Beatty's intentions are not recorded but there seems no doubt that he would have sailed as soon as the Germans were reported to be at sea and would have aggressively pursued battle.Given the distances involved, if the German sortie were reported promptly and the Grand Fleet sailed immediately on receipt of such a report, there was every possibility that they could have cut off the German line of retreat and forced a fight to the finish. Admiral Hipper seemed well aware of the risk in this plan, and expressed a sanguinary attitude about it: "a battle for the honour of the fleet in this war, even if it were a death battle, it would be the foundation for a new German fleet"
Appendix: Orders of battle
Had this operation resulted in a battle between the British and German fleets, it would have been one of the largest Naval Battles in history. The following lists give details of the ships which would potentially have been involved.
German order of battle
The German fleet was to be organized into three groups, plus supporting submarines and airships, as follows:
-High Seas Fleet
Commander-in-Chief, High Seas Fleet: Admiral Franz Ritter von Hipper in battleship Baden.
-Scouting forces
Commander, Scouting Forces: RAdm Ludwig von Reuter in battle cruiser Hindenburg.
I. SG (RAdm Reuter) battlecruisers: Hindenburg (F), Derfflinger, Moltke, Von der Tann, Seydlitz
II. SG (Cdre Viktor Harder) light cruisers: Königsberg (F), Karlsruhe, Pillau, Nürnberg, Köln, Dresden, Graudenz.
Deputy Leader of Torpedo-Boats: FKpt Hans Quaet-Faslem in light cruiser: Frankfurt.
II. TBF destroyers: (3. hf) G101, G104, V100, G103, G102; (4. hf) B97, B111, B109, B110 and B112.
I. TBF (detachment) torpedo boats: (2. hf) V130, S133, S135, S134 and S139.
VII. TBF (detachment) torpedo boats: (13. hf) S138, V83, S65, V78 and S56.
- Main body (under Commander-in-Chief)
III. BS (VAdm Hugo Kraft), battleships: König (F), Bayern, Grosser Kurfürst, Kronprinz Wilhelm, Markgraf.
Fleet Flagship battleship: Baden (F, Adm Hipper)
I. BS (VAdm Friedrich Boedicker) battleships: Ostfriesland (F), Thüringen, Posen, Nassau, Oldenburg, Westfalen, HelgolandIV. BS (VAdm Hugo Meurer) battleships: Friedrich der Grosse (F), König Albert, Kaiserin, Prinzregent Luitpold, Kaiser
Leader of Torpedo-Boats Cdre Paul Heinrich(GE) in light cruiser Emden
I. TBF torpedo boats: (1. hf) V129, G39, G86, G40, G38, S32
V. TBF torpedo boats: (9. hf) G11, V6, V3, V2; (10. hf) G8, G10, V5
VI. TBF torpedo boats: (11. hf) V128, V127, S132, S131, V126, V125; (12. hf) V43, V45, V44, S49, S50, V46
IX. TBF torpedo boats: (17. hf) V80, S52, S51, S60, S36
- Minelaying group
IV. SG (RAdm Johannes von Karpf(GE)) light cruisers: Regensburg (F), Bremse, Brummer, Strassburg, Stralsund; attached minelayers: Arcona, Möwe
VIII. TBF torpedo boats: (15. hf) T180, T193, T192, T195, T190, T189; (16. hf) torpedo boats: T178, T179, T176, T186
Airships: L65, L64, L63, L52, L61, L56, SL22
Submarines: thirty U-boats were assigned to this operation, in six patrol lines:[38] U-43, U-52, U-53, U-60, U-62, U-78, U-86, U-91, U-94, U-96, U-100, U-107, U-108, U-113, U-162, UB-64, UB-67, UB-80, UB-86, UB-87, UB-93, UB-96, UB-98, UB-116, UB-118, UB-121, UB-125, UB-126, UB-130, UB-131, UC-58.
British order of battle
This is the administrative order of battle of the Grand Fleet and other important commands in Home Waters on 11 November 1918. Excluded from this list are ships on detached service and minor vessels of war such as minesweepers, sloops and older vessels employed on patrol duties; it includes only forces likely to have been engaged had the German sortie gone ahead. Some of these ships may not in fact have been available to sail on 30 October due to breakdowns or routine maintenance. The Grand Fleet was based at Rosyth, with usually one Squadron detached to Scapa Flow for gunnery training.
Grand Fleet
Commander-in Chief: Adm Sir David Beatty in battleship Queen Elizabeth (attached destroyer: Oak)
1st BS (Adm Sir Charles Madden) battleships: Revenge (F), Emperor of India, Iron Duke, Benbow, Marlborough, Canada, Ramillies, Resolution, Royal Oak, Royal Sovereign (attached cruiser: Blonde)
2nd BS (VAdm Sir John de Robeck) battleships: King George V (F), Orion, Ajax, Centurion, Conqueror, Monarch, Thunderer, Agincourt, Erin (attached cruiser: Bellona)
4th BS (VAdm Sir Montague Browning) battleships: Hercules (F), Colossus, Bellerophon, Collingwood, Neptune, St. Vincent (attached cruiser: Boadicea)
5th BS (VAdm A C Leveson) battleships: Barham (F), Malaya, Valiant, Warspite (attached cruiser:Blanche)
6th BS (RAdm H Rodman) battleships: New York(USN) (F), Arkansas(USN), Florida(USN), Texas(USN), Wyoming(USN)
Cruisers (with main body)
2nd CS (RAdm E F Bruen) armoured cruisers: Minotaur (F), Cochrane, Shannon
4th LCS (RAdm A F Everett) light cruisers: Calliope (F), Cambrian, Caroline, Comus, Cordelia, Constance
7th LCS (RAdm G H Borrett) light cruisers: Carysfort (F), Aurora, Penelope, Undaunted, Cleopatra
Flying Squadron (RAdm R F Phillimore)[q] aircraft carriers: Furious (F), Argus, Vindictive, Nairana, Pegasus, Campania[r]
Battlecruiser force
Commander-in-Chief: VAdm Sir William Pakenham in battle cruiser Lion
1st BCS (RAdm Sir Henry Oliver) battlecruisers: Repulse (F), Renown, Tiger, Princess Royal
2nd BCS (RAdm Sir Lionel Halsey) battle cruisers: New Zealand (F), Australia(RAN), Inflexible, Indomitable
1st CS (VAdm T D W Napier) battle cruisers: Courageous (F), Glorious
1st LCS (RAdm W H Cowan): Inconstant (F), Galatea, Royalist, Phaeton, Caledon
2nd LCS (RAdm J A Fergusson): Birmingham (F), Dublin, Melbourne(RAN), Sydney(RAN), Yarmouth
3rd LCS (RAdm A T Hunt): Chatham (F), Southampton, Chester, Birkenhead
6th LCS (RAdm E S Alexander-Sinclair): Cardiff (F), Calypso, Caradoc, Cassandra, Ceres
Destroyer Command
Commodore (Destroyers): Cdre H J Tweedie in light cruiser: Castor
3rd DF leaders: Nimrod, Talisman; destroyers: Maenad, Mameluke, Marvel, Menace, Michael, Munster, Napier, Noble, Nonsuch, Onslaught, Petard; temporarily attached from 4th DF (Devonport): Lawford, Nizam, Norseman, Oracle, Oriana, Orpheus
11th DF leaders: Valorous, Seymour, Kempenfelt; destroyers: Romola, Sarpedon, Tancred, Tenacious, Tormentor, Vancouver, Vanessa, Vanity, Versatile, Viscount, Vittoria, Vivacious, Vortigern, Voyager, Walker, Walrus, Watchman
12th DF leaders: Valhalla, Saumarez; destroyers: Scimitar, Scotsman, Scout, Scythe, Seabear, Sepoy, Simoom, Sirdar, Speedy, Tomahawk, Torch, Trinidad, Tryphon, Vivien, Waterhen, Winchester, Wolsey, Wrestler
13th DF light cruiser: Champion, leaders: Valentine, Valkyrie; destroyers: Vimiera, Vega, Vectis, Violent; Vendetta, Verulam, Wakeful, Westminster; Verdun, Viceroy, Vesper, Venetia; Wolfhound, Ursa, Ursula, Urchin; Umpire, Ulster, Tower, Tristram; Vidette, Winchelsea, Westcott; Windsor, Whitley, Woolston, Walpole, Wessex
14th DF leaders: Vampire, Anzac; destroyers: Medina, Norman, Octavia, Opportune, Orford, Paladin, Patriot, Pellew, Penn, Peregrine, Peyton, Plover, Plucky, Pylades, Relentless, Sabre, Seafire, Seraph, Somme, Sparrowhawk, Splendid, Tactician, Tobago, Tyrant, Velox, Warwick, Whirlwind; due to transfer to 1st DF but temporarily retained by 14th DF: Nonpareil, Observer, Offa, Orestes
15th DF leaders: Parker, Grenville; destroyers: Patrician, Radstock, Raider, Rapid, Ready, Restless, Rigorous, Rob Roy, Rocket, Rosalind, Rowena, Sable, Sabrina, Salmon, Sorceress, Tirade, Trenchant, Undine; temporarily attached from 2nd DF (Buncrana): Marne, Medway, Michael, Mystic, Nicator, Pelican
21st DF (transferring from 6th DF, Dover) leaders: Botha, Douglas, Swift; destroyers: Mansfield, Melpomene, Milne, Miranda, Moorsom, Murray, Nugent, Phoebe
-Harwich Force
5th LCS (RAdm Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt) light cruisers: Curacoa (F), Coventry, Curlew, Concord, Centaur, Conquest, Danae, Dragon
10th DF leaders: Spenser, Shakespeare, Bruce, Montrose; destroyers: Radiant, Redgauntlet, Redoubt, Retriever, Satyr, Sceptre, Sharpshooter, Skate, Skilful, Springbok, Starfish, Stork, Sturgeon, Swallow, Sybille, Sylph, Taurus, Teazer, Tempest, Tetrarch, Thisbe, Thruster, Torrid, Truculent
-Dover Force
6th DF (Dover) leader: Broke; modern destroyers: Manly, Mastiff, Meteor, Morris, Termagant, Trident, Afridi, Amazon, Cossack, Crusader, Viking, Zubian
Minelaying destroyers
20th DF (Immingham) leaders: Abdiel, Gabriel, destroyers: Tarpon, Telemachus, Vanoc, Vanquisher, Venturous, Ferret, Legion, Prince, Sandfly
Submarines operating with the Battle Fleet
12th S/MF: light cruiser: Fearless; submarines: K2, K3, K5, K6, K7, K8, K15
13th S/MF: leader: Ithuriel; K9, K10, K11, K12, K14, K16, K22
- North Sea patrols
8th S/MF (Yarmouth) submarines: H21, H28, H29, H30, V1, V2
9th S/MF (Harwich) submarines: E29, E31, E41, E43, E45, E51, E52, E53, E56, L9, L15, L14, L17, C23, C25
10th S/MF (Tees) submarines: E27, E33, E39, E40, E42, E44, G6, G12, G13, L11, L12, L16
11th S/MF (Blyth) submarines: G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G10, J2, J3, J4, J5, J6, J7
14th S/MF (Blyth) submarines: H8, H11, H12, H14, H15, H22, H23, H24, H25, H26, L8, R1, R2, R9, R12
Nearly a century ago, the Grand Fleet of the Royal Navy and the High Seas Fleet of the German Imperial Navy very narrowly avoided a battle that would have exceeded even Jutland in size and scope. Between them, the British, the Americans and the Germans fielded nearly seventy battleships and battlecruisers, the greatest concentration of firepower and tonnage until the great battles of World War II. The battle didn’t happen for the simplest of reasons; German sailors didn’t want to die for a lost cause.
The Plan:
On October 24, 1918, the German high command ordered the High Seas Fleet to prepare to sortie in the direction of the Thames estuary, with the objective of drawing the Grand Fleet out and destroying it in open battle. While even such a victory would not turn the tide of war (the situation on the Western Front was basically irreparable by this point), the Germans believed that the defeat of the Royal Navy would force the British to accept more lenient peace terms. In any case, the Germans expected that Britain might demand the fleet during peace negotiations, and thus that very little was at risk beyond the lives of many thousands of sailors.
By October 1918 the High Sea Fleet was built around the core of 18 battleships and 5 battlecruisers, most of which had been completed before the outbreak of war. Since the Battle of Jutland in May 1916, the obsolete pre-Dreadnoughts had been de-commissioned, two new battleships with 15-inch guns (SMS Baden and SMS Bayern) and the new battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg had joined the fleet, but one Dreadnought battleship SMS Rheinland had been damaged beyond repair by running aground in the Baltic. The fleet had undertaken only three sorties into the North Sea at full strength since June 1916 and April 1918.
The order of 24 October for the High Seas Fleet's attack is as follows:
Commander of the High Seas Fleet
Op. 269/A I
SMS KAISER WILHELM II, 24.10.1918
VERY SECRET
O. MATTER
O.-COMMAND No.19.
A. Information about the enemy
It is to be supposed that most of the enemy forces are in Scottish east coast ports, with detachments in the Tyne, the Humber and the Channel.
B. Intentions
The enemy will be brought to battle under conditions favorable for us.
For this purpose, the concentrated High Seas forces[d] will advance by night into the Hoofden, and attack combat forces and mercantile traffic on the Flanders coast and in the Thames estuary. This strike should induce the enemy to advance immediately with detachments of his fleet[e] toward the line Hoofden/German Bight. Our intention is to engage these detachments on the evening of Day II of the operation, or to have them attacked by torpedo-boats during the night of Day II or III. In support of the main task the approach routes of the enemy from east Scottish ports to the sea area of Terschelling will be infested by mines and occupied by submarines.
C. Execution
i) Departure from the German Bight by day, out of sight of the Dutch coast;
ii) Route through the Hoofden so that the attack on the Flanders Coast and the Thames Estuary takes place at dawn on Day II;
iii) The Attack:
a) against the Flanders coast by the commander of the 2nd Torpedo-Boat Flotilla with Graudenz, Karlsruhe, Nürnberg and the 2nd Torpedo-Boat Flotilla.
b) against the Thames estuary by the 2nd Scouting Group with Königsberg, Köln, Dresden, Pillau and the 2nd Torpedo-Boat Half-Flotilla
Covering of a) by the fleet and b) by the C-in-C of the Scouting Forces;
iv) Return so as to reach the combat area favorable to us, near Terschelling, one or two hours before nightfall on Day II.
v) Protection of the return (Day II) by part of the 8th Flotilla
vi) Mine laying by the leader of 4th Scouting Group with 4th Scouting Group (supported by minelayers by Arkona[f] and Möwe[g]) and the 8th Flotilla, on the approaches of the enemy, in accord with plan No. I.
vii) Disposition of submarines on the enemy routes in accord with plan No. III
viii) Attack by torpedo-boats during the night of Day II to III, in case an encounter has already taken place, from near the Terschelling Light Vessel towards the Firth of Forth, in accordance with the orders of the commander of torpedo-boats. On the meeting of the torpedo-boats with the fleet in the morning of Day III, see the following order;
ix) Entrance into the German Bight by departure route or by routes 420, 500 or 750, depending on the situation;
x) Air reconnaissance: if possible.
Map showing schematic of proposed German Fleet raid of October 1918.
U boat operations
The plan called for 25 U-boats to be deployed in six lines in the southern North Sea, in the hope of ambushing British ships sailing to counter-attack the German Fleet raiding forces. Other U-boats were to undertake special operations involving British Naval Bases. On 23 October seven U-boats at large in the North Sea (U-108, UB-86, UB-121, UB-125, UB-96, UC-58 and U-60) were diverted by wireless signals to take up positions off Rosyth, in order to give the alarm when the British Fleet sailed, and hopefully launch attacks. In addition, U-43, also at sea, was directed to take up a watching position near the Tyne. Starting on 24 October, the other U-boats began departing from their base at Heligoland to their patrol areas.
Two of these U-boats were lost. The first, U-78 (Oblt. Johann Vollbrecht), sailed on 27 October from Heligoland for a minelaying mission off the Scottish East Coast, but she was torpedoed and sunk the same day by the British submarine G2 in the central North Sea, roughly 280 nautical miles (520 km; 320 mi) east of the Firth of Forth. All 40 crewmen were lost.
The other submarine to be sunk was UB-116, which sailed from Heligoland on 25 October with special orders to attack the British fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow. She was commanded by the 26-year-old Oberleutnant zur See Hans Joachim Emsmann who, since first becoming a U-boat captain in February 1918, had sunk a total of 26 ships. She attempted to enter Scapa Flow submerged by the southern passage, Hoxa Sound, on the evening of 28 October. Hydrophones mounted ashore at Stanger Head, Flotta, alerted the British defenses, and the sea-bed magnetometer loops, designed to detect the magnetic signatures of incoming vessels and thus trigger remote-controlled mines, were activated. Emsmann raised his periscope at 11:30 pm, presumably to check his position, and was spotted by look-outs on shore; the mines detonated shortly thereafter, leaving the submarine disabled on the sea bed. She was finished off by depth charges from defense trawlers shortly thereafter; all 37 crew members were lost.
Two other submarines, UB-98 and UB-118 were damaged in collision with each other on 28 October, and had to return to port. Two others, UB-87 and UB-130 also aborted their missions due to breakdowns.
British reaction
In late October 1918 the British Grand Fleet, based at Rosyth in the Firth of Forth, had some 35 Dreadnought battleships and 11 battlecruisers (including two of the very lightly armored Courageous class). Twenty of these ships had been completed since the outbreak of war, and a third of them were armed with the highly effective 15-inch gun. The oldest capital ship in the fleet was Indomitable (commissioned in June 1908). Five of these ships were from the United States Navy and one from the Royal Australian Navy. The materiel problems which beset the Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland and beyond, (i.e. poor flash-protection in ammunition handling, lack of deck armour over magazines, deficient armour-piercing shells, and too few destroyers) had all been remedied to various extents.
In particular, the newly designed "Green Boy" shells for the fleet's heavy guns were thought to be such a great improvement in offensive power that they nullified the advantage of the heavier armour protection of German battleships. Moreover, the fleet possessed new weapons (such as ship-borne torpedo aircraft, and fast steam-driven submarines) for which the German fleet had no match.
The Spanish Flu reached its peak in the Grand Fleet in October 1918; for example, sick list of the light cruiser HMS Cardiff peaked at 19 people (6% of her complement) on 23 October 1918. It had returned to its usual level (2 persons) by 31 October. The morale in the British Fleet was high in anticipation of a re-match for Jutland, the personality and leadership of the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir David Beatty, being an important reason for this. Admiral Beatty was anticipating action, and warned the fleet to make preparations as early as 14th October 1918.
Intelligence
In the First World War British Naval Intelligence in general, and code-breaking in particular, was highly efficient. It played a very important role in the battles of Dogger Bank and Jutland, in the American entry into the war on the Allied side, and the defeat of the U-boats in 1917-18.
By late 1917 improvements in German communications security had made intelligence gathering more difficult, at least as far as the High Seas Fleet was concerned. Between October 1917 and April 1918, the Germans were able to launch three surprise sorties into Norwegian waters against mercantile traffic. On the last occasion (22 and 25 April 1918) employing their whole fleet. Each time the British did not receive sufficiently timely warning to mount an effective counter-attack. High-power wireless communications were essential for the control of U-boats at sea; but this also allowed efficient triangulation-based location of the U-boats by the Allies. In addition, U-boats employed a simpler cypher system than that used by the surface fleet, which Room 40, the British Admiralty's code-breaking section, could usually read with few difficulties. In October 1918 these methods allowed the Admiralty to track the U-boats sent to blockade Rosyth. As early as the afternoon of 23 October the Admiralty alerted Admiral Beatty that the situation was abnormal and that they would reinforce him by sending destroyers from the anti-submarine Flotillas based at Plymouth and Buncrana. By late on 28 October the situation was reaching a climax, and Vice Admiral Sydney Fremantle, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff and Rear Admiral Reginald Hall, the Director of Naval Intelligence sent Beatty a full appreciation which read, in part:
Dispositions of enemy submarines combined with positions of their large minefield recently laid and now clear constitutes fairly decisive evidence of his desire to draw the Grand Fleet out. No evidence of how he proposes to achieve this object but evidence that no move of his battlefleet can take place before tomorrow night. No objective of the enemy is apparent that will not involve great risk for him. Therefore he may confine himself to emerging from the Bight and returning after making us aware of his exit by W/T signals. Unlikely the enemy will risk fleet action until the Armistice negotiations are settled one way or another. Press reports of German submarines proceeding home via the Norwegian Coast probably emanate from Germany and are intended to conceal existence of submarine trap.?
Throughout the following 48 hours, Fremantle was able to keep Beatty well informed of developments in a timely manner, correctly describing the concentration of the High Seas Fleet at Schillig Roads on the evening of the 29 October, and its intention to sail on the 30 October. Hipper's unexpected postponement of the operation on 30 October was initially ascribed to fog.
Comparison of forces
The detailed orders of battle are summarized in the table below. The disparity in forces was roughly 2-to-1 in favour of the British. Had the battle been joined, it would have involved some 69 capital ships (in comparison with 58 involved at Jutland).
Dreadnought battleships: British (35) German (18).
Battlecruisers: British (11) German (5).
Armored Cruisers: British (4) German (0).
Light cruisers: British (37) German (14).
Aircraft carriers: British (3) German (0).
Flotilla leaders, destroyers and torpedo-boats: British (160) German (60).
Submarines: British (14) German (25).
The Ships:
There is no question that the Allies had a massive advantage over the Germans in the North Sea. That advantage had grown since Jutland, as the British had added new battlecruisers, new battleships and a squadron of American dreadnoughts. For their part, the Germans had added two new super-dreadnoughts, each carrying eight 15” guns, that were roughly comparable to the most formidable of the British ships. But Allied advantages remained overwhelming. The Grand Fleet possessed thirty-five dreadnoughts (including twenty-three super-dreadnoughts), eleven battlecruisers and a wealth of support vessels. The High Seas Fleet had only eighteen dreadnoughts (of which only Baden and Bayern could properly be termed “super”) and five battlecruisers.
A realistic plan ore pointless sacrifice
Writing after the war, Admiral Scheer asserted that "it was highly probable an expedition of the Fleet might achieve a favourable result. If the Fleet suffered losses, it was to be assumed that the enemy's injuries would be in proportion, and that we should still have sufficient forces to protect the U-boat campaign in the North Sea, which would have to be resumed if the negotiations should make imperative a continuation of the struggle with all the means at our disposal." The High Seas Fleet had undertaken similar diversionary attacks intended to draw British units into a submarine/mine ambush before: the Action of 19 August 1916 was the one occasion when this tactic came closest to succeeding. On 27 October, the German Government had agreed to surrender the fleet as part of the armistice; thus in strictly material terms, the German Navy had nothing to lose.
Admiral Beatty's intentions are not recorded but there seems no doubt that he would have sailed as soon as the Germans were reported to be at sea and would have aggressively pursued battle.Given the distances involved, if the German sortie were reported promptly and the Grand Fleet sailed immediately on receipt of such a report, there was every possibility that they could have cut off the German line of retreat and forced a fight to the finish. Admiral Hipper seemed well aware of the risk in this plan, and expressed a sanguinary attitude about it: "a battle for the honour of the fleet in this war, even if it were a death battle, it would be the foundation for a new German fleet"
Appendix: Orders of battle
Had this operation resulted in a battle between the British and German fleets, it would have been one of the largest Naval Battles in history. The following lists give details of the ships which would potentially have been involved.
German order of battle
The German fleet was to be organized into three groups, plus supporting submarines and airships, as follows:
-High Seas Fleet
Commander-in-Chief, High Seas Fleet: Admiral Franz Ritter von Hipper in battleship Baden.
-Scouting forces
Commander, Scouting Forces: RAdm Ludwig von Reuter in battle cruiser Hindenburg.
I. SG (RAdm Reuter) battlecruisers: Hindenburg (F), Derfflinger, Moltke, Von der Tann, Seydlitz
II. SG (Cdre Viktor Harder) light cruisers: Königsberg (F), Karlsruhe, Pillau, Nürnberg, Köln, Dresden, Graudenz.
Deputy Leader of Torpedo-Boats: FKpt Hans Quaet-Faslem in light cruiser: Frankfurt.
II. TBF destroyers: (3. hf) G101, G104, V100, G103, G102; (4. hf) B97, B111, B109, B110 and B112.
I. TBF (detachment) torpedo boats: (2. hf) V130, S133, S135, S134 and S139.
VII. TBF (detachment) torpedo boats: (13. hf) S138, V83, S65, V78 and S56.
- Main body (under Commander-in-Chief)
III. BS (VAdm Hugo Kraft), battleships: König (F), Bayern, Grosser Kurfürst, Kronprinz Wilhelm, Markgraf.
Fleet Flagship battleship: Baden (F, Adm Hipper)
I. BS (VAdm Friedrich Boedicker) battleships: Ostfriesland (F), Thüringen, Posen, Nassau, Oldenburg, Westfalen, HelgolandIV. BS (VAdm Hugo Meurer) battleships: Friedrich der Grosse (F), König Albert, Kaiserin, Prinzregent Luitpold, Kaiser
Leader of Torpedo-Boats Cdre Paul Heinrich(GE) in light cruiser Emden
I. TBF torpedo boats: (1. hf) V129, G39, G86, G40, G38, S32
V. TBF torpedo boats: (9. hf) G11, V6, V3, V2; (10. hf) G8, G10, V5
VI. TBF torpedo boats: (11. hf) V128, V127, S132, S131, V126, V125; (12. hf) V43, V45, V44, S49, S50, V46
IX. TBF torpedo boats: (17. hf) V80, S52, S51, S60, S36
- Minelaying group
IV. SG (RAdm Johannes von Karpf(GE)) light cruisers: Regensburg (F), Bremse, Brummer, Strassburg, Stralsund; attached minelayers: Arcona, Möwe
VIII. TBF torpedo boats: (15. hf) T180, T193, T192, T195, T190, T189; (16. hf) torpedo boats: T178, T179, T176, T186
Airships: L65, L64, L63, L52, L61, L56, SL22
Submarines: thirty U-boats were assigned to this operation, in six patrol lines:[38] U-43, U-52, U-53, U-60, U-62, U-78, U-86, U-91, U-94, U-96, U-100, U-107, U-108, U-113, U-162, UB-64, UB-67, UB-80, UB-86, UB-87, UB-93, UB-96, UB-98, UB-116, UB-118, UB-121, UB-125, UB-126, UB-130, UB-131, UC-58.
British order of battle
This is the administrative order of battle of the Grand Fleet and other important commands in Home Waters on 11 November 1918. Excluded from this list are ships on detached service and minor vessels of war such as minesweepers, sloops and older vessels employed on patrol duties; it includes only forces likely to have been engaged had the German sortie gone ahead. Some of these ships may not in fact have been available to sail on 30 October due to breakdowns or routine maintenance. The Grand Fleet was based at Rosyth, with usually one Squadron detached to Scapa Flow for gunnery training.
Grand Fleet
Commander-in Chief: Adm Sir David Beatty in battleship Queen Elizabeth (attached destroyer: Oak)
1st BS (Adm Sir Charles Madden) battleships: Revenge (F), Emperor of India, Iron Duke, Benbow, Marlborough, Canada, Ramillies, Resolution, Royal Oak, Royal Sovereign (attached cruiser: Blonde)
2nd BS (VAdm Sir John de Robeck) battleships: King George V (F), Orion, Ajax, Centurion, Conqueror, Monarch, Thunderer, Agincourt, Erin (attached cruiser: Bellona)
4th BS (VAdm Sir Montague Browning) battleships: Hercules (F), Colossus, Bellerophon, Collingwood, Neptune, St. Vincent (attached cruiser: Boadicea)
5th BS (VAdm A C Leveson) battleships: Barham (F), Malaya, Valiant, Warspite (attached cruiser:Blanche)
6th BS (RAdm H Rodman) battleships: New York(USN) (F), Arkansas(USN), Florida(USN), Texas(USN), Wyoming(USN)
Cruisers (with main body)
2nd CS (RAdm E F Bruen) armoured cruisers: Minotaur (F), Cochrane, Shannon
4th LCS (RAdm A F Everett) light cruisers: Calliope (F), Cambrian, Caroline, Comus, Cordelia, Constance
7th LCS (RAdm G H Borrett) light cruisers: Carysfort (F), Aurora, Penelope, Undaunted, Cleopatra
Flying Squadron (RAdm R F Phillimore)[q] aircraft carriers: Furious (F), Argus, Vindictive, Nairana, Pegasus, Campania[r]
Battlecruiser force
Commander-in-Chief: VAdm Sir William Pakenham in battle cruiser Lion
1st BCS (RAdm Sir Henry Oliver) battlecruisers: Repulse (F), Renown, Tiger, Princess Royal
2nd BCS (RAdm Sir Lionel Halsey) battle cruisers: New Zealand (F), Australia(RAN), Inflexible, Indomitable
1st CS (VAdm T D W Napier) battle cruisers: Courageous (F), Glorious
1st LCS (RAdm W H Cowan): Inconstant (F), Galatea, Royalist, Phaeton, Caledon
2nd LCS (RAdm J A Fergusson): Birmingham (F), Dublin, Melbourne(RAN), Sydney(RAN), Yarmouth
3rd LCS (RAdm A T Hunt): Chatham (F), Southampton, Chester, Birkenhead
6th LCS (RAdm E S Alexander-Sinclair): Cardiff (F), Calypso, Caradoc, Cassandra, Ceres
Destroyer Command
Commodore (Destroyers): Cdre H J Tweedie in light cruiser: Castor
3rd DF leaders: Nimrod, Talisman; destroyers: Maenad, Mameluke, Marvel, Menace, Michael, Munster, Napier, Noble, Nonsuch, Onslaught, Petard; temporarily attached from 4th DF (Devonport): Lawford, Nizam, Norseman, Oracle, Oriana, Orpheus
11th DF leaders: Valorous, Seymour, Kempenfelt; destroyers: Romola, Sarpedon, Tancred, Tenacious, Tormentor, Vancouver, Vanessa, Vanity, Versatile, Viscount, Vittoria, Vivacious, Vortigern, Voyager, Walker, Walrus, Watchman
12th DF leaders: Valhalla, Saumarez; destroyers: Scimitar, Scotsman, Scout, Scythe, Seabear, Sepoy, Simoom, Sirdar, Speedy, Tomahawk, Torch, Trinidad, Tryphon, Vivien, Waterhen, Winchester, Wolsey, Wrestler
13th DF light cruiser: Champion, leaders: Valentine, Valkyrie; destroyers: Vimiera, Vega, Vectis, Violent; Vendetta, Verulam, Wakeful, Westminster; Verdun, Viceroy, Vesper, Venetia; Wolfhound, Ursa, Ursula, Urchin; Umpire, Ulster, Tower, Tristram; Vidette, Winchelsea, Westcott; Windsor, Whitley, Woolston, Walpole, Wessex
14th DF leaders: Vampire, Anzac; destroyers: Medina, Norman, Octavia, Opportune, Orford, Paladin, Patriot, Pellew, Penn, Peregrine, Peyton, Plover, Plucky, Pylades, Relentless, Sabre, Seafire, Seraph, Somme, Sparrowhawk, Splendid, Tactician, Tobago, Tyrant, Velox, Warwick, Whirlwind; due to transfer to 1st DF but temporarily retained by 14th DF: Nonpareil, Observer, Offa, Orestes
15th DF leaders: Parker, Grenville; destroyers: Patrician, Radstock, Raider, Rapid, Ready, Restless, Rigorous, Rob Roy, Rocket, Rosalind, Rowena, Sable, Sabrina, Salmon, Sorceress, Tirade, Trenchant, Undine; temporarily attached from 2nd DF (Buncrana): Marne, Medway, Michael, Mystic, Nicator, Pelican
21st DF (transferring from 6th DF, Dover) leaders: Botha, Douglas, Swift; destroyers: Mansfield, Melpomene, Milne, Miranda, Moorsom, Murray, Nugent, Phoebe
-Harwich Force
5th LCS (RAdm Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt) light cruisers: Curacoa (F), Coventry, Curlew, Concord, Centaur, Conquest, Danae, Dragon
10th DF leaders: Spenser, Shakespeare, Bruce, Montrose; destroyers: Radiant, Redgauntlet, Redoubt, Retriever, Satyr, Sceptre, Sharpshooter, Skate, Skilful, Springbok, Starfish, Stork, Sturgeon, Swallow, Sybille, Sylph, Taurus, Teazer, Tempest, Tetrarch, Thisbe, Thruster, Torrid, Truculent
-Dover Force
6th DF (Dover) leader: Broke; modern destroyers: Manly, Mastiff, Meteor, Morris, Termagant, Trident, Afridi, Amazon, Cossack, Crusader, Viking, Zubian
Minelaying destroyers
20th DF (Immingham) leaders: Abdiel, Gabriel, destroyers: Tarpon, Telemachus, Vanoc, Vanquisher, Venturous, Ferret, Legion, Prince, Sandfly
Submarines operating with the Battle Fleet
12th S/MF: light cruiser: Fearless; submarines: K2, K3, K5, K6, K7, K8, K15
13th S/MF: leader: Ithuriel; K9, K10, K11, K12, K14, K16, K22
- North Sea patrols
8th S/MF (Yarmouth) submarines: H21, H28, H29, H30, V1, V2
9th S/MF (Harwich) submarines: E29, E31, E41, E43, E45, E51, E52, E53, E56, L9, L15, L14, L17, C23, C25
10th S/MF (Tees) submarines: E27, E33, E39, E40, E42, E44, G6, G12, G13, L11, L12, L16
11th S/MF (Blyth) submarines: G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G10, J2, J3, J4, J5, J6, J7
14th S/MF (Blyth) submarines: H8, H11, H12, H14, H15, H22, H23, H24, H25, H26, L8, R1, R2, R9, R12
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