Eagle Guardian: The War of 2010

Not quite! A couple more updates till the kick-off, though in the story we are only a matter of hours away. I'll say no more than that!

To snack on while I'm reading your updates.

Just like if if was popping "Hunt For the Red October" into the DVD player.

Minor quibble: Fort Bragg is located in North Carolina, not Georgia.

Overall I have enjoyed this TL so far. It's a bit of an unique setting for a post-Cold War NATO-Russia war; most such TLs are either set in the near-future or within the past five years, usually with a PoD involving Syria or Ukraine. It's sort of nice to see one with the PoD revolving around the Russo-Georgian war and the color revolutions of the late 2000s - early 2010s. I do wonder how much of a threat Russia will stack up to be at this time, given that IIRC they're right smack-dab in the middle of their military reforms after Georgia (granted their schedules have obviously been pushed forward in light of this most recent crisis, but there's only so much you can do in a limited amount of time).

Brief question: did the 2010 Kyrgyz revolution occur ITTL? I don't recall it being mentioned during the Central Asia update, but my memory might just be shot. An increased Russian military presence in the region might have very well prevented the uprisings of OTL.

Forty–Two

The headquarters of the French DGSE is located in Paris’ 20th Arrondissement, on the western side of the city. It is oft referred to as ‘la piscine’: the swimming pool, after a noted national aquatic centre right nearby. For the past two weeks, the home base of France’s national foreign intelligence service had been guarded soldiers escorting the usual armed policemen. The street outside was closed to vehicle traffic and pedestrian access was restricted. On the afternoon of August 6th, a Russian national got through all of that security and walked up to the main entrance. He could have been carrying a gun or a bomb and would have been undetected in doing so when getting this far. He carried neither though.

Instead, he came here to defect to France.


The surprised internal guards let him into the main lobby – their many weapons were pointed at him – as he was repeatedly asked his name and how he had got here. The only replies from the Russian was to state that he wished to defect to France and to relate two names of DGSE officers he said he knew worked here. He wanted to speak to one, or both, of them. The outrageous external security breach outside would be something that was going to cause a lot of later drama though the dramatics inside were lessened when one of the two employees whose name the Russian had called came down and went with him into a secure side room off the lobby. There would be no gunshots now. The Frenchman knew the Russian. He was a major with the GRU who had been monitored by the DGSE where he acted for Russia’s interests in several African countries, against those of France, and where the French had given him the nickname la brute (the brute). The name wasn’t meant to be flattering and it also adequately described some of his activities on that continent. More than just his time in Africa when committing brutal acts, the Russian was known to the DGSE for his assignment as an accredited diplomat – dealing with cultural affairs supposedly – to the Consulate-General in Strasbourg. He’d behaved himself when in France though was watched by the DGSE’s domestic counterparts due to la brute’s known status as an intelligence operative. From Strasbourg, he’d been expelled from France back in July though along with the majority of Russian diplomats in France (the consulate-generals in Strasbourg and Marseille were both closed while there were enforced drastic personnel cuts at the embassy here in Paris) who were sent home. La brute had left France and been watched go. Now he was back and had got himself here all without being detected. And he was saying he wanted to defect.

Vouched for in terms of identity, the wannabe defector was spoken to mainly by senior people though with the same Frenchman whose name he’d given as a sort of laissez-passer present too. They had questions, many questions to ask of him. Why was he defecting? What did he want in exchange? Was this a defection which he wished to see done now or would be a ‘defector-in-place’ and stay with his organisation while feeding the DGSE information? Where was his family and wasn’t he concerned about their fate? Did he have any information which he considered valuable for France in terms of knowledge or, even better, physical evidence that could be important? Why had he chosen France to defect to? What motivated his desire to do what he was doing knowing the consequences of such an action? They weren’t trying to force him to leave (should he go to, then difficulties might arise) nor turning him away, but a walk-in – the term for a such a person as he appeared to be in the international intelligence world – was always going to bring these types of questions. The DGSE had to be on their guard. He could have been a false defector either aiming for a long-term complicated campaign of disinformation or a sudden one-shot blow to harm the DGSE and France. They tried not to offend him yet did throw this barrage of questions at him because of the danger which he might pose. The room was wired: there was high definition video and audio surveillance upon him. Those talking to him this Friday afternoon were all professionals and several had dealt with walk-in’s before… though usually to embassies or consulates rather than the heavily-guarded DGSE headquarters around which there was supposed to be an impenetrable barrier of armed men!

La brute could have played it coy. He could have dropped dark hints about things he knew and asked for many things before he revealed those. He could have been hostile and evasive. He could have made up extraordinary lies, seeking to confirm the DGSE’s worst fears, while looking for an opening to enrich himself. He did none of that though. He sat in a room with French intelligence officers and warned them of what was coming. France, like other NATO countries was about to be attacked. He had knowledge of attacks to be made against France because he had been smuggled into France to help assist in the preparations for them. He had decided instead that he wished to no longer have anything to do with the GRU, President Putin’s regime, nor even the Rodina anymore.

When were these attacks to take place?

Within hours came the response from la brute: just hours now.


It had been just after four o’clock (Central European Time) when the French-speaking Russian intelligence operative had appeared within the confines of the DGSE headquarters. On a normal Friday at such a time, especially at this time of year, he would have been lucky to have found so many senior people around, especially someone he had personally butted heads with in Francophone Africa. These weren’t normal times though. France’s foreign intelligence agency was, like the majority of the French Armed Forces, on alert due to the incredibility tense stand-off with Russia. Outside of France’s borders, the DGSE had operations underway in terms of traditional intelligence operations as well as those which would be deemed as being of a paramilitary nature. The Division Action was busy abroad and the DGSE even had its own spy ship, the impressive Dupuy de Lôme with all of its antenna array, at sea supporting such activities. France wasn’t about to be caught flat-footed by a war launched by Russia and the DGSE believed that it was in a position to catch wind of such a foolish move by Putin far ahead of time.

It wasn’t believed that the Kremlin was about to launch a war at this time. France’s allies disagreed though the position of the DGSE, which they briefed President Sarkozy on, was that with all the military readiness that NATO had moved to, Russia just wasn’t going to do it. There weren’t yet the signs of impending actions that the DGSE could see. Now, sitting in their headquarters, was a Russian GRU man saying that Russia was ‘just hours’ away from doing that in the face of all the detection in-place that they had to spot an incoming strike against France with far longer lead time… and using their own means too.

The defector downstairs was kept talking. La brute continued to be asked countless questions with tricks tried to catch out any lies. DGSE officers in with him played good cop / bad cop where there was friendliness and hostility both shown. Upstairs, the senior people, including the agency’s director, discussed what he was saying. He was giving information on GRU activities where they had people already on French soil ready to launch armed attacks. His claim to be unsure of the exact time of that incoming attacks, the very moment when they would be launched, concerned those people. That was a problem for them. If his story was true, then he should know that. The interrogators in the room – their superiors were watching this live and in contact with them – were instructed to push for details here. The Russian said that he didn’t know that. His task was logistics and intelligence, not direct planning. Pushed he was, again and again, but he remained steadfast in his denial of not knowing when. He kept saying that it was due to happen soon. He spoke of how he had left and come to Paris at the last possible moment because he had tried to find out exactly when but failed. With an apologetic tone, la brute said that he could not have done any more than he had.

As he kept talking, la brute gave details of several of those incoming attacks against France. He provided much information. This would all need checking out to be confirmed though the Russian kept on saying that France didn’t have the time to do that. He could say that all that he wanted; the senior people at the DGSE weren’t going to have their actions dictated to them by him. France could act faster than he thought and without him stopping them. Several hours passed before word came back to la piscine from the French countryside but it was the confirmation needed. Outside of Avord Airbase, the home station of the French Air Force’s fleet of E-3F Sentry aircraft, there was a farmhouse where well-armed security troops from Avord’s security detachment had quietly moved to surround. There were armed men spotted inside. The scouts sent there – half a dozen men from the Fusiliers Commandos de l’Air platoon at Avord – would need time but more than that, larger numbers to strike, yet they had seen what la brute had said would be there. The base went on full alert and a raid prepared. That was now the business of the military; the DGSE now moved to take their defector more seriously. He wasn’t told about how his information had panned out but pressed for more. The pressure was kept up on him to spill his guts and – no matter how much he protested he didn’t know – reveal when the attack would come.


Sarkozy was in Brussels tonight (it was after ten o’clock before the Avord sighting was made) where several EU heads of state were meeting. The European Union was getting more involved in the NATO-Russia stand-off after for much time recently playing a back seat. This intervention was welcome by some and not welcome by others. Briefed on what was going on, Sarkozy left the Belgian capital. It was night-time and the city was full of security forces: the foreign media had no idea that he left. His hosts and officials with international partners – representing both EU and NATO nations – weren’t told why. He came back to Paris and met with the head of the DGSE and several ministers. This occurred well after midnight and continued into the early hours of August 7th.

Sarkozy wanted more information. He wasn’t alone in that. That information was being sought. Time ticked away. There was a countdown ongoing and few knew the scale, even the existence, of the timetable that the countdown was linked to.

H-Hour was approaching.

However, an event in the North Sea, unrelated to events at la piscine with what la brute had to say, meant that that H-Hour would come earlier for others than it was supposed to be.

Sic transit gloria mundi - Thus passed the glory of the world...

Fantastic update James.

Time is ticking away!
Thank you.

Forty-Three

For nearly a week now, units of the Royal Netherlands Navy had been tracking a freighter ship as it steamed across the North Sea, seemingly en route for the famed Dutch harbour of Rotterdam, a bustling international seaport. The origin of the vessel was unknown to Dutch intelligence. Other agencies such as the CIA and MI6 could offer little information about the ship, except that she had at one time been registered under the flag of Sudan some years prior.

M Squadron, unlike its sister C Squadron, specialised in the counter-terrorism role and had practiced such boarding’s dozens of times. Joining these elite Dutch commandos were four members of Britain’s Special Boat Service, the SBS.

This issue was fast overcome, however. There was a long-standing tradition of friendship between the Dutch Marines and their British equivalents, and under NATO war plans, the majority of the Dutch Marines would find themselves under the command of the UK’s 3 Commando Brigade, which was currently up in Norway alongside its American counterparts. The government in The Hague was also happy to have the diplomatic support gained by the interception being a joint operation.

The assault team, numbering thirty-one commandos including the British troops, moved by helicopter from the mainland to the frigate Tromp, patrolling in the North Sea at a distance. Aboard the ship, the commandos underwent a final briefing and carried out final checks on their weapons and equipment.

They wore black dry-suits to protect them from the icy waters should they end up there; their weapons were short-barrelled versions of the Heckler & Koch 416 assault rifle, with each man also carrying a Sig Saur 9mm pistol for use in a more confined environment; they also wore night-vision goggles attached to their lightweight helmets. Some of the commandos carried shotguns or breaching charges to make their way through locked doors. After spending nearly an hour afloat aboard the Tromp, the Dutch & British commandos were given the final approval to mount an assault on the Ghost Ship.

Though the primary threat was believed to be Russian Special Forces – Spetsnaz – the Dutch also believed that the ship could be nothing to do with the Eastern Europe Crisis at all, but rather a plot by terrorists. They were prepared for any eventuality. The assault team boarded a trio of Royal Netherlands Navy NH-90 helicopters. Due to the small nature of the frigate’s helipad, the helicopters had to land one after the other to pick up their troops. The helicopters made visual contact with the Ghost Ship at quarter to four in the morning, Amsterdam time. Efforts by the Tromp to hail the Ghost Ship had been met with stony silence. As the leading NH-90 approached the ship, a figure aboard the vessel fired upon the chopper with an RPG-29.

The assailant had been hasty in aiming the weapon and the ship was being tossed about by the waves; it was a harrowing moment for those aboard the aircraft, but the flaming projectile missed narrowly as the helicopter pilot banked sharply to the left. Door gunners aboard the three NH-90s returned fire with machineguns, trading rounds with the crew of the ship while the pilots manoeuvred their lumbering beasts into position to disembark the commandos. After a brief exchange of gunfire between the enemy troops and the helicopter door gunners, two of the NH-90s came to a hover at both ends of the storm-tossed vessel.

Commandos began repelling from those two helicopters, while the third chopper provided cover with its machineguns. Men aboard the ship fired on the rappelling Dutch commandos with short-barrelled AK-74s and other small-arms. Two of the Dutchmen were hit, one killed and another wounded, before they reached the ground. The remaining troops leapfrogged expertly into the ship, killing several of their opponents as they advanced. The circling NH-90 returned fire onto the bridge of the ship, killing several people within the tower.

The fire-fight lasted for some thirteen minutes, with the commandos clearing the ship room-by-room and taking heavy casualties. Six Dutchmen and one British commando were killed as the ship was cleared; Ten of their opponents were dead, and six more had been captured by the time the vessel was declared secure. The men captured aboard the ship were clearly Russian speakers.

At that moment, no coercive methods where used against the prisoners. However, before being loaded aboard one of the helicopters, those Russians were informed bluntly that, as they were not in uniform, they could not expect to be offered the protections granted by international laws governing the treatment of Prisoners of War.

While they remained in the custody of the Dutch, the intelligence services of the United States, Great Britain, and France would all want to talk to these individuals. Reports of the incident in the North Sea were sent up the chain of command first to SACEUR in Brussels and them from Admiral Stavridis up to the political leaders of almost all NATO countries as Moscow denied those men aboard the Ghost Ship were Russian commandos, claiming them to be terrorists unaffiliated with Russia.

Thus, the final hours of peace came to an end.

End of Part Two