forcon
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Post by forcon on Feb 7, 2019 21:49:57 GMT
Fantastic writing.
I get the feeling that this is an accurate representation of the cabinet meeting;
This also reminds me of the anti-terror raids back in 2017. Though they were mainly carried out by police firearms teams there were SAS and other personnel who were clearly military (EOD or intelligence corps maybe?) present in support.
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forcon
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Post by forcon on Feb 8, 2019 18:48:14 GMT
Thirty-SevenTurkey was not preparing to go to war with Russia like the rest of NATO was. The country was mobilising because Russia was preparing to go to war with NATO and such a war would likely be fought in part around Turkey’s borders, but the government of President Abdullah Gul was opposed to the Turkish Armed Forces actually taking part in this conflict. Turkey was a country that had a troubled relationship with the rest of NATO, and itself was not technically on the North Atlantic. The relationship between Turkey and the United States had been on a downward spiral since the end of the Cold War, and that had only been made worse by the incident back in May when Israeli commandos had stormed several ships carrying humanitarian supplies to the Gaza Strip, killing several Turkish charity workers in the process; when the United States had indicated its support for Israel with a silence that spoke volumes in Ankara, Turkey had been enraged. A series of as-yet undiscovered ‘active measures’ undertaken by Russia’s SVR only made that worse, causing protests outside the NATO airbase at Incirlik in Turkey.
There were many individuals within the Turkish Armed Forces who resented President Gul’s reluctance to support NATO. Turkey benefited from membership to that alliance as much as she gave. Another factor in causing dissent within the Turkish military was the slide towards Islamism that was taking place, and the breaking apart of secular government. Throughout the end of July, Turkish military officers, led by the Chief of the General Staff, General İlker Başbuğ, began plotting an attempt to remove President Gul and his supporters in Parliament from their positions. Turkey was no stranger to military interventions of this sort, with numerous coups having taken place during the Cold War and even during the 1990s. The government had not been particularly worried about the prospect of a military takeover, however, having viewed such things as part of the past and not likely in the future.
Years earlier, several purges of the officer corps had taken place with potentially mutinous soldiers imprisoned or cashiered. From within the Armed Forces though, dissent was rising as several senior officers moved to oust President Gul from office and ensure the continuation of a secular, non-religious government, the type of government which had ruled Turkey since the end of the Second World War and ensured a stable relationship between Turkey and the United States as well as other NATO allies. Several meetings between Turkish military officers and American liaison personnel had taken place at Incirlik Airbase over the previous couple of days, though there was little information available as to what conversations had transpired during these meetings. On the evening of August 1st, 2010, the Turkish Armed Forces moved to take control of the country and establish their own form of government. It began when Brigadier General Zekai Aksakallı, a senior figure within the Turkish Special Forces community and an officer that was ardently opposed to the coup, was shot dead by commandos of the Turkish Special Forces. Those elite soldiers were dressed in civilian clothes and carried submachine guns, appearing on a pair of motorcycles outside the Turkish Ministry of National Defence in Ankara. They cut down Aksakalli in a storm of automatic gunfire and then sped off into the night away from terrified onlookers. With the killing of Aksakalli, the coup was on. General İlker Başbuğ made radio contact with officers loyal to him in several different areas of the country, using secure networks to do so. F-4 Phantom strike fighters of the Turkish Air Force scrambled to provide air cover for the plotters, taking up positions above Ankara as a no-fly zone was hastily declared. Those warplanes had flown from Eskişehir Airbase, the base commander of which was loyal to General Başbuğ. Troops from the Turkish Land Forces’ IV Corps moved in around Ankara to secure vital areas of the Turkish capital. Troops from 1st Commando Brigade flew in by helicopter, landing at the Ministry of National Defence and gunning down several security guards who tried to resist.
More operators attempted to seize President Gul at his residence on the outskirts of the city; Gul was able to escape, with this being made possible by the rapid efforts of his security staff after they were tipped off by Turkish Air Force major stationed at the Ministry of National Defence. More soldiers, belonging to 28th Mechanized Infantry Brigade and 2nd Commando Brigade, moved in by armoured vehicles and trucks to secure more sites around Ankara. They took the Parliament building and Ankara-Esenboğa International Airport, rapidly seizing control of much of the country’s infrastructure. More soldiers from the II Corps moved to secure bridges over the Bosporus Strait, cutting off Istanbul from the remainder of Turkey. Initially, it appeared as the putsch was going smoothly. It would not be long before things fell apart. President Gul’s security guards took him to Merzifon Airbase, a facility whose commander remained loyal to his government and opposed to the conspiracy. There, he was able to set up a call with Turkish Radio & Television Corporation, sending out the message that he was alive and well at a ‘secure location’. Thousands quickly took to the streets to protest the coup. Soldiers stationed on the Bosporus Bridge fired on civilians, killing twenty-three people, before they themselves came under attack by troops from the Turkish Land Forces’ III Corps, whose commander over in Istanbul was on the fence with regards to who he would support until President Gul’s television address reached his headquarters. His troops went forwards along with local police officers and civilians, forcing the surrender of the troops stationed on the bridge. At Merzifon Airbase, President Gul and loyalist military officers began plotting a counter- coup as the tables rapidly turned with the recapture of the Bosporus. Briefly, it looked as though Turkey would descend into civil war, but this was to be avoided. F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jets took off from Gul’s location, quickly entering the airspace over Ankara and shooting down a trio of the outdated F-4s flown by pro- coup pilots. Moving rapidly across the countryside, troops from the pro-Gul IX Corps, based further east near the Georgian border, launched an operation to retake the Turkish capital city and restore President Gul’s government. They met heavy resistance on the outskirts of the city from 2nd Commando Brigade, with a battle taking place that left forty-five pro- coup troops dead along with sixteen loyalist soldiers and officers. The anti-Gul forces withdrew from the outskirts of the city, harassed by rioting civilians and police officers as they moved, with loyalist civilians trying to block their escape. Members of 1st Commando Brigade, stationed around the Ministry of National Defence and the Parliament building, were overwhelmed by mechanized infantry of the loyalist 25th Mechanized Brigade and forced to lay down their arms. Troops and police stormed the Ministry of National Defence and arrested those personnel who had been involved in the treasonous conspiracy. They were treated brutally, cuffed and thrown to the ground before being repeatedly beaten; a particularly dire future awaited them. The last remaining pro- coup forces were from the IV Corps of the Turkish Land Forces. They withdrew to Ankara-Esenboğa International Airport, where they believed they could mount a strong enough defence to buy time for a second attempt to be made to remove President Gul. This was not to be though; 4th Armored Brigade attacked the putschist’ stronghold, using M-60 main battle tanks and covered by attack helicopters. After only an hour of fighting, the airport was back under the control of loyalist forces, and the coup was put down. President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan were horrified by what had happened. Thorough investigations were ordered immediately after the plot was subdued, and within days, thousands of military officers, intelligence personnel, parliamentarians and academics were arrested for the part they had played in the conspiracy.
Moscow saw an opportunity here to drive Turkey yet further away from NATO. President Gul was requested for a meeting with the Russian ambassador and agreed to such a thing, with the ambassador informing Gul that Russian operatives had proof that the CIA had taken part in the planning of the coup against him. Sure enough, the ambassador offered photographs of meetings between American military officers at Incirlik Airbase and several Turkish officers who were currently in custody following the fighting. Under interrogation, some of those prisoners did talk of meetings involving American personnel which covered the possibility of a coup to bring Turkey back to NATO. The ambassador also presented Gul with a doctored recording of a telephone conversation between General Başbuğ and the American military liaison in Ankara; this piece of evidence was fabricated, but it was a very good fake, and the photographs and confessions already proven to the enraged Gul that this plot against him was the work of the United States, whose motive had been to ensure that Turkey would fight alongside NATO if and when war broke out.
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ricobirch
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Post by ricobirch on Feb 8, 2019 19:22:51 GMT
You guys are spoiling us with the quality & frequency of these updates.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Feb 8, 2019 19:27:54 GMT
You guys are spoiling us with the quality & frequency of these updates. I think if they posted this on other sides it could be a major thread, o wait, it is already a major thread here, keep up the good work guys.
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hussar01
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Post by hussar01 on Feb 8, 2019 20:51:06 GMT
nice twist. A Turkey close to Russia mean Greece is close to the US.
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forcon
Lieutenant Commander
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Post by forcon on Feb 9, 2019 13:52:14 GMT
You guys are spoiling us with the quality & frequency of these updates. I think if they posted this on other sides it could be a major thread, o wait, it is already a major thread here, keep up the good work guys.
Thank you guys! We aim to please. More up tonight.
nice twist. A Turkey close to Russia mean Greece is close to the US.
Thanks, though not nescessarily with Greece getting closer to the US. More of that will be covered in #39.
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James G
Squadron vice admiral
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Post by James G on Feb 9, 2019 19:09:12 GMT
Thirty–Eight
The first several days of August saw the opening of armed attacks occurring in Estonia and Latvia – not in Lithuania though – where Russian separatists struck at the government and authorities there. These were orchestrated by Russia and in fact supported on the ground too by their operatives. The lie told was that these were oppressed locals striking blows for freedom: the reality was that this was all part of the last stage of pre-conflict tension coming from the Kremlin. Failure had come with the overture acts across the rest of Europe yet the schedule remained for everything else. In many ways, these actions undertaken in two of the three Baltic States weren’t that unexpected. The governments in Tallinn and Riga were expecting this to occur though were taken aback by the scale of it all and successes had when they had believed that they were more prepared than they ultimately were to defend against these. NATO’s senior leadership wasn’t surprised either. Such a thing had been anticipated and it was something mentioned three times the week beforehand as soon to occur when Obama was delivered his Presidential Daily Briefing by the US Intelligence Community. The Russians were certain to do this, he was told, to provide them with an excuse to move in to ‘restore order’ and ‘protect ethnic Russians’. They would also see this commence in spite of last month’s obstruction of their preparations when the CIA had seized one of the major weapons suppliers to these groups in that snatch mission in Prague. Once the attacks happened, later than projected, it was apparent that the delay had come from the disruption caused with the Prague operation. What hadn’t been mentioned to Obama, nor what anyone else had thought would happen, was that the Russians would send their own people into the fight and that they too would target NATO forces on the ground as well.
Gun and bomb attacks were made in parts of Estonia and Latvia where there were large minority or even small majority Russian-speaking populations within each country. Claims of responsibility were made by previous unheard-of groups supposed fighting for freedom. A barrage of internal and external propaganda came with this. What was important though was the perceived chaos that could be shown to be occurring in these regions which a-joining or were near to Russia itself. This was an operation undertaken by the FSB, not the GRU or the SVR. Back in Moscow, Bortnikov had pointed to the ‘failures’ made by the two other organisations and wormed his way into getting approval for Russian domestic intelligence agency to strike abroad. This action on what was supposed to be the turf of the others was all about the major internal rivalry between the three – the FSB being the most powerful of them all yet without complete dominance – though sold to the Russian Security Council as a smart move. The FSB had the necessary experience for this and would be acting within communities of Russian speakers just outside Russia’s borders. Moreover, the FSB long had intelligence ties within the two nations, which included ethnic Russians but also native Estonians & Latvians who would betray their own country, to exploit here. Bortnikov had gotten his way and been authorised to see this done. Northern and north-eastern parts of Estonia as well as the central belt of Latvia (from Riga on the Baltic coast following the course of the Daugava through the middle of the country all the way to the Russian border) saw a multitude of deadly attacks. FSB officers directed attacks by local terrorists – or freedom fighters if one chose to believe the propaganda – against the authorities and selected military sites. On a few occasions, the FSB itself used its own men to take a direct role though that was the exception rather than the rule. Where the FSB had its own men used in force, and exclusively too, was when they struck against the NATO military presence which could be found in Latvia. Both the multinational Baltic Mechanised Brigade and also the US Army’s Green Berets were targeted.
Dutch and German troops with the German-led battalion-sized battle group (there were Slovenians there too yet who didn’t come under fire) were shelled with mortars when in their dispersed staging area within the Latvian countryside. Large-calibre projectiles were fired from several directions and were well-aimed. An immediate move by an on-alert reaction force to move out and engage the attackers was cut down by IEDs and then machine gun fire. Some of these men had fought in Afghanistan when part of their country’s commitment to ISAF and faced similar attacks from the Taliban though nothing this deadly and nor from an attacker which fast vanished into the countryside. There were four men dead, fifteen injured and a lot more rather shook up at what they had suddenly faced. Bortnikov had confidently assured his colleagues that afterwards these troops would go out on the rampage using maximum force to hunt down their attackers and that could be exploited: the Germans are on the march like it is 1941 again! Alas, instead it was Latvian soldiers themselves who tried to hunt down those attackers – to no avail – while the NATO soldiers left their encampment for a secondary site. What the FSB had hoped to see where the situation on the ground could be further inflamed wasn’t here. Tactically, they had done very well. It was only politics which failed them.
Hitting the Green Berets with the 10th Special Forces Group (10 SFG) was done the following day. A different FSB team was used here, men who had combat experience of bloody counter-insurgency work in the Caucasus. These men weren’t paramilitaries nor were they soldiers: they were just killers. Aided by local intelligence, they struck at the field base camp for a company of the 10 SFG. Here, the company support elements – the B Team – was located which supported the six A Teams further out aiding Latvian preparations for war. One A Team, ODA0125, was back at the base camp and the FSB weren’t expecting their presence. An attempt at covert entry to kill support personnel and kidnap prisoners for interrogation was detected in the nick of time. A furious fire fight occurred. Both sides lost men who ended up dead and prisoner. Following the Russian pull-out, they took the company XO, an experienced captain, with them (wounded but dragged away) but left two of their own dead men behind. The Americans were left with a live captive – his FSB colleagues thought he was dead – but had three of their people killed. The prisoners that each side had in their custody afterwards weren’t going to face a nice time in custody. Each would be pressed for information. Not knowing that they had left a man alive who could talk, the Russians didn’t hunt for him initially. A few days later, the FSB was tipped off by a local traitor high up in the Latvian Armed Forces but by then it was too late to find their man. As to the Americans, they knew at once that the Russians had one of theirs. They threw everything that they had at finding him. Back in Washington, Obama and Gates were personally briefed on the hunt for the Green Beret held. He and his kidnappers couldn’t be found though. It was understood that all knowledge in his head was being drained from him but nothing could be done to stop that.
Away from the violence seen in the Baltic States, Russian preparations for war commenced. This moved to an advanced stage now. There was a lot of effort to conceal what was going on with camouflage and deception, as well as all of the distractions offered elsewhere, yet it was impossible to hide everything. There was a belief that so much of what was being done was being successfully hidden… but how could Russia be sure that that was the case?
The Russian Navy put its ships to sea. Many submarines were already out, with more following, but the beginning of August saw the four fleets of the Russian Navy start to deploy surface vessels. The Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific Fleets each significantly increased their at-sea presence where coastal screening forces were now joined by larger vessels. Battle groups were formed. These didn’t yet move too far away from the bases from which they had deployed. What they did instead was to concentrate. This couldn’t be hidden from NATO surveillance though the Russians hoped that as the West’s many intelligence-gathering assets focused on the big ships, the majority of the missing submarines wouldn’t be noted as being absent from port. Even if they were, if the deception efforts failed, NATO could hardly be expected to get a track on them this early or maybe never at all. The submarines joined others already at sea and set off towards their designated wartime operational areas. As to the surface fleets which assembled close to Russian shores, these were covered by land-based air power. The Cold War era force of hundreds of missile-carrying bombers had been much reduced though there were still some of those available. Furthermore, both the Baltic Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet had support from tactical aircraft flying from land and these were capable aircraft. To aid in the distraction effort in the Baltic where Russian submarines were moving about in far-shallower waters than they would have liked to have operated in, several flights of these tactical aircraft assigned to the Baltic Fleet (from Russian Naval Aviation yet also Russian Air Force unit on temporary tasking) upped the scale of air operations against NATO warships in the Baltic. NATO had increased its number of vessels and brought many together in tactical formations. Russian Su-24s and Su-27s – Fencers and Flankers – made mock attacks at low-level and swarmed right among the flotillas. They practically dared NATO to open fire on them. Radio messages came from below warning them off while sailors reported being able to read aircraft markings from some of these aircraft due to how close they came. Only when NATO fighters showed up, drawn away from other missions, did the Russians pull away. Other flights undertaken by Flankers, coming from Kaliningrad yet also the St. Petersburg area, made unfriendly interceptions of NATO maritime surveillance aircraft. These were out looking for the submarines that the Russians wanted NATO to stay away from. The high-profile intimidation of surface ships masked the more-important effort to scaring away the unarmed submarine-hunters.
Back on land, the mass of Russian and Belorussian armoured forces were on the borders of the Baltic States and Poland. NATO intelligence summaries of these read like it was the Cold War again with ‘guards tanks divisions’ and ‘guards motor rifle brigades’ aplenty. Russian camouflage measures – the infamous maskirovka – hid some of what was there but nowhere near enough. It was just impossible to do with satellites looking down from space but also reconnaissance aircraft back over the border in NATO airspace which aimed their detection systems eastwards. Games were played by the Russians where they used disinformation in the electronic sphere and also on the ground physically to not allow NATO to get an accurate read on what they had ready. The best thing to do would be for NATO not to know they were there but in the absence of that, they tried their best to confuse their opponents. Reports were filed from subordinates up the chain of command to superiors stating that this was all working and NATO knew nothing true. As was the case elsewhere, the truth was that the Russians couldn’t be sure if this was all working. Regardless, they sill tried hard to achieve their aim.
Among the ongoing maskirovka, specialist Russian and Belorussian forces were busy making their own preparations for when this massed force soon moved forward into battle. Electronic warfare teams were fine-turning their equipment ready to use these in an offensive fashion when the shooting started. There was a belief that a lot of success would come with these in disrupting NATO tactical and strategic communications but also exploiting what could be gained from those not jammed and left active instead by listening in. Air defence and tactical missiles units had mobile equipment like their electronic warfare counterparts. Launchers for SAMs and SSMs would be moving forward behind the combat elements into battle. They would stay on the move while the war was fought. These offensive elements (the SAMs would be used in that role primarily with less emphasis on any form of static defence; the SSMs were pure offensive weapons) of the attacking force waited to turn their weapons loose. Their time to do that was coming.
Soon.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Feb 9, 2019 20:19:40 GMT
Thirty–EightThe first several days of August saw the opening of armed attacks occurring in Estonia and Latvia – not in Lithuania though – where Russian separatists struck at the government and authorities there. These were orchestrated by Russia and in fact supported on the ground too by their operatives. The lie told was that these were oppressed locals striking blows for freedom: the reality was that this was all part of the last stage of pre-conflict tension coming from the Kremlin. Failure had come with the overture acts across the rest of Europe yet the schedule remained for everything else. In many ways, these actions undertaken in two of the three Baltic States weren’t that unexpected. The governments in Tallinn and Riga were expecting this to occur though were taken aback by the scale of it all and successes had when they had believed that they were more prepared than they ultimately were to defend against these. NATO’s senior leadership wasn’t surprised either. Such a thing had been anticipated and it was something mentioned three times the week beforehand as soon to occur when Obama was delivered his Presidential Daily Briefing by the US Intelligence Community. The Russians were certain to do this, he was told, to provide them with an excuse to move in to ‘restore order’ and ‘protect ethnic Russians’. They would also see this commence in spite of last month’s obstruction of their preparations when the CIA had seized one of the major weapons suppliers to these groups in that snatch mission in Prague. Once the attacks happened, later than projected, it was apparent that the delay had come from the disruption caused with the Prague operation. What hadn’t been mentioned to Obama, nor what anyone else had thought would happen, was that the Russians would send their own people into the fight and that they too would target NATO forces on the ground as well. Gun and bomb attacks were made in parts of Estonia and Latvia where there were large minority or even small majority Russian-speaking populations within each country. Claims of responsibility were made by previous unheard-of groups supposed fighting for freedom. A barrage of internal and external propaganda came with this. What was important though was the perceived chaos that could be shown to be occurring in these regions which a-joining or were near to Russia itself. This was an operation undertaken by the FSB, not the GRU or the SVR. Back in Moscow, Bortnikov had pointed to the ‘failures’ made by the two other organisations and wormed his way into getting approval for Russian domestic intelligence agency to strike abroad. This action on what was supposed to be the turf of the others was all about the major internal rivalry between the three – the FSB being the most powerful of them all yet without complete dominance – though sold to the Russian Security Council as a smart move. The FSB had the necessary experience for this and would be acting within communities of Russian speakers just outside Russia’s borders. Moreover, the FSB long had intelligence ties within the two nations, which included ethnic Russians but also native Estonians & Latvians who would betray their own country, to exploit here. Bortnikov had gotten his way and been authorised to see this done. Northern and north-eastern parts of Estonia as well as the central belt of Latvia (from Riga on the Baltic coast following the course of the Daugava through the middle of the country all the way to the Russian border) saw a multitude of deadly attacks. FSB officers directed attacks by local terrorists – or freedom fighters if one chose to believe the propaganda – against the authorities and selected military sites. On a few occasions, the FSB itself used its own men to take a direct role though that was the exception rather than the rule. Where the FSB had its own men used in force, and exclusively too, was when they struck against the NATO military presence which could be found in Latvia. Both the multinational Baltic Mechanised Brigade and also the US Army’s Green Berets were targeted. Dutch and German troops with the German-led battalion-sized battle group (there were Slovenians there too yet who didn’t come under fire) were shelled with mortars when in their dispersed staging area within the Latvian countryside. Large-calibre projectiles were fired from several directions and were well-aimed. An immediate move by an on-alert reaction force to move out and engage the attackers was cut down by IEDs and then machine gun fire. Some of these men had fought in Afghanistan when part of their country’s commitment to ISAF and faced similar attacks from the Taliban though nothing this deadly and nor from an attacker which fast vanished into the countryside. There were four men dead, fifteen injured and a lot more rather shook up at what they had suddenly faced. Bortnikov had confidently assured his colleagues that afterwards these troops would go out on the rampage using maximum force to hunt down their attackers and that could be exploited: the Germans are on the march like it is 1941 again! Alas, instead it was Latvian soldiers themselves who tried to hunt down those attackers – to no avail – while the NATO soldiers left their encampment for a secondary site. What the FSB had hoped to see where the situation on the ground could be further inflamed wasn’t here. Tactically, they had done very well. It was only politics which failed them. Hitting the Green Berets with the 10th Special Forces Group (10 SFG) was done the following day. A different FSB team was used here, men who had combat experience of bloody counter-insurgency work in the Caucasus. These men weren’t paramilitaries nor were they soldiers: they were just killers. Aided by local intelligence, they struck at the field base camp for a company of the 10 SFG. Here, the company support elements – the B Team – was located which supported the six A Teams further out aiding Latvian preparations for war. One A Team, ODA0125, was back at the base camp and the FSB weren’t expecting their presence. An attempt at covert entry to kill support personnel and kidnap prisoners for interrogation was detected in the nick of time. A furious fire fight occurred. Both sides lost men who ended up dead and prisoner. Following the Russian pull-out, they took the company XO, an experienced captain, with them (wounded but dragged away) but left two of their own dead men behind. The Americans were left with a live captive – his FSB colleagues thought he was dead – but had three of their people killed. The prisoners that each side had in their custody afterwards weren’t going to face a nice time in custody. Each would be pressed for information. Not knowing that they had left a man alive who could talk, the Russians didn’t hunt for him initially. A few days later, the FSB was tipped off by a local traitor high up in the Latvian Armed Forces but by then it was too late to find their man. As to the Americans, they knew at once that the Russians had one of theirs. They threw everything that they had at finding him. Back in Washington, Obama and Gates were personally briefed on the hunt for the Green Beret held. He and his kidnappers couldn’t be found though. It was understood that all knowledge in his head was being drained from him but nothing could be done to stop that. Away from the violence seen in the Baltic States, Russian preparations for war commenced. This moved to an advanced stage now. There was a lot of effort to conceal what was going on with camouflage and deception, as well as all of the distractions offered elsewhere, yet it was impossible to hide everything. There was a belief that so much of what was being done was being successfully hidden… but how could Russia be sure that that was the case? The Russian Navy put its ships to sea. Many submarines were already out, with more following, but the beginning of August saw the four fleets of the Russian Navy start to deploy surface vessels. The Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific Fleets each significantly increased their at-sea presence where coastal screening forces were now joined by larger vessels. Battle groups were formed. These didn’t yet move too far away from the bases from which they had deployed. What they did instead was to concentrate. This couldn’t be hidden from NATO surveillance though the Russians hoped that as the West’s many intelligence-gathering assets focused on the big ships, the majority of the missing submarines wouldn’t be noted as being absent from port. Even if they were, if the deception efforts failed, NATO could hardly be expected to get a track on them this early or maybe never at all. The submarines joined others already at sea and set off towards their designated wartime operational areas. As to the surface fleets which assembled close to Russian shores, these were covered by land-based air power. The Cold War era force of hundreds of missile-carrying bombers had been much reduced though there were still some of those available. Furthermore, both the Baltic Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet had support from tactical aircraft flying from land and these were capable aircraft. To aid in the distraction effort in the Baltic where Russian submarines were moving about in far-shallower waters than they would have liked to have operated in, several flights of these tactical aircraft assigned to the Baltic Fleet (from Russian Naval Aviation yet also Russian Air Force unit on temporary tasking) upped the scale of air operations against NATO warships in the Baltic. NATO had increased its number of vessels and brought many together in tactical formations. Russian Su-24s and Su-27s – Fencers and Flankers – made mock attacks at low-level and swarmed right among the flotillas. They practically dared NATO to open fire on them. Radio messages came from below warning them off while sailors reported being able to read aircraft markings from some of these aircraft due to how close they came. Only when NATO fighters showed up, drawn away from other missions, did the Russians pull away. Other flights undertaken by Flankers, coming from Kaliningrad yet also the St. Petersburg area, made unfriendly interceptions of NATO maritime surveillance aircraft. These were out looking for the submarines that the Russians wanted NATO to stay away from. The high-profile intimidation of surface ships masked the more-important effort to scaring away the unarmed submarine-hunters. Back on land, the mass of Russian and Belorussian armoured forces were on the borders of the Baltic States and Poland. NATO intelligence summaries of these read like it was the Cold War again with ‘guards tanks divisions’ and ‘guards motor rifle brigades’ aplenty. Russian camouflage measures – the infamous maskirovka – hid some of what was there but nowhere near enough. It was just impossible to do with satellites looking down from space but also reconnaissance aircraft back over the border in NATO airspace which aimed their detection systems eastwards. Games were played by the Russians where they used disinformation in the electronic sphere and also on the ground physically to not allow NATO to get an accurate read on what they had ready. The best thing to do would be for NATO not to know they were there but in the absence of that, they tried their best to confuse their opponents. Reports were filed from subordinates up the chain of command to superiors stating that this was all working and NATO knew nothing true. As was the case elsewhere, the truth was that the Russians couldn’t be sure if this was all working. Regardless, they sill tried hard to achieve their aim. Among the ongoing maskirovka, specialist Russian and Belorussian forces were busy making their own preparations for when this massed force soon moved forward into battle. Electronic warfare teams were fine-turning their equipment ready to use these in an offensive fashion when the shooting started. There was a belief that a lot of success would come with these in disrupting NATO tactical and strategic communications but also exploiting what could be gained from those not jammed and left active instead by listening in. Air defence and tactical missiles units had mobile equipment like their electronic warfare counterparts. Launchers for SAMs and SSMs would be moving forward behind the combat elements into battle. They would stay on the move while the war was fought. These offensive elements (the SAMs would be used in that role primarily with less emphasis on any form of static defence; the SSMs were pure offensive weapons) of the attacking force waited to turn their weapons loose. Their time to do that was coming. Soon. Great update James G
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forcon
Lieutenant Commander
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Post by forcon on Feb 9, 2019 23:03:26 GMT
I second what Lordroel said. Great update and full if things I didn't expect. Even as a co-writer I never saw stuff like the attack on the Green Berets coming. Well done!
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forcon
Lieutenant Commander
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Post by forcon on Feb 10, 2019 17:17:42 GMT
Thirty-Nine
There were three NATO countries that were specifically and pointedly not mobilising for war in the same capacity as the rest of the Alliance. While NATO forces across the continent had gone on alert and been sent eastwards against the looming threat posed by Russia, the governments of Italy, Greece, and Turkey remained staunchly neutral in the crisis, determined not to get involved in the oncoming conflict. There were a variety of reasons for this across all three nations’, with the principle one being domestic opposition to the idea of a major war in Europe. There had been disagreements with Turkey that were far more blatant, with that country withdrawing its military personnel from NATO assignments following the failed coup d’état against President Gul.
Greece was wracked by financial crisis, and the government of Prime Minister George Papandreou couldn’t face the possibility of being forced to fight a war against Russia, a war in which his own country would be on the frontlines and would almost certainly fall victim to attack from the air or even to an amphibious assault along the coast, opening up the Bosporus for Russian warships to traverse through. Greece was pointedly not deploying its own relatively large military alongside its NATO allies. The threat of attacks directly against Hellenic soil was simply too much for the government to allow, and combined with Greece’s economically ruinous state, Papandreou’s government wasn’t willing to take the country to war. Of course, it didn’t help that Germany had refused to grant Greece an emergency loan earlier in 2010; many would see Greece’s refusal to stand alongside her allies as an act of revenge for the failure of the rest of Europe to come to Greece’s aid financially. Personnel from Russia’s SVR quietly talked with Greek officials throughout those final days of peace, ensuring that Papandreou was aware that a neutral Greece would not face any military action from Russia; neutrality was all that was required to avoid the bombing of Greek cities by Russian warplanes.
Italy faced a rather different form of bullying from Russia’s intelligence services.
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, the head of government of Italy, had always held a fairly warm relationship with President Vladimir Putin. Berlusconi was also scandal-ridden politician with a long and sordid history. There were allegations of corruption and bribery against him when it came to several business projects, and on numerous occasions the Italian Prime Minister had been accused of holding wild sex parties involving prostitutes and illegal narcotics. However, there was little to no evidence of these events that could ever lead to criminal prosecution for Berlusconi himself. However, the SVR new of one particular dirty little secret which would change that fact. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service had been searching for such damning Kompromat against western politicians in general since the end of the Georgia War of 2008, and in the case of Berlusconi they had been more successful than had ever been anticipated.
The SVR had uncovered that the Italian Prime Minister had been involved in the sexual abuse of a child. A teenage Moroccan girl who worked as a prostitute in Italy had been found to have attended a ‘party’ at Berlusconi’s villa, where a bizarre sex ritual had been performed. Sex offenders in general are viewed in a particularly negative light in the prison system and for a man of Berlusconi’s stature, the public humiliation of this all coming to light and the prospect of a lengthy prison sentence was too horrifying a thought to contemplate.
Moscow’s ambassador to Italy, after being briefed by personnel from the SVR, paid a visit to the Italian Prime Minister. After a brief exchange of pleasantries, the two men were left alone and the ambassador got to work. He was himself truly a diplomat and not a spy, but in his tenure as a civil servant he had worked with people from the SVR & GRU and new how to behave when conducting operations such as these. The ambassador told Berlusconi that it was in Italy’s best interest to remain neutral. Berlusconi was shown plans for missile attacks against Milan and Rome, and informed that should any ‘hypothetical’ conflict escalate into nuclear war, Italy would definitely be a target for nuclear annihilation if it joined in the fighting. The ambassador then coyly told Berlusconi what the SVR new about his numerous encounters with the aforementioned Moroccan girl. Moscow’s representative was wonderfully skilful in his hinting towards Berlusconi at his knowledge of the scandal and about the ‘friends’ Moscow could make in the Italian media or the police were this information to fall into the hands of someone outside Berlusconi’s inner circle of entrusted people.
The release of information such as that would ruin Berlusconi’s life. He would face impeachment, imprisonment and public humiliation that would last for the remainder of his life. Again, the ambassador told Berlusconi that it was in Italy’s best interests to remain neutral. No Italian Military forces were mobilised beyond preparatory steps in those last days of peace in Europe. Berlusconi wasn’t going to take Italy to war with Russia, but he did vow that Italy would defend its own airspace and waters from attack. NATO forces weren’t asked to leave Italy and there was confusion at SHAPE as to what this would mean when war did break out and how that would be dealt with.
Italian military officers and spooks committed treason on August 4th.
Their actions were thoroughly illegal but also thoroughly justified. When it had been announced the previous day that the Italian Armed Forces wouldn’t be deploying with their NATO allies, there had been fury amongst senior military personnel. They didn’t want a war, of course, but Italy was obligated by treaty to fight one if and when Russia attacked the Baltic States, and for this commitment to be ignored by Berlusconi was an outrage to them. There would be no military coup like what had taken place in Russia, and no tanks would take to the streets to overthrow the government, but officers in the Italian Armed Forces acted against the law nonetheless in resisting Berlusconi’s orders.
Italy’s military and civilian intelligence organisations began investigating possible links between Berlusconi and the Kremlin; in addition to this, senior military officers assigned to the NATO headquarters began informing their American and British counterparts that it was suspected by Italian intelligence that Berlusconi was colluding with Moscow, be that willingly or through some form of coercion. Contacts were sought in Parliament between senior soldiers and parliamentarians who respected Italy’s NATO obligations as evidence to bring down Berlusconi was sought. It was all being done very discretely with nobody having any desire to be caught and face prosecution themselves, but the Central Intelligence Agency offered all the help it could give in bringing Italy back to the NATO alliance and having that country’s armed forces fight against Russia as war loomed.
Turkey was the third and final NATO country to refuse its obligations. This was because President Gul believed that the CIA had played a part in orchestrating the failed coup attempt that had occured days ago. Roundups of military officers whose involvement was suspected were still ongoing, and from what the SVR was telling their Turkish counterparts it seemed as though the United States had sought to overthrow President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan to put a new, more amiable government into power and ensure that Turkey fought against Russia. President Gul had no intention of bringing his country into a war against Russia, whose intelligence services were performing a very useful role to Turkey by informing them about American operations going on there. Turkey had decided to expel NATO forces from Incirlik Airbase on its soil, marking the effective end of its membership of the alliance. As well as declaring that Turkey would not deploy forces northwards into Europe, President Gul announced that Turkey was closing the Bosporus to any military warships – NATO or otherwise - until further notice. This would prevent NATO warships from entering the Black Sea and engaging Russian forces there, which could prove to be disastrous in a military campaign.
The US Sixth Fleet had been preparing to send more warships into that enclosed area of water to reinforce the NATO shipping already present, but without the ability to do that it was likely that NATO could lose its entire fleet there to Russian land-based airpower and submarine attacks.
There were fierce debates amongst the Sixth Fleet’s headquarters staff. The Sixth Fleet was undoubtedly the NATO formation most affected by the refusal of Turkey, Greece, and Italy to honour their treaty obligations. Vice Admiral Harry Harris, Sixth Fleet commander, was deeply troubled by what was going on. Without access to the Black Sea he couldn’t reinforce his isolated task force there, and with the Italians staying neutral he was missing a good chunk of the land-based air cover as well as a good number of anti-submarine warfare vessels that would otherwise be supporting him. With no other option, Harris ordered the Stennis carrier strike group to head eastwards towards the Bosporus and take up position there, not entering the Strait.
If and when war came, Harris could order his surface forces to go through the Bosporus, if necessary fighting their way through Turkish forces to get there; that situation was not considered likely, but the prospect of Turkish forces resisting NATO entry into the Black Sea was something that Sixth Fleet had to at least contemplate. For now, Sixth Fleet moved to its pre-war positions in the Eastern Mediterranean, ready to strike when the time came.
And it was coming.
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hussar01
Chief petty officer
Posts: 104
Likes: 60
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Post by hussar01 on Feb 10, 2019 18:04:14 GMT
Not to be absurd, but on the off hand Turkey decides to contest the sixth fleet, NATO can actualy deliver Istanbul to Greece? Now that Greece would jump on!
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James G
Squadron vice admiral
Posts: 7,608
Likes: 8,833
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Post by James G on Feb 10, 2019 18:23:22 GMT
Not to be absurd, but on the off hand Turkey decides to contest the sixth fleet, NATO can actualy deliver Istanbul to Greece? Now that Greece would jump on! Greece is only out because it is bust broke and, like Italy, only ditching a fight rather than aligning with Russia. Turkey on the other hand is showing hostile intent. In theory, there is that possibility if Turkey fought nato on this issue. But Turkey would have to be beaten down heavily on its own soil, Greece would have to step up and the West would have to accept territorial annexation over a completely hostile population for this to occur. I can't see it. The stars aren't aligned in that way here.
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Post by lukedalton on Feb 10, 2019 18:27:08 GMT
Great, well Berlusconi little sex adventure's were not really a secret and you don't get to be a genius to do 2 plus 2 (plus his notorious tie with Putin will be under scrutiny and a scandal on his own)...on the other side nobody will want a scandal in this moment or in the immediate future; the more probable outcome will be President Napolitano quietly summon Berlusconi to the Quirinale and pointing the necessity to create a goverment of national unity in this dire moment...and that he need a vacation, a very long vacation quietly pointing out that the cat is out the bag (there will be also an assurance that if he go now there will be no investigation over his behaviour or his contact with the Russian).
Regarding Greece, nice move, really...in May, at least in OTL, the EU give Greece aid for 110 billions of euros so doing nothing is a little lie (there was a serious fear of contamination of the situation at the other nations of South Europe, so i doubt that Germany will put a veto for the EU aid); sure the string attached regarding the austerity were not liked by Athens (as by anyone else) but frankly there were nothing more to do due to the epic failure of the Greece financial system; the only silver line is that Papandreau can use the current crisis to start to clean house an year earlier than OTL maybe lessening the overall effect
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James G
Squadron vice admiral
Posts: 7,608
Likes: 8,833
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Post by James G on Feb 10, 2019 18:35:28 GMT
Great, well Berlusconi little sex adventure's were not really a secret and you don't get to be a genius to do 2 plus 2 (plus his notorious tie with Putin will be under scrutiny and a scandal on his own)...on the other side nobody will want a scandal in this moment or in the immediate future; the more probable outcome will be President Napolitano quietly summon Berlusconi to the Quirinale and pointing the necessity to create a goverment of national unity in this dire moment...and that he need a vacation, a very long vacation quietly pointing out that the cat is out the bag (there will be also an assurance that if he go now there will be no investigation over his behaviour or his contact with the Russian). Regarding Greece, nice move, really...in May, at least in OTL, the EU give Greece aid for 110 billions of euros so doing nothing is a little lie (there was a serious fear of contamination of the situation at the other nations of South Europe, so i doubt that Germany will put a veto for the EU aid); sure the string attached regarding the austerity were not liked by Athens (as by anyone else) but frankly there were nothing more to do due to the epic failure of the Greece financial system; the only silver line is that Papandreau can use the current crisis to start to clean house an year earlier than OTL maybe lessening the overall effect Silvio's neutrality, as Forcon has shown us, looks doomed. As to Greece, the financial crisis has been worse due to the Russian issue with oil and gas delivery disruption hitting the whole of Europe. With hindsight, this probably should have been covered more in the months previously. Greece is in a very bad way and a fight now isn't wanted: the Russian diplomatic play is an easy way out for them and SVR boasts of a stunning coup with ring hallow among those who know the truth.
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Post by lukedalton on Feb 10, 2019 18:37:43 GMT
Not to be absurd, but on the off hand Turkey decides to contest the sixth fleet, NATO can actualy deliver Istanbul to Greece? Now that Greece would jump on! Instanbul no, really that time are gone ; Cyprus on the other hand. Really if Papandreau is really smart and Turkey really piss of the rest of Europe and the USA, the EU and NATO can simply back politically and economically Greece on the Cyrpus disputes (even permit the union of Greece with the republic of Cyprus) and the Aegean dysputes
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