James G
Squadron vice admiral
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Post by James G on Feb 3, 2019 20:47:33 GMT
When the GRU shows the Russian Security Council the war plans are only defensive, the SVR will say where is the other offensive half? The SVR and GRU will duke it out, as they long have done. But, that aside, the GRU has just got a-hold of everything they need to make NATO's time very troublesome and even things out, especially at the beginning of the conflict too.
As to a Russian ORBAT, I shall try to do that tomorrow. That one, like the NATO one, will be sometime before the war though and not showing last-minute additions. I plan to do others - and post them in word documents for downloads - at the moment of the fight and others throughout. Forcon and I have worked on several of them.
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forcon
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Post by forcon on Feb 4, 2019 17:20:17 GMT
Thirty-Three:Since the middle of July when that airliner was blown out of the sky over Kaliningrad, President Obama had found himself undergoing daily briefings from the National Security Council relating to the crisis with Russia. Present in those meetings, which took place in the White House’ below-ground situation room, were the President himself, Secretary of State Clinton & Secretary of Defence Gates, National Security Advisor James Jones, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen. With the notable exception of Emmanuel, those people had been pushing the President to upgrade the Pentagon’s Defence Readiness Condition in light of recent events. The decision to do so was a political one rather than being a strictly military matter, as Mullen would have preferred. In theory, Robert Gates, as Secretary of Defence, could have issued those orders. That was what had been done on 9/11, when Gates’ predecessor was out of touch with President Bush. Now, however, the situation was a lot more complex and there were the political ramifications of taking the US Military to a defensive alert level not reached since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Gates didn’t feel that it was really his place to order a DEFCON increase even as armed conflict with Russia moved from being a possibility to becoming an apparent inevitability. Debates took place about how raising the DEFCON level would look in the media and what Moscow might make of it. Rahm Emmanuel tried repeatedly to persuade Obama to back away from that course of action, believing that not only would it provoke the Russians, but it would also cost Obama the next election. Offering a contrary opinion, Jim Jones, himself a former Marine Corps officer, asked Obama how it would look if Russia did launch a ‘pre-emptive’ war against NATO and American soldiers died because they hadn’t been allowed to prepare for such a thing properly. After several days of heated debates, the hawks won out. On July 29th, the Department of Defence ordered US forces to DEFCON 3. This was not a worldwide measure that would affect the entire US military, but rather the instructions to take a higher state of alert were given to commands that would find themselves in the immediate conflict zone if and when war did break out. Specifically and operationally, this meant that US European Command (EUCOM) would increase to DEFCON 3, along with the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which controlled America’s vast nuclear arsenal. The post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was a joint billet, with the officer holding that command also being in charge of EUCOM. Admiral James Stavridis had been preparing himself mentally for war for several months now. Since mid-2009, even, before Medvedev’s demise in Putin’s coup d’état, NATO’s military leadership had been studying the possibility of Russia launching a war of aggression in the Baltic region in an effort to extract economic concessions from NATO. With the initiating of Operation EAGLE GUARDIAN, NATO forces across Europe were already mobilising, and a herculean effort was underway to lift thousands of American servicemen and women to Europe by sea and by air. Airports in Germany, Holland, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Great Britain were overflowing with thousands of ugly grey jets laden with troops, while on the East Coast of America, a series of convoys were preparing to put to sea carrying the men and equipment of the US Army’s 4th Infantry Division, which was slated to arrive in Rotterdam in about a weeks’ time. The long-expected move to DEFCON 3 allowed Stavridis to take far more appropriate – and also intrusive – force protection measures. He could coordinate these measures through the US Army European Command headquarters at Stuttgart in Germany and through CJTF – East in Krakow. US Military facilities across Europe went into lockdown, with the fear that Russian commandos could otherwise infiltrate the bases undercover. The number of security patrols was doubled with orders being issued that intruders were to be shot dead after a single warning. US Air Force fighter jets based in Europe – there were F-16 Fighting Falcons in Germany & Italy, and F-15 Eagles and Strike Eagles in England – began flying an increasing amount of combat air patrols over the Baltic Sea and over the border between Poland and Belarus, working with the Polish Air Force to do so. Alternate command posts were staffed and airborne command & control aircraft readied for operations. Technically, the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet fell under Stavridis’ command. However, that formidable force effectively acted as a command all of its own, having ships based in Spain and Italy and patrolling out in the Mediterranean Sea. The Sixth Fleet went to DEFCON 3 also when Obama finally issued those orders. The aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) was in the process of moving through the Suez Canal into the Med, having completed a tour supporting ground operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many thousands of sailors, eager to return home, were suddenly told they would instead be going to the Mediterranean in case war broke out with Russia. Aboard the Stennis and her escorts – a cruiser, three destroyers, one frigate, and two attack submarines – crews made numerous practices for what to do in the event of air or submarine attack against them as they steamed northwards out of the Suez and then westwards to link up with vessels of the Spanish & French navies. Like US Army and Air Force facilities in Europe, the Sixth Fleet’s coastal facilities went into similar lockdowns. Heavily-armed military policemen, working alongside local security forces, undertook constant patrols around navy bases and port facilities to ensure that no sabotage could take place throughout those last days of peace. Back home in the United States, Strategic Command moved to DEFCON 3. For Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Command (CINC-STRAT), this would involve some similar measures to the ones being taken in Europe, but also some activities that many would consider to be far more extreme. In his position as CINC-STRAT, US Air Force General Kevin Chilton commanded virtually the entire nuclear arsenal of the United States. Chilton was a vastly experienced officer and a former astronaut who knew his job well. However, it would have been a sobering experience for any man, to suddenly find oneself ordered to prepare for the possibility of fighting an all-out nuclear war, a war where the goal would be to destroy the enemy for a longer period than the enemy could destroy you. Though the Defence Intelligence Agency doubted that Moscow would open a war with the use of nuclear weapons, it was thought of as a realistic possibility that a major war between NATO and Russia would at some point escalate into a nuclear exchange, with that being almost impossible to control and probably leading to the total destruction of all the major world powers. Everyone would do everything in their power to avoid that nightmare scenario, but nevertheless General Chilton was ordered to prepare his forces to destroy Mother Russia in the event that it did. His plans entailed the use of over two thousand nuclear warheads against military bases, industrial centres, and cities, across Russia and it was estimated that it would cost the lives of over fifty million Russians, virtually all of whom would be innocent civilians.
In order to avoid a nuclear war, Chilton reasoned, he had to look as though he could win one. Chilton’s most potent force were the fourteen Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines of the US Navy which fell under his command. Each of these submarines carried on average, 192 nuclear warheads mounted on twenty-four Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Under peacetime readiness levels, there would be at least five of those submarines on patrol around the Atlantic and Pacific, their locations such a closely-guarded secret that even their own crews wouldn’t know it exactly. Any one of the Ohio-class submarines could destroy a nation and inflict millions of casualties. When STRATCOM went up to DEFCON 3, another three such submarines were surged from naval bases in Hawaii, Washington, and Georgia. Other boats would be flushed from their bases as soon as they were ready, but some of the remaining submarines were undergoing repairs or refits, or didn’t have the correct crew assembled and so were unable to take to the seas just yet. Over the last few days of July, though, the US Navy’s component of the nuclear ‘triad’ was prepared to fight and ‘win’ a nuclear war, if necessary by striking first. In addition to the submarines, General Chilton commanded the US Air Force ground-based nuclear missile silos and crews. Roughly three hundred Minuteman-III ICBMs were scattered across the states of Wyoming, North Dakota, and Montana. More vulnerable to a first strike as fixed, non-mobile targets always were, the ICBM crews found themselves ordered to target their missiles towards Russia for the first time since the 1990s, when Presidents’ Clinton and Yeltsin had retargeted their missiles away from cities in each-others homeland. The final component of the nuclear triad was the US Air Force bomber force, which was under the authority of Global Strike Command, itself a subordinate of Strategic Command. The US Air Force had a vast array of firepower when it came to strategic nuclear bombers; there were ancient, but still capable, B-52H heavy bombers, capable of carrying nuclear-tipped cruise missiles or gravity bombs, and also conventional warheads, as well as B-2A ‘Spirit’ stealth bombers which could in theory slip through Russian air defences when the call came for them to do so. The B-1B ‘Lancer’ supersonic bombers of the US Air Force had been modified to prevent them from carrying nuclear warheads under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) a decade earlier. Those nuclear-capable B-52H & B-2A bombers, along with dozens of tankers and support aircraft, were dispersed from their regular airbases in Missouri, Louisiana, and North & South Dakota, and sent to alternate dispersal airfields. The bombers were made ready to scramble into the air at a moment’s notice, flying from a variety of different airfields and civilian airports. If the United States was going to be forced by Moscow’s actions to fight a nuclear war, General Chilton was determined to use his forces to take out as much of Russia’s nuclear arsenal as possible before it could be utilised, thus savings many lives and perhaps even ensuring that the United States could survive as a functioning world power in that doomsday scenario. His actions in preparing STRATCOM for nuclear war were mirrored in Russia as that country prepared itself for war. Russia’s Bear, Blackjack & Backfire bombers were similarly moved to alternate dispersal sites along with their tankers, while Russia’s huge array of mobile ICBMs were sent out from their garrisons with orders to disperse into the wilderness and ride out a potential American first strike; Russia’s Navy was sending its nuclear-missile submarines to see in numbers not seen since the Cold War, with those vessels in many cases detected and shadowed by the US Navy and the Royal Navy. The summer air was thick, absolutely choked with tension. Nerves around the world were frayed as the great powers were being driven towards war – towards World War III.
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James G
Squadron vice admiral
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Post by James G on Feb 4, 2019 18:37:11 GMT
That was very good. You've left me on my edge of the seat waiting to see what happens.
(thankfully I know!)
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Feb 4, 2019 18:54:56 GMT
Thirty-Two:Since the middle of July when that airliner was blown out of the sky over Kaliningrad, President Obama had found himself undergoing daily briefings from the National Security Council relating to the crisis with Russia. Present in those meetings, which took place in the White House’ below-ground situation room, were the President himself, Secretary of State Clinton & Secretary of Defence Gates, National Security Advisor James Jones, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen. With the notable exception of Emmanuel, those people had been pushing the President to upgrade the Pentagon’s Defence Readiness Condition in light of recent events. The decision to do so was a political one rather than being a strictly military matter, as Mullen would have preferred. In theory, Robert Gates, as Secretary of Defence, could have issued those orders. That was what had been done on 9/11, when Gates’ predecessor was out of touch with President Bush. Now, however, the situation was a lot more complex and there were the political ramifications of taking the US Military to a defensive alert level not reached since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Gates didn’t feel that it was really his place to order a DEFCON increase even as armed conflict with Russia moved from being a possibility to becoming an apparent inevitability. Debates took place about how raising the DEFCON level would look in the media and what Moscow might make of it. Rahm Emmanuel tried repeatedly to persuade Obama to back away from that course of action, believing that not only would it provoke the Russians, but it would also cost Obama the next election. Offering a contrary opinion, Jim Jones, himself a former Marine Corps officer, asked Obama how it would look if Russia did launch a ‘pre-emptive’ war against NATO and American soldiers died because they hadn’t been allowed to prepare for such a thing properly. After several days of heated debates, the hawks won out. On July 29th, the Department of Defence ordered US forces to DEFCON 3. This was not a worldwide measure that would affect the entire US military, but rather the instructions to take a higher state of alert were given to commands that would find themselves in the immediate conflict zone if and when war did break out. Specifically and operationally, this meant that US European Command (EUCOM) would increase to DEFCON 3, along with the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which controlled America’s vast nuclear arsenal. The post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was a joint billet, with the officer holding that command also being in charge of EUCOM. Admiral James Stavridis had been preparing himself mentally for war for several months now. Since mid-2009, even, before Medvedev’s demise in Putin’s coup d’état, NATO’s military leadership had been studying the possibility of Russia launching a war of aggression in the Baltic region in an effort to extract economic concessions from NATO. With the initiating of Operation EAGLE GUARDIAN, NATO forces across Europe were already mobilising, and a herculean effort was underway to lift thousands of American servicemen and women to Europe by sea and by air. Airports in Germany, Holland, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Great Britain were overflowing with thousands of ugly grey jets laden with troops, while on the East Coast of America, a series of convoys were preparing to put to sea carrying the men and equipment of the US Army’s 4th Infantry Division, which was slated to arrive in Rotterdam in about a weeks’ time. The long-expected move to DEFCON 3 allowed Stavridis to take far more appropriate – and also intrusive – force protection measures. He could coordinate these measures through the US Army European Command headquarters at Stuttgart in Germany and through CJTF – East in Krakow. US Military facilities across Europe went into lockdown, with the fear that Russian commandos could otherwise infiltrate the bases undercover. The number of security patrols was doubled with orders being issued that intruders were to be shot dead after a single warning. US Air Force fighter jets based in Europe – there were F-16 Fighting Falcons in Germany & Italy, and F-15 Eagles and Strike Eagles in England – began flying an increasing amount of combat air patrols over the Baltic Sea and over the border between Poland and Belarus, working with the Polish Air Force to do so. Alternate command posts were staffed and airborne command & control aircraft readied for operations. Technically, the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet fell under Stavridis’ command. However, that formidable force effectively acted as a command all of its own, having ships based in Spain and Italy and patrolling out in the Mediterranean Sea. The Sixth Fleet went to DEFCON 3 also when Obama finally issued those orders. The aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) was in the process of moving through the Suez Canal into the Med, having completed a tour supporting ground operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many thousands of sailors, eager to return home, were suddenly told they would instead be going to the Mediterranean in case war broke out with Russia. Aboard the Stennis and her escorts – a cruiser, three destroyers, one frigate, and two attack submarines – crews made numerous practices for what to do in the event of air or submarine attack against them as they steamed northwards out of the Suez and then westwards to link up with vessels of the Spanish & French navies. Like US Army and Air Force facilities in Europe, the Sixth Fleet’s coastal facilities went into similar lockdowns. Heavily-armed military policemen, working alongside local security forces, undertook constant patrols around navy bases and port facilities to ensure that no sabotage could take place throughout those last days of peace. Back home in the United States, Strategic Command moved to DEFCON 3. For Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Command (CINC-STRAT), this would involve some similar measures to the ones being taken in Europe, but also some activities that many would consider to be far more extreme. In his position as CINC-STRAT, US Air Force General Kevin Chilton commanded virtually the entire nuclear arsenal of the United States. Chilton was a vastly experienced officer and a former astronaut who knew his job well. However, it would have been a sobering experience for any man, to suddenly find oneself ordered to prepare for the possibility of fighting an all-out nuclear war, a war where the goal would be to destroy the enemy for a longer period than the enemy could destroy you. Though the Defence Intelligence Agency doubted that Moscow would open a war with the use of nuclear weapons, it was thought of as a realistic possibility that a major war between NATO and Russia would at some point escalate into a nuclear exchange, with that being almost impossible to control and probably leading to the total destruction of all the major world powers. Everyone would do everything in their power to avoid that nightmare scenario, but nevertheless General Chilton was ordered to prepare his forces to destroy Mother Russia in the event that it did. His plans entailed the use of over two thousand nuclear warheads against military bases, industrial centres, and cities, across Russia and it was estimated that it would cost the lives of over fifty million Russians, virtually all of whom would be innocent civilians. In order to avoid a nuclear war, Chilton reasoned, he had to look as though he could win one. Chilton’s most potent force were the fourteen Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines of the US Navy which fell under his command. Each of these submarines carried on average, 192 nuclear warheads mounted on twenty-four Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Under peacetime readiness levels, there would be at least five of those submarines on patrol around the Atlantic and Pacific, their locations such a closely-guarded secret that even their own crews wouldn’t know it exactly. Any one of the Ohio-class submarines could destroy a nation and inflict millions of casualties. When STRATCOM went up to DEFCON 3, another three such submarines were surged from naval bases in Hawaii, Washington, and Georgia. Other boats would be flushed from their bases as soon as they were ready, but some of the remaining submarines were undergoing repairs or refits, or didn’t have the correct crew assembled and so were unable to take to the seas just yet. Over the last few days of July, though, the US Navy’s component of the nuclear ‘triad’ was prepared to fight and ‘win’ a nuclear war, if necessary by striking first. In addition to the submarines, General Chilton commanded the US Air Force ground-based nuclear missile silos and crews. Roughly three hundred Minuteman-III ICBMs were scattered across the states of Wyoming, North Dakota, and Montana. More vulnerable to a first strike as fixed, non-mobile targets always were, the ICBM crews found themselves ordered to target their missiles towards Russia for the first time since the 1990s, when Presidents’ Clinton and Yeltsin had retargeted their missiles away from cities in each-others homeland. The final component of the nuclear triad was the US Air Force bomber force, which well under the authority of Global Strike Command, itself a subordinate of Strategic Command. The US Air Force had a vast array of firepower when it came to strategic nuclear bombers; there were ancient, but still capable, B-52H heavy bombers, capable of carrying nuclear-tipped cruise missiles or gravity bombs, and also conventional warheads, as well as B-2A ‘Spirit’ stealth bombers which could in theory slip through Russian air defences when the call came for them to do so. The B-1B ‘Lancer’ supersonic bombers of the US Air Force had been modified to prevent them from carrying nuclear warheads under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) a decade earlier. Those nuclear-capable B-52H & B-2A bombers, along with dozens of tankers and support aircraft, were dispersed from their regular airbases in Missouri, Louisiana, and North & South Dakota, and sent to alternate dispersal airfields. The bombers were made ready to scramble into the air at a moment’s notice, flying from a variety of different airfields and civilian airports. If the United States was going to be forced by Moscow’s actions to fight a nuclear war, General Chilton was determined to use his forces to take out as much of Russia’s nuclear arsenal as possible before it could be utilised, thus savings many lives and perhaps even ensuring that the United States could survive as a functioning world power in that doomsday scenario. His actions in preparing STRATCOM for nuclear war were mirrored in Russia as that country prepared itself for war. Russia’s Bear, Blackjack & Backfire bombers were similarly moved to alternate dispersal sites along with their tankers, while Russia’s huge array of mobile ICBMs were sent out from their garrisons with orders to disperse into the wilderness and ride out a potential American first strike; Russia’s Navy was sending its nuclear-missile submarines to see in numbers not seen since the Cold War, with those vessels in many cases detected and shadowed by the US Navy and the Royal Navy. The summer air was thick, absolutely choked with tension. Nerves around the world were frayed as the great powers were being driven towards war – towards World War III. Another good update forcon |
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James G
Squadron vice admiral
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Post by James G on Feb 4, 2019 19:40:57 GMT
A brigade/divisional-level ORBAT for Russian/Belorussian ground forces forward deployed through the last week of July:
(many forces elsewhere not shown including still-mobilising reservists)
WESTERN OPERATIONAL COMMAND
RUSSIAN SIXTH ARMY
11th Air Assault Brigade – airmobile unit, deployed in the Kola
25th Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed in the Kola
61st Naval Infantry Brigade – deployed in the Kola
200th Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed in the Kola
RUSSIAN ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS
336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade – deployed in Kaliningrad
1ST GUARDS MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – new formation, deployed in Kaliningrad
7th Guards Motor Rifle & 79th Motor Rifle Brigades
98TH GUARDS AIRBORNE DIVISION – deployed in Kaliningrad
217th Guards Airborne & 299th Guards Airborne & 331st Guards Airborne Regiments
RUSSIAN TWENTIETH GUARDS ARMY
138th Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed opposite Estonia
4TH GUARDS TANK DIVISION – deployed opposite Latvia
12th Guards Tank & 13th Guards Tank & 14th Guards Tank & 423rd Guards Motor Rifle Regiments
10TH GUARDS TANK DIVISION – deployed opposite Latvia
6th Guards Motor Rifle & 61st Guards Tank & 62nd Guards Tank & 248th Motor Rifle Regiments
76TH GUARDS AIR ASSAULT DIVISION – deployed opposite Estonia and Latvia
23rd Guards Air Assault & 104th Guards Air Assault & 234th Guards Air Assault Regiments
RUSSIAN TWENTY–SECOND GUARDS ARMY
2ND GUARDS MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – deployed in Belarus
1st Guards Motor Rifle & 1st Guards Tank & 15th Guards Motor Rifle & 283rd Guards Motor Rifle Regiments
3RD MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – deployed in Belarus
100th Tank & 237th Tank & 245th Guards Motor Rifle & 752nd Motor Rifle Regiments
5TH GUARDS TANK DIVISION – recent arrival from Siberia, deployed in Belarus
108th Tank & 140th Guards Tank & 160th Guards Tank & 311th Guards Motor Rifle Regiments
BELARUS ARMY
6th Guards Mechanised Brigade – deployed opposite Poland
11th Guards Mechanised Brigade – deployed opposite Poland
37th Guards Mechanised Brigade – deployed near Minsk
38th Guards Mobile Brigade – airmobile unit, deployed opposite Poland
103rd Guards Mobile Brigade – airmobile unit, deployed opposite Lithuania
120th Guards Mechanised Brigade – deployed opposite Lithuania
RESERVES
27th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed near Bryansk
31st Guards Air Assault Brigade – deployed near Smolensk
345th Guards Airborne Regiment – re-established unit, deployed near St. Petersburg
106TH GUARDS AIRBORNE DIVISION – deployed in the greater Moscow region
51st Guards Airborne & 119th Guards Airborne & 137th Guards Airborne Regiments
RUSSIAN SECOND ARMY
74th Motor Rifle Brigade – recent arrival from Central Russia, deployed near Ryazan
27TH GUARDS MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – recent arrival from Central Russia, deployed near Yaroslavl
81st Guards Motor Rifle & 152nd Tank & 433rd Motor Rifle & 506th Guards Motor Rifle Regiments
85TH MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – recent arrival from Central Russia, deployed near Tambov
59th Motor Rifle & 74th Guards Tank & 228th Motor Rifle & 288th Guards Motor Rifle Regiments
Joint Peacekeeping Command Transnistria
Transnistrian 1st Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed opposite Moldova
Transnistrian 2nd Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed opposite Moldova
Russian 237th Guards Air Assault Regiment – re-established unit, deployed in Transnistria
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Feb 4, 2019 19:42:16 GMT
A brigade/divisional-level ORBAT for Russian/Belorussian ground forces forward deployed through the last week of July: (many forces elsewhere not shown including still-mobilising reservists)
WESTERN OPERATIONAL COMMAND
RUSSIAN SIXTH ARMY11th Air Assault Brigade – airmobile unit, deployed in the Kola25th Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed in the Kola61st Naval Infantry Brigade – deployed in the Kola200th Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed in the KolaRUSSIAN ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS
336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade – deployed in Kaliningrad1ST GUARDS MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – new formation, deployed in Kaliningrad7th Guards Motor Rifle & 79th Motor Rifle Brigades 98TH GUARDS AIRBORNE DIVISION – deployed in Kaliningrad217th Guards Airborne & 299th Guards Airborne & 331st Guards Airborne Regiments RUSSIAN TWENTIETH GUARDS ARMY
138th Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed opposite Estonia4TH GUARDS TANK DIVISION – deployed opposite Latvia12th Guards Tank & 13th Guards Tank & 14th Guards Tank & 423rd Guards Motor Rifle Regiments 10TH GUARDS TANK DIVISION – deployed opposite Latvia6th Guards Motor Rifle & 61st Guards Tank & 62nd Guards Tank & 248th Motor Rifle Regiments 76TH GUARDS AIR ASSAULT DIVISION – deployed opposite Estonia and Latvia23rd Guards Air Assault & 104th Guards Air Assault & 234th Guards Air Assault Regiments RUSSIAN TWENTY–SECOND GUARDS ARMY
2ND GUARDS MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – deployed in Belarus1st Guards Motor Rifle & 1st Guards Tank & 15th Guards Motor Rifle & 283rd Guards Motor Rifle Regiments 3RD MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – deployed in Belarus100th Tank & 237th Tank & 245th Guards Motor Rifle & 752nd Motor Rifle Regiments 5TH GUARDS TANK DIVISION – recent arrival from Siberia, deployed in Belarus108th Tank & 140th Guards Tank & 160th Guards Tank & 311th Guards Motor Rifle Regiments BELARUS ARMY
6th Guards Mechanised Brigade – deployed opposite Poland11th Guards Mechanised Brigade – deployed opposite Poland37th Guards Mechanised Brigade – deployed near Minsk38th Guards Mobile Brigade – airmobile unit, deployed opposite Poland103rd Guards Mobile Brigade – airmobile unit, deployed opposite Lithuania120th Guards Mechanised Brigade – deployed opposite LithuaniaRESERVES27th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed near Bryansk31st Guards Air Assault Brigade – deployed near Smolensk345th Guards Airborne Regiment – re-established unit, deployed near St. Petersburg106TH GUARDS AIRBORNE DIVISION – deployed in the greater Moscow region51st Guards Airborne & 119th Guards Airborne & 137th Guards Airborne Regiments RUSSIAN SECOND ARMY
74th Motor Rifle Brigade – recent arrival from Central Russia, deployed near Ryazan27TH GUARDS MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – recent arrival from Central Russia, deployed near Yaroslavl81st Guards Motor Rifle & 152nd Tank & 433rd Motor Rifle & 506th Guards Motor Rifle Regiments 85TH MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – recent arrival from Central Russia, deployed near Tambov59th Motor Rifle & 74th Guards Tank & 228th Motor Rifle & 288th Guards Motor Rifle Regiments Joint Peacekeeping Command Transnistria
Transnistrian 1st Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed opposite MoldovaTransnistrian 2nd Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed opposite MoldovaRussian 237th Guards Air Assault Regiment – re-established unit, deployed in TransnistriaIs the BELARUS ARMY independent ore integrated and depended on the Russians. |
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James G
Squadron vice admiral
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Post by James G on Feb 4, 2019 19:56:22 GMT
A brigade/divisional-level ORBAT for Russian/Belorussian ground forces forward deployed through the last week of July: (many forces elsewhere not shown including still-mobilising reservists)
WESTERN OPERATIONAL COMMAND
RUSSIAN SIXTH ARMY11th Air Assault Brigade – airmobile unit, deployed in the Kola25th Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed in the Kola61st Naval Infantry Brigade – deployed in the Kola200th Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed in the KolaRUSSIAN ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS
336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade – deployed in Kaliningrad1ST GUARDS MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – new formation, deployed in Kaliningrad7th Guards Motor Rifle & 79th Motor Rifle Brigades 98TH GUARDS AIRBORNE DIVISION – deployed in Kaliningrad217th Guards Airborne & 299th Guards Airborne & 331st Guards Airborne Regiments RUSSIAN TWENTIETH GUARDS ARMY
138th Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed opposite Estonia4TH GUARDS TANK DIVISION – deployed opposite Latvia12th Guards Tank & 13th Guards Tank & 14th Guards Tank & 423rd Guards Motor Rifle Regiments 10TH GUARDS TANK DIVISION – deployed opposite Latvia6th Guards Motor Rifle & 61st Guards Tank & 62nd Guards Tank & 248th Motor Rifle Regiments 76TH GUARDS AIR ASSAULT DIVISION – deployed opposite Estonia and Latvia23rd Guards Air Assault & 104th Guards Air Assault & 234th Guards Air Assault Regiments RUSSIAN TWENTY–SECOND GUARDS ARMY
2ND GUARDS MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – deployed in Belarus1st Guards Motor Rifle & 1st Guards Tank & 15th Guards Motor Rifle & 283rd Guards Motor Rifle Regiments 3RD MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – deployed in Belarus100th Tank & 237th Tank & 245th Guards Motor Rifle & 752nd Motor Rifle Regiments 5TH GUARDS TANK DIVISION – recent arrival from Siberia, deployed in Belarus108th Tank & 140th Guards Tank & 160th Guards Tank & 311th Guards Motor Rifle Regiments BELARUS ARMY
6th Guards Mechanised Brigade – deployed opposite Poland11th Guards Mechanised Brigade – deployed opposite Poland37th Guards Mechanised Brigade – deployed near Minsk38th Guards Mobile Brigade – airmobile unit, deployed opposite Poland103rd Guards Mobile Brigade – airmobile unit, deployed opposite Lithuania120th Guards Mechanised Brigade – deployed opposite LithuaniaRESERVES27th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed near Bryansk31st Guards Air Assault Brigade – deployed near Smolensk345th Guards Airborne Regiment – re-established unit, deployed near St. Petersburg106TH GUARDS AIRBORNE DIVISION – deployed in the greater Moscow region51st Guards Airborne & 119th Guards Airborne & 137th Guards Airborne Regiments RUSSIAN SECOND ARMY
74th Motor Rifle Brigade – recent arrival from Central Russia, deployed near Ryazan27TH GUARDS MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – recent arrival from Central Russia, deployed near Yaroslavl81st Guards Motor Rifle & 152nd Tank & 433rd Motor Rifle & 506th Guards Motor Rifle Regiments 85TH MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION – recent arrival from Central Russia, deployed near Tambov59th Motor Rifle & 74th Guards Tank & 228th Motor Rifle & 288th Guards Motor Rifle Regiments Joint Peacekeeping Command Transnistria
Transnistrian 1st Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed opposite MoldovaTransnistrian 2nd Motor Rifle Brigade – deployed opposite MoldovaRussian 237th Guards Air Assault Regiment – re-established unit, deployed in TransnistriaIs the BELARUS ARMY independent ore integrated and depended on the Russians. A bit of both though more integrated than independent overall. In wartime, they will form a separate corps which will include a few Russian units. Other Belorusian troops will be with the Russians though in one of their armies. At the high command level, a Russian general will give the orders though he will have a Belorusian principle deputy for the sake of politics. Other Belorusian officers who aren't in-place for show purposes will have important transport, supply and security roles as half of the Russian force is in Belarus. |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Feb 4, 2019 19:57:55 GMT
Is the BELARUS ARMY independent ore integrated and depended on the Russians. A bit of both though more integrated than independent overall. In wartime, they will form a separate corps which will include a few Russian units. Other Belorusian troops will be with the Russians though in one of their armies. At the high command level, a Russian general will give the orders though he will have a Belorusian principle deputy for the sake of politics. Other Belorusian officers who aren't in-place for show purposes will have important transport, supply and security roles as half of the Russian force is in Belarus. A, the beginning of the reintegration of Belarus into the Russian Federation. |
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lueck
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Post by lueck on Feb 5, 2019 5:57:08 GMT
James, what is the diffence between a new unit and re-established unit on the orbat list for the Russian military. roughly how much larger could the russian orbat get before they run out of units to commit against the west.
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James G
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Post by James G on Feb 5, 2019 17:34:57 GMT
James, what is the diffence between a new unit and re-established unit on the orbat list for the Russian military. roughly how much larger could the russian orbat get before they run out of units to commit against the west. The difference is that the division has been stood up in recent weeks and really isn't organised in such a way: it is just a command matter. The re-established regiments are tighter organised and function better as a unit. In all honestly, this came straight from my own notes and I should have just had them each listed as 'new'. They could double that. There would be no more airborne/airmobile and naval infantry, plus there aren't top quality units, but there are still many troops elsewhere or coming out of mobilisation tasks from depot stations: the latter being not rubbish but not brilliant either. |
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James G
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Post by James G on Feb 5, 2019 20:11:33 GMT
Thirty–Four
The Russian leadership decided to go to war.
There were many expressed reasons among the members of the Security Council as to why this had to be done but there was only one real reason. The truth was that, bravado aside, they were terrified of the consequences of not doing so.
Fradkov had presented to them the latest ‘highlights’ of the intercepted emails from the America secretary of state. Writing to one of her closest aides who remained back in Washington while she herself was flying to Brussels, Clinton mentioned the DEFCON Three decision and then explained the message which she aimed to present on behalf of her country as NATO foreign ministers assembled in the Belgian capital. Fradkov paraphrased what she said when he told Putin and the others that she was to tell them that the NATO military deployment would stop Russian from launching a war to unite its people behind a wave of patriotic fervour. Thus, within Russia a revolt would occur afterwards and, finally, a colour revolution would be seen. That was one which the West must be prepared to support yet not get caught in doing so. Moreover, coming from the SVR’s Chappaqua Connection, another email sent from her Blackberry while she was en-route, the secretary of state said that should the worse happen – i.e. a complete collapse of order across Russia – the United States, alone if necessary but preferably joined but its NATO allies, should move into Russia to restore order less the country descend into a civil war. Fradkov stated that Clinton was speaking for the Obama Administration here and not just herself. Whether the SVR director lied here was debateable. He certainly embellished and provided an interpretation as he saw things in the long-winded comments, but he wasn’t making this up. This had all been written and intercepted… but it was how he spun it for this audience which mattered. He presented this to his colleagues who had long ‘known’ that this was the American’s intentions. Now he gave the evidence of their aim to topple the Russian leadership and rape Russia afterwards by sending in troops. There was a smile on his face as he told the Security Council this. He had hit the goldmine and waited for the congratulations to come for doing so well. Alas, his news was followed by something else straight away by another member of this ultimate decision-making body that made his secondary. Fate wasn’t being kind to him!
General Shlyakhturov informed the Security Council of the GRU’s success (doing what the SVR had failed to do he didn’t have to say) in getting a-hold of NATO war plans. The SVR objected to what its rival had their hands on in stating that that was only half of what should have been gotten – there must be offensive plans as well as defensive ones, surely? – and expressed concerns over it all being a British deception where they had supplied the GRU was false information. Shlyakhturov stood by his information with the defence minister and the generals stating that they believed that the information as accurate and saying that it was incredibly valuable while offering ‘no opinion’ on whether there was more that could have been stolen from the West here. As with the SVR’s great success with the contents of information gained from the Chappaqua Connection, where the GRU had the Eagle Guardian (and Rookery) war plans, the Security Council was rather underwhelmed in the opinion of Shlyakhturov when he presented these. They asked about other matters, issues where their current concerns were in the form of ongoing NATO military deployments rather than giving him all the congratulations he believed he deserved for masterminding this brilliant operation.
The head of the GRU had one of his senior aides tell these men just what they feared they would hear. NATO was moving many more of their military forces around than what had already been seen deploying into Eastern Europe. The Americans, even with troops tied up in both Afghanistan and Iraq, were preparing to move others (many of those from units resting post-deployment to the middle East or standing up ready to go to that region) in great number: between three and five further US Army divisions, and two more of US Marines as well, had received deployment orders. British, French and other NATO countries with divisions of troops were having those readied too for reinforcement of those already assigned to Eagle Guardian. There were large numbers of NATO combat aircraft deploying into Poland with others, especially American ones including their F-22 Raptors, soon to join them there or if politics allowed into neighbouring countries such as the Czech Republic, Denmark and Germany. Across in southern England, a wing of B-52 bombers was arriving with reports of a second wing to follow. There were four US Navy aircraft carriers at-sea or soon to be within the coming days. The Americans would have one each in the North Atlantic, another in the Pacific, a third in the Med. and a fourth one in the Arabian Sea where (using Pakistani and the Afghan airspace) its jets could threaten Russia from the south. The Royal Navy had cancelled its Exercise Auriga wargames planned for September and also cut other peacetime deployments all to mass as many ships as possible; the French were doing just the same including getting their aircraft carrier with all of its combat aircraft to sea as well. None of these military forces, even if at the moment not on Russia’s borders, could be dismissed as unthreatening. They were all either moving directly towards those frontiers or getting ready to encircle Russia from every available position that NATO – led by the Americans here… as always – could do so.
Discussing these deployments, the Security Council concluded that clearly the West was getting ready for war. The council’s chair spoke on this issue. Gravely, Patrushev affirmed his belief that NATO was soon about to start psychologically preparing its people for war – maybe its government were already – using this ‘defensive’ terminology when their intent was only to attack. The best defence was only always to attack first, wasn’t it? Ivanov agreed with his colleague on this and then there came the others chiming in quickly enough all in support. There was no voice of dissent raised in the unanimous fear. Putin waited until all of the Security Council members had had their say. He asked Patrushev to have the room cleared of only the senior people. That was done with haste. The president then addressed those who remained with him.
War it must be then. Russia was soon to be attacked and the West would ‘find a way’ to do this either by creating another one of their provocations with an aircraft or encouraging more internal disturbances leading to an invasion through hybrid means. This couldn’t be allowed to occur. The only way to stop it, the only way to save the Rodina from this – cough themselves cough – was to strike first. He asked Kozak what allies of Russia would stand with them at this time? The foreign minister stated that the support that they had now from many global nations who were opposed to the will of the West would be maintained in war: America’s many enemies would all actively support Russia. Of Ivanov, Putin enquired as to whether the West was still divided: his prime minister, and trusted colleague, stated that there was much division especially in Europe with the Greek financial crisis but more so a fear of conflict, would keep many smaller but geographically important NATO countries out of the war. Fradkov piped up and explained that that division could be increased with some schemes that the SVR had in development. The president turned to his defence minister and queried whether Operation Slava was still viable. The current war plan for a defensive-offensive war would bring success, Zubkov affirmed. How long before it could be put into action? Ten days came the reply. Ten days was a long time Bortnikov and Patrushev both cautioned: could things be done quicker, could the timetable be accelerated? Zubkov addressed his president rather than the other two when he said the Russian Armed Forces needed ten days. A week, even nine or eight days, just wasn’t long enough. Shoygu gave an important input here where he suggested that these ten days could be spent well. The West could be given distractions during that time to take their eye somewhat off the ball. Putin asked whether the GRU could provide those distractions. With quite the eagerness, ahead of Fradkov whose mouth opened to speak up to offer the SVR to do that instead, Shlyakhturov assured his president that the GRU could do just that. There were some things already planned and only needing a green light to go ahead: these were prepared to hamper a NATO attack on Russia.
Patrushev then closed the meeting of Russia’s leadership. Kozak was sent to Minsk and the others set to their own tasks. Putin’s parting words were to remind them that the next ten days would be those which would ensure that the Rodina could be saved. He pulled Shlyakhturov aside as everyone else parted ways and enquired over these distractions. The president was told what they were and was informed that it was to be the start of something called ‘the overture’. Shlyakhturov said that these were perfect, fool-proof plans with complete security around them and utter deniability. Putin would wait and see if that was the case before believing that yet they were going to go ahead regardless.
In the twenty-four hours after the Security Council decision, a trio of mass-casualty tragic events rocked Europe. Two of them were the work of the GRU; the third was a coincidence and a real accident, not a staged one as the other two were. There were more planned GRU staged incidents which were supposed to occur in the following days.
In the North Sea, a Norwegian oil rig was the scene of a fantastic explosion. This occurred below the water where drilling was underway. The platform was rocked from side-to-side and it was fast unstable. It looked like a build-up of pressure, when there were so many safety measures in-place to if not stop then detect that, had occurred. Following on from this, seemingly related, several fires began and took a-hold of the platform. Evacuation measures began but the fire was so fast and there was another underwater blast. Part of the platform collapsed. It was meant to be strengthened to stop that occurring. There were dozens killed and many more trapped. Norwegian rescue efforts were rapidly under way and they called upon help from European neighbours. There were many trapped workers aboard the oil rig who needed saving from a terrible fate if not pulled away from this scene of chaos.
Down in Germany, there was a collision between a passenger train and a freight train. The former was an Intercity Line-5 train on a link which ran from Berlin to the Ruhr and onwards to Basel; the latter was laden with heavy machinery. The crash of one headfirst into the other, when all safety systems were there to stop them being anywhere near each other and certainly not able to possibly collide, occurred between Hannover and Braunschweig. The railway line ran through an area of woodland known as the Hamelerwald and occurred in the darkness. There were dead and injured all over the place. Emergency services converged upon the crash site from across Germany. As was the case with the Norway oil rig fire, governments were distracted and military assistance was sought (for search and rescue roles) due to these events. Yet, with this train crash being on-land, even in a small forest, there was plenty of evidence left laying around of this so-called accident: more than could be found in the sea off Norway.
Over in Warsaw, one the city’s hotels went up in flames. There were many people trapped who needed rescuing and this big event occurred where there was much media access. Poland’s emergency services reacted fast. Quickly, all evidence pointed to faulty electrical wiring which had recently been marked as hazardous but ignored on cost grounds. The accident here though became suspected to be what the oil rig fire and the train crash were: deliberate acts. In the words of the Polish foreign minister when speaking to his colleagues in Brussels, it was a case of ‘once is bad luck, twice is coincidence but three times is enemy action’. Through no fault of his own, Shlyakhturov’s clever scheme was about to fast unravel. It probably would have quickly even without the hotel fire yet that really didn’t help.
Moscow’s state terrorism was soon going to be exposed for what it was.
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lordbyron
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Post by lordbyron on Feb 6, 2019 18:46:04 GMT
Well, the fuse has been lit now...
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forcon
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Post by forcon on Feb 6, 2019 18:57:20 GMT
Thirty-Five
The remainder of NATO – with the exceptions of Greece, Turkey & Italy - mobilised on August 1st when the actions committed by Russia were fully exposed for the world to see. It hadn’t taken much for Western intelligence services to figure out that the latest series of disasters were deliberate actions that had been carried out on Moscow’s behalf. The scenes that took place in the countryside of northern Germany in those following days were ones of chaos. Thirty-seven people had died in the tragic incident, a direct result of actions undertaken by the GRU at the behest of the Kremlin. Amateur and professional footage of ambulances carrying away the wounded and of investigators scouring the remains of the wreckage were shown across Western television news channels, with this incident in Germany gaining far more attention than the equally tragic destruction of the Norwegian oil rig in the North Sea. . The whole thing had been meant to look like an accident, a misfortunate which would distract Germany away from the ongoing international crisis, but this was not to be. There was no evidence of a signal failure anywhere along the routes taken by either train, nor was there any evidence of human error amongst the train drivers which would have caused the incident. The specifics of how such an incident could have been caused were debatable, but almost immediately after the incident, Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service – similar to the FBI – the BND, began investigating the train crash as a possible terrorist incident. They were soon able to match the faces of several individuals who had been caught by surveillance cameras near the site of the crash to footage taken at Stuttgart International Airport of group of military-aged men entering Germany via a commercial flight from Kiev. Those individuals had been questioned upon their arrival in Germany at customs & immigration, and they stated that they were members of a Ukrainian rock-band arriving to tour Western Europe; their unlikely cover story had worked and they had been granted access to Germany. Members of Germany’s GSG-9 police special operations unit raided a suspected safe-house near Munich where the perpetrators of the assault were believed to have gone to ground. A number of personnel from the BND were also present as the raid took place, but the heavily-armed GSG-9 men went in first, expecting the Russians to put up a fight. As expected, the trio of men inside the house fired back with submachine guns at the assault team, leading to two deaths amongst the German police assaulters. All three of the suspected Russian commandos were killed in the assault, leaving Allied intelligence services with no live prisoners to interrogate. Nonetheless, numerous Russian-made firearms and explosive devices were discovered when the location was searched along with large sums of cash and several false passports that the BND believed to have been issued by Russian intelligence. Russia had been behind the train incident and the lives lost were on the hands of the GRU; this was something that the German security establishment was utterly convinced of and so they felt confident enough to present their evidence to the rest of NATO through Brussels. A number of NATO foreign ministers and secretaries, including US Secretary of State Clinton, were in Brussels, flitting about between NATO’s civilian headquarters and its military counterpart, SHAPE. Their presence was part of a last-ditch effort to bring the world back from the brink of war. Numerous meetings had taken place between representatives from almost all NATO countries along with military and intelligence personnel. The US, Britain, France, Poland and the Baltic States were trying to bring the Germans and the smaller European states to understand that war was now highly likely, in order to get them to mobilise and send their forces eastwards as the larger NATO allies had already started doing. German intelligence officers briefed the remaining members of the alliance on what they knew about the train crash. Back in Berlin, military chiefs of staff were advising Chancellor Merkel and her cabinet on the military steps that could be taken in response; Germany had started a full-scale mobilisation shortly after the train crash, following in the footsteps of Poland, France and the United Kingdom. Soon, German forces would join their allies in large numbers in Poland to reinforce them further, with the first German Army unit to arrive being the 1st Airmobile Brigade, which was rapidly placed under the command of the US Army’s V Corps, stationed along the Polish border with Belarus. Norway, a country which bordered Russia and subsequently had been in the process of mobilising for several days now, also sent a delegation of military and intelligence officers to Brussels to brief NATO’s political representatives on what they had uncovered while investigating the explosion on their North Sea oil rig. Their evidence was somewhat less damning that what the Germans had shown, but it was still highly suspicious, with a patrol aircraft noting the presence of a Russian submarine in the area of the oil rig less than an hour before the devastating explosion, a submarine which could have carried frogmen carrying explosives. The explosives which had caused the eruption in the first place couldn’t be traced back to the GRU, but the fact that bomb residue had been found at all was damning enough, proving that whatever had happened out there had been a deliberate action and not a horribly coincidental accident. As the nation was already mobilising for war, there was little more that could be done by Oslo except for an increase in security patrols around oil rigs as well as around potential strategic targets around Norway. In an controversial measure, the Norwegian security forces also began detaining suspected Russian infiltrators and collaborators, operating under the authority of Cold War-era emergency protocols meant to defend the country from behind-the-lines attacks. The reluctant governments of Spain, Portugal, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, the Czech Republic, and many others, followed suit. There was no more will to resist what was now seen as inevitable; war was coming and it was better to be prepared. This sentiment was echoed in the United Kingdom when the British government had mobilised its Armed Forces several days prior. Already, roads and railways across Central Europe were flooded with military traffic; virtually all German and Polish airports became military supply hubs with thousands of civilian flights being cancelled. As far as the eye could see, military vehicles trundled down every highway heading eastwards, including massive trucks built to carry tanks and armoured vehicles to the battlefield. Adding to the chaos was the suspension of most American civilian flights as the Civil Reserve Air Fleet was called up. Now, tens of thousands of Allied troops from the more reluctant European nations were also en route to Eastern Europe to join General Petraeus’ Combined Joint Task Force – East, which by now was effectively an Army-level formation, as NATO had planned during previous exercises where this scenario had been practiced. Those watching felt that the world was falling apart around them; this was all supposed to have ended when the wall came down. There wasn’t meant to be the threat of nuclear war dangling over their heads, not now in the Twenty-First Century. * NATO FORCES IN EUROPE AFTER MOBILISATION ORDERS ISSUED: US Army 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team – Italy-based unit NATO Forces Norway{On the ground in northern Norway} Norwegian Army Brigade Nord US Marines 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade Royal Marines 3rd Commando Brigade – Dutch marines attached CJTF EASTBaltic States Forward Deployed Forces{On the ground in Estonia}Estonian Land Forces 1st Infantry Brigade Estonian Land Forces 2nd Infantry Brigade (US Army) 2nd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division
{On the ground in Latvia}Latvian Land Forces 1st Infantry Brigade Mixed NATO Multinational Brigade East – UK-led mixed force {On the ground in Lithuania}Lithuanian Land Forces Mechanised Infantry Brigade ‘Iron Wolf’ Counterattack Force{About to depart from the UK} British Army 16th Air Assault Brigade {On the ground in eastern Germany} French & German Armies Franco-German Brigade {On the ground in northern Poland} US Army 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment Polish Army 12TH MECHANISED DIVISION 2nd Mechanised & 7th Coastal Defence [Mechanised] & 12th Mechanised Brigade ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS{UK-led multinational force covering the Polish border with Kaliningrad and in the Suwalki Gap: spread north to south} Polish Army 16TH MECHANISED DIVISION 9th Armoured Cavalry & 15th Mechanised & 20th Mechanised Brigades British Army 1ST ARMOURED DIVISION – German-stationed units reinforced from the UK 7th Armoured & 12th Mechanised & 20th Armoured Brigades French Army 2nd Armored Brigade Polish Army 6th Airborne Brigade US Army 170th Armored Brigade Combat Team US V CORPS{US-led multinational force covering the Polish border with Belarus: spread north to south} Polish Army 11TH ARMOURED CAVALRY DIVISION 10th Armoured Cavalry & 17th Mechanised & 34th Armoured Cavalry Brigades US Army 3RD INFANTRY DIVISION – recent arrivals in Europe 1st Armoured & 2nd Armoured & 3rd Infantry & 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Teams US Army 172nd Armored Brigade Combat Team Polish Army 1ST MECHANISED DIVISION 1st Armoured & 3rd Mechanised & 21st Infantry Brigades German Army 1st Airmobile Brigade GERMAN–DUTCH I CORPS{On the ground in eastern Germany and western Poland} Dutch Army 11th Airmobile & 13th Mechanised Brigade & 43rd Mechanised Brigades German Army 1ST PANZER DIVISION 9th Panzer Brigade & 21st Panzer Brigade German Army 26th Airborne Brigade German Army 10TH PANZER DIVISION 12th Panzer Brigade & 23rd Mountain Brigade (Credit for the ORBAT goes mostly to James not myself) |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Feb 6, 2019 19:13:23 GMT
Thirty-Five GERMAN–DUTCH I CORPS {On the ground in eastern Germany and western Poland} Dutch Army 11th Airmobile & 13th Light Brigade & 43rd Mechanised Brigades One issue here, the 13th Light Brigade should still be called in 2010 the 13th Mechanised Brigade and like the 43rd is still equipped with the Combat Vehicle 90 and also both brigades still are equipped with 60 Leopard 2A6 operated with the 42th Tank battalion (43rd Mechanised Brigade) and the 11th Tank battalion (13th Mechanised Brigade). |
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Post by redrobin65 on Feb 6, 2019 19:40:06 GMT
I wonder if the Russians realize that terrorism and special forces ops against civilians is likely to turn the population of NATO countries against them, making NATO less likely to sue for peace.
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