Brussels Pact / WEU instead of NATO faces down the Soviets in Europe during the Cold War

Well, it is entirely doable for Western Europe as a whole (UK, France, and Benelux alone are never going to cut it), but it requires a few accomplishments to pull it out: a) Western Europe needs to accept a similar level of military expenditure and army size as OTL USA throughout the Cold War b) W Europeans need to pool and optimize their demographic, economic, and military resources, OTL NATO/EU levels of integration are not going to suffice, they need to implement a quasi-federal system with fiscal integration, a common army, and a supranational democratic government. This more or less means ratification of the European Defence Community, the European Political Community, and the European Economic Community in the early-mid '50s, with the latter eventually progressing to full economic integration c) quick, full rearmament of W Germany and Italy and co-opting as many friendly European states in the system as possible, such as trying to persuade the Scandinavian states to join, giving associate status to Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey even if they do not yet entirely fulfill European integration criteria (they can be fully integrated as soon as they democratize and close the socio-economic gap), and accepting division of Austria with integration of W Austria e) building a sufficiently impressive nuclear deterrent (my best guess would be a full nuclear triad with at least 150-200 warheads for each of UK, France, W Germany, Italy, Spain, and the rest) f) Britain needs to let go of Imperial pretensions and nostalgia, and wholeheartedly accept its destiny as part of united Europe. Thankfully, the existential threat of the Soviet behemoth w/o American protection is exactly the kind of overwhelming external stimulus that can easily drive the W Europeans to do all of the above.

Perhaps it was not exactly doable by '45, but even IOTL military and political integration of the 'Inner Six' (France, W Germany, Italy, Benelux) with a common army and a supranational parliamentary government potentially was entirely feasible by the early-mid '50s. The systems - European Defence Community and European Political Community - which envisaged them were seriously discussed and reached the stage of treaty drafting and attempted parliamentary ratification at that time. I am entirely confident the looming Stalinist threat in absence of an American deterrent would be more than enough to drive the EDC/EPC to clear the hurdle of French parliamentary ratification and hence be successful. In these circumstances, even the Gaullists which stood in the way IOTL are going to see the writing on the wall and get along. Besides granting the considerable military and budget optimization benefits of a common army, the EDC/EPC project was set up precisely to circumvent the political issues of a full rearmament of W Germany and Italy relatively soon after WWII. Once the EDC and the EPC are ratified, the military and political 'pillars' of quasi-federal Western European integration would be into place since the mid '50, although the system might obviously need a little more time and effort for complete implementation and optimization. As it concerns economic integration, I concede it might require a little more time and effort than setting up a common army or a supranational government because of the necessary socio-economic harmonization process that can only be rushed that much. Even so, OTL setting up of European economic integration included a lot of unnecessary delays, foot-dragging, and halfway measures which ITTL would in all likelihood be skipped. My tentative best guess assumes the W Europeans would be able and willing to set up a common market by the 50s-60s, a common currency and free movement of capital and people by the 60s-70s, and fiscal integration by the 70s-80s.

I also concede these quasi-federal levels of integration would be entirely feasible for the Inner Six core, but a tad too much (especially in the mid 20th century) for Britain and the rest of Western-aligned Europe. In these circumstances, the natural solution would be a two-tiered system of European integration, with the 'Carolingian' core adopting the quasi-federal level as described above, and Britain, Scandinavia, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey engaging in a looser level, more or less equivalent to the NATO standard of military integration and something between EFTA and OTL EEC/EU levels of political cooperation and economic integration (of course adjusted for period standards). Depending on current levels of democratization, socio-economic development, and political will, certain members of the outer ring may well progress to the inner core levels of integration over time; this is more or less a given for Iberia soon after the fascist regimes fall. I honestly dunno if in these circumstances Canada is going to follow the example of Britain or of the USA, it might go both ways depending on political butterflies. It is also anyone's guess whether in these circumstances Britain and the Scandinavian countries would prefer to cling to the 'outer ring' standard of integration indefinitely or would eventually decide to join the inner core by the 21st century. Given the timetable of establishment of the EDC/EPC system, I do assume the French nuclear project would be entirely subsumed in the Pan-European one pretty much from the beginning, and become an integral part of the common army. The British one would in all likelihood stay distinct (at least as long as Britain does stay in the outer ring) but have the same level of integration with the European one as the US, British, and French deterrents have in OTL NATO (e.g. see nuclear sharing). I tend to assume in these circumstances the evolution of Austria into a neutral united state would most likely falter and the country would instead get divided like Germany, with W Austria inevitably becoming part of the European inner core, or even getting reunified with W Germany).

If you ask my opinion, the beneficial socio-economic effects of accelerated economic integration and the considerable resources spared thanks to complete military integration would at least more or less balance the increased budget expenditure required to ensure adequate defence of Europe in absence of an American committment. So the W Europeans would not probably need to cut down on their socio-economic development or establishment of their welfare systems, although they might get driven to a slightly quicker decolonization process. This would be most feasible in practice as it concerns Southeast Asia, with early disengagement from Indochina, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and the Arab world, since for Africa decolonization was rushed enough as it were and created an horrible mess, acclerating even further would turn the continent into an even worse disaster zone. The only area that would likely represent an important exception is Algeria; France and by extension the quasi-federal EU may well cling to it as much as OTL for the usual reasons. This would likely cause the deployment and engagement of the EDC army in the Algeria War. Moreover, with a stronger Anglo-European military thanks to these developments and America being less engaged because of isolationism, the Western European powers may well take a more belligerant stance during the Suez Crisis if Nasser follows the same path as OTL. This might well mean the Anglo-European expeditionary corps crushing the Egyptian army on the battlefield and toppling the Nasserist regime in cooperation with the Israelis, or it might mean a military confrontation with the USSR in a loose equivalent of the Cuban Missile Crisis depending on the levels of belligerance of the Soviet leaders and how much they are distracted at the time by unrest in Eastern Europe.

The scenario does assume the USA returns to their isolationist stance about European affairs after WWII, but even by pre-war standards the Americans were much more interventionist as a rule about protection of their interests in the Western Hemisphere and the Far East. ITTL they do disengage from Europe and let the W Europeans deal with their own business, but would this mean they also disengage from Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, etc? Doubtful if one looks at pre-WWII standards of American committment in the Pacific region. And what are they going to do about the Middle East, where they had started getting seriously involved before and during WWII and would have compelling strategic and economic interests at least since the mid 20th century because of the oil issue? It is going to be a very different world whether the Americans just pull out from Europe and let the W Europeans contain the USSR by themselves in that theater, but stay engaged in East Asia and the Middle East, or they pull back into the Western Hemisphere and let Europe and/or pro-Western local proxies contain the Sino-Soviets or else the Reds get a free rein to destabilize and rampage. Personally I find the former alternative more likely, the Americans pull out of Europe but stay engaged more or less as OTL in East Asia and the Middle East, so that the USA, the EU, and the UK at least informally share the job of containing the Soviets in the Middle East.

Full agreement here. I may only point out that unlike OTL where the USA and the UK saw the French nuclear project as a troublesome Gaullist vanity and stayed apart, forcing France to wage the program more or less alone, ITTL the Americans and the British are very likely to see the strategic necessity of an European nuclear deterrent and share data with the EDC. Even with the disruption caused by nazifascism and WWII, the W Europeans had excellent nuclear physics expertise (re. the establishment and development of CERN), so with the combo of Pan-European pooling of resources and data sharing with the USA and the UK, we may well see successful EDC/EU nuclear tests as soon as the late 50s, and thermonuclear ones by the early 60s.  

This is an accurate assessment of the worst-case scenario, although in practice it would not be so likely unless the USA is somehow drastically war-weary or its leadership is extremely incompetent and/or seriously blinded by hardcore isolationist ideology or pro-Soviet prejudice.


Well, on second thoughts the level of economic integration the inner core would require from the outer bloc if they are to share any kind of free-trade relationship and a military alliance would likely vary between OTL EFTA (especially in the initial stages) and OTL no-eurozone EU (especially in the late stages). The sum of the two is never going to be 'just' a mere free-trade area for long, however. At the very least, the leaders of the European integration project would absolutely require a serious committment to the common-market system for their own turf pretty much since the beginning of the whole enterprise, and increasingly from their neighbor allies/associates as time goes on, with all the centralization this entails. If OTL is anything to go by, the EFTA-like outer bloc is inevitably going to feel the attraction of the federalizing inner core in the long term and either be absorbed into it or be pulled into a satellite position, esp. once Western Europe starts to experience widespread prosperity and Britain loses the Empire and suffers serious decline.

The PoD is too late for the moribund British Empire to evolve into anything more than a useless mini-UN, India is going its own way, the Dominions are being inexorably dragged in the American sphere (US military disengagement from Europe won't make any real difference for that), and without them the EFTA bloc simply lacks the weight to deal with the European core as an equal in the long term. This process would be even more likely ITTL since a more distant USA that is mostly focused on its Asian and Middle Eastern interests would be less available as an alternative for the outer bloc (and in the end, it would just exchange a satellite relationship with the Euro core with one with the USA). Successful quasi-federal military and political integration of the European core would also create greater, not lesser, incentive and pressure for the area to progress towards equivalent levels of cooperation in the economic field over time, and for its allies/associates to conform to common-market standards.


I concur success of the European bloc in these circumstances would critically require US support until ca. 1950 and the Marshall Plan, although this would not so difficult to achieve in practice even with an America eager to bring its forces home, provided the guys in Washington are barely aware of the huge economic and strategic benefits a Western Europe free from Soviet domination would ensure. I also agree (and stated myself) that even for the 'Carolingian' core area, the economic pillar of the integration project would start in the 50s at the common-market level and take several decades to progress to modern eurozone levels and beyond to fiscal integration. Unlike the military and political pillars, which may take just a few years, a decade or so at most, to be implemented, effective economic integration requires a gradual socio-economic harmonization process that cannot be rushed or compressed overmuch. In near-optimal conditions, it would at least take a generation or so. Having said that, the same process IOTL suffered a lot of unnecessary delays and foot-dragging which doubled the time required and TTL circumstances would likely minimize. IOTL, economic integration was more or less the forerunner of the whole project after the failure of the EDC/EPC. ITTL, it would be the round-up aspect, with successful military and political integration creating massive pressure for completion. Think of the vast momentum existence of a common military budget would exercise for wider economic integration, or the huge positive effects existence of a supranational parliamentary government and a common army with millions of young Europeans getting drafted into it would have on the development of a Pan-European identity and political consciousness.

Of course, this essentially concerns the inner core area, i.e. the six founding nations and (after democratization) Iberia. The outer bloc of Britain, Ireland, Scandinavia, etc. may well cling to an EFTA and NATO standard of integration for the foreseeable future if it truly deems sovreignty concerns paramount, albeit at the price of being gradually pulled into a satellite position, not by anyone's malice but by impersonal economic, strategic, and political trends.

Well, I would not really describe the relationship between OTL EFTA countries such as Norway or Switzerland and the EU as a 'master/servant' relationship with implied Euro tyrannical maliciousness. Rather it is a sensible compromise between the wish of these countries to have unrestricted free trade with the EU, the legitimate and reasonable decision of the EU to protect the integrity of its system and fairness for its members by refusing to concede such free trade without compliance to its common market system, and the choice of these countries of not getting fully engaged in the EU out of sovreignty concerns even at the price of not getting a vote at the table where such common market rules are set up. More or less the same terms would likely apply ITTL between the quasi-federal EU and the EFTA countries as long as the negotiation power gap of the two sides remains the same or worse. Notably, TTL federalization would in all likelihood considerably increase the power gap in the EU's favor by improving its political cohesion, adding the weight of foreign-policy and military integration, ironing out the current wrinkles of incomplete economic integration by progressing to the fiscal level, and overall establishing the EU as the second Western superpower alongside the USA.

I also object to the implied description of the EU, either OTL or TTL, as a tool of Germany to achieve long-sought dominion of the continent under a new guise. If one looks to the well-documented history of EU functioning, it is clear that (W) Germany has always been one of the leading partners for obvious reasons, but they just as always have shared the leadership with France, and other important members such as Italy, Spain, and to a lesser degree the Visegrad bloc have had almost as much influence. In the time it was a member and cared to engage in the system in good faith instead of trying to game it from within or heading to the door in a hissy fit, Britain too has had as much influence as the other bigwigs. As it concerns TTL, there is nothing to suggest early evolution of the EU towards a quasi-federal path because of the Soviet existential challenge would change the demographic, economic, and geopolitical hard facts that made it a mutipolar affair. If anything, early evolution towards federalization would accelerate the parallel rise, which is noticeable even OTL (ironically also including the Euroskeptic far-right nationalists), of a Pan-European political spectrum of parties, movements, lobbies, and power blocs that largely organize and work according to prevalent ideological or factional agendas rather than national differences. Over time, it shall be less and less French vs. Germans vs. Italians and more and more socialists vs. christian democrats or conservatives vs. liberals. Or for that matter, the professional military vs. the pacifists, the unions vs. big business, or the farmers vs. the environmentalists.

As it concerns TTL Germany, it is hard to tell what could realistically improve its power within Europe that much, in comparison to OTL. Sure, there is a good chance TTL Austria would get divided instead of becoming a united neutral state and W Austria be reunified with W Germany instead of joining the EU as a small member state, but that would make a significant but not overwhelming difference in the Germans' favor. The main difference would be in the military field by closing the strategic gap between W Germany and Italy. I am not sure if TTL circumstances would likely cause an accelerated decay of the Communist bloc (and hence liberation of E Germany) or the timetable would turn out much like OTL. Depending on how the EU with its EFTA/NATO allies and the USA agree to share the global job of containing the Reds, it might be the European bloc simply replaces OTL US committment in Europe and the Americans redirect the spared resources into domestic development. Alternatively, the USA might use what they spare in Europe to improve defence of the Western bloc elsewhere, and the federalizing EDC/EU evolves into a second Western superpower backed by the UK that is militarily powerful in its own turf as OTL NATO. This would considerably increase the economic strain of rearmament for the Soviet bloc to compete with two more efficient and advanced superpowers instead of one, and likely accelerate the decay and collapse of the Communist system.

As it concerns the role of the EFTA ITTL, I gladly concede that if the Dominions decide to keep a privileged trade relationship with the UK instead of with the USA as they did IOTL, and by extension this causes them to be tied to the EFTA bloc through the British bridge, this may give the EFTA the geopolitical and economic weight it would need to negotiate its trade relationship with the EU on equal terms, survive, and thrive as its own bloc within the Western world. I am just skeptical it would happen, if you ask my opinion the ship for that kind of evolution of the British Empire had more or less sailed in the interwar period, and definitely disappeared beyond the horizon if WWII ends like it did. After the war, the Dominions were more or less already bolted to America's side in economic and strategic terms, declining Britain would not be able to grant them a fraction of the benefits close ties with the USA gave them, geography just made the disparity more compelling, and fading Imperial loyalty would not make them vote against their evident self-interest if the Americans stay reasonable. Early US military disengagement from Europe, provided it happens in terms that still allow W Europe to thrive, won't make a significant difference for the Dominions about this.

A preferential trade relationship with the Commonwealth as an alternative to European integration to keep British economy thriving, or worse Britain's ability to negotiate its relationship with Europe on Britain's terms, to get optimal free trade with financial hub privileges and keep total national sovreignty and control of its borders because something something British exceptionalism, has always been an Brexiteer pipedream for post-WWII Britain, be it in 1973-75 or in 2016-18. A preferential trade relationship with the USA would of course work, but at the obvious price of becoming a subordinate of the American giant. And without a viable alternative, history is more or less bound to repeat itself for TTL EFTA, since Britain, Ireland, Switzerland, and the Nordic countries alone did not have the critical mass by themselves to make the bloc competitive in the long term, invert Britain's postwar economic decline, or help Eastern Europe deal with its post-Communist issues, especially not in comparison to the stable, prosperous, powerful, and non-oppressive EU next door. Historically, the EU did absolutely nothing to coerce or pressure the British, Irish, Nordics, or Eastern Europeans to join it. It was those nations that formed a lively queue at its door and aggressively lobbied to be admitted, even when the established members had serious qualms about their admission. The British politicians of the 1960s and 1970s made an informed decision to drop the EFTA which was not working adequately to reverse their nation's decline and bang at the EU's door for good reasons. One might argue if in hindsight it was the best decision given how the Euro-British marriage turned out, but that would be a complex issue to analyze perhaps best fit for another discussion. Perhaps ITTL these peoples shall make themselves content with the deal of OTL Norway and Switzerland, or perhaps they shall make an informed democratic choice after an adequate national debate to merge their destinies forever with a united Europe, with no self-delusion being possible about joining a free-trade association instead of a confederation evolving into federation.

In the case the EFTA-cum-Dominions Anglo-Norse bloc does become an established, thriving reality within the Western bloc alongside the USA, quasi-federal 'Carolingian' EU, and the East Asian nations, I am not entirely sure, once Communism falls, if the Eastern European nations would prefer to join the EU or the EFTA. On one hand, membership in the EFTA would allow them to keep their full national sovreignty, something they'd care a lot about after the bad experience of being Soviet thralls. On the other hand, joining the federal EU would grant them better benefits in terms of political stabilization to the liberal-democratic standard, subsidies for transition to the capitalist system and socio-economic development, and military protection from a resurgent, aggressive Russia, something they seemed to care as much if not more about. OTL historical record is kind of ambigous about this, so ITTL it might go both ways. But I suspect practical benefits would most likely trump nationalism in this case, since in the end the Eastern Europeans seem to be in favor of being within the system, reap its benefits, and try to make it work to their preferences rather than heading for the door.

As it concerns TTL management of military affairs between the EDC/EU, the UK, and other EFTA countries within the European NATO, I assume the federalizing EDC/EU shall rise to replace the OTL leading role of the USA within the alliance, and not much else would change in practice. The UK shall likely develop the same kind of strategic 'special partnership' it had IOTL with America, and be an important and respected voice to be heard, but still ultimately a subordinate one when the chips are called. Nothing really important would change apart from this leadership switch for Greece, Turkey, and the Nordic NATO members. Spain and Portugal shall stay NATO/EFTA members as long as they have authoritarian regimes, then swiftly join the federal EU soon after they democratize. I have my own serious doubts Canada would care to join an European alliance out of an Anglosphere bond if neither the USA nor Australia and NZ are in it. Ironically, if it happens, it may well be a way for America and the other developed Western nations to be pulled back in, and for the European NATO to evolve into a global alliance of the Western world with the EU, the UK, the USA, the Dominions, Japan, and South Korea. Ireland and Switzerland shall in all likelihood stay neutral. So might well Sweden, although if early disengagement of America causes the USSR to act more aggressively in the Baltic, there is a non-trivial chance Sweden may decide to join Euro-NATO instead, or alternatively build its own nuclear deterrent. Austria might go like OTL or perhaps more likely be divided during the Cold War. In the latter case the W Austria would most likely get reunified with W Germany, and after the fall of Communism E Germany and E Austria would follow.

Just like OTL, the Eastern European nations shall make a very eager queue to join the Western bloc and its signature organizations the moment the Wall comes down. The federalizing EDC/EU shall build its Pan-European army, which shall grow in power, efficiency, and stature to match the US one, especially within its own turf, even if it may or may not have the same exact global force projection capability. On the other hand, TTL US army might well be not as geared for global projection as OTL. The Euro military shall include a sizable nuclear deterrent with a full nuclear triad. The UK army shall have its own nuclear deterrent, same as OTL, and a similar level of integration with the Euro one as OTL. I dunno if they would care to keep a force permanently deployed in Europe if the Americans pull out. I assume Yugoslavia is still going to break apart, although a stronger united Europe next door may well make the division less troublesome, and beat down bloodthirsty Serbian nationalists if they rise their ugly heads. Likewise, a stronger united Europe next door may well be enough to snuff out Russian ambitions to mess with the national integrity and freedom to manage its own foreign policy of Ukraine.

Hmm, I sense the discussion is coming close in certain areas to an Eurofederalist vs. Euroskeptic ideological debate on the merits of European integration that given the widely opposite and dearly held beliefs of the two sides and abundant previous similar experiences not going well would almost surely end non-constructively. So I suggest to agree to disagree on anything touching the issue. I would only kindly ask the counterpart to tone down the gratuitous use of terms implying a tyrannical and oppressive nature of the EU, or any other political entity more centralized politically than small nation states for that matter, notwithstanding their actual committment to liberal democracy.



And I stated this depends a lot on TTL time schedule of Communism's collapse. As I see it, it might be largely the same as OTL, give or take a half-decade, or be significantly changed, depending on whether TTL circumstances (quasi-federal Western European EU with advanced political, military, and eventually economic integration, no US military deployment in Europe but likely still extensive US engagement in the Middle East and East Asia) end up creating a substantially different economic burden for the USSR to sustain competition with the Western bloc or things largely stay the same. It might go both ways. If things do not change much, also absorption of E Germany and its effects on the weight of Germany within the EU would not change much from OTL, apart from the possible absence of the British Isles and Scandinavia. The latter admittedly would represent a significant dominance but IMO the Soviet bloc would collapse late enough that federalization of the EU would be a long-established and wholly done fact, so admission of E Germany would destabilize its inner functioning overmuch. In all likelihood, the main effects would be a) the other areas of the EU bargaining for economic concessions in other area, such as a less restrictive monetary policy or more Investments for economically-disadvantaged areas b) the rest of the EU sponsoring the admission of other European countries (the obvious candidates would be the Eastern European nations). Otherwise, the only realistically possible TTL gain for Cold War W Germany in comparison to OTL would be the failue of Austria's restoration of independence as a neutral united state, it division on the template of Germany and Korea, and a union of W Austria and W Germany. The W Austrian territories are small enough in demographic and economic terms I doubt they would make that substantial a difference in Germany's favor. E Austria would be subsumed in a larger German reunification when Communism falls but the above circumstances would apply.We might discuss what would be the scenario in case the Soviet bloc collapses on different schedule but we need of kind to agree which one would likely be.



Even in the case TTL federal EU gets limited in size to the its W European minimum core (founding members plus Iberia and Austria) with the possible/likely addition of at least a sizable portion of Eastern Europe, I would argue it would still have more than enough economic, military, and soft power weight in global terms to qualify for the same league as the USA or the USSR. One area where it may well fall short is by having a lesser global force projection capability than the American one, but in all likelihood still more or less the same as the Soviet one, since its military would in all likelihood geared up for regional/continental supremacy in the European, Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, and African theaters. Not very different from its Soviet opponent. For that matter, TTL America may well turn out to have less FPC than OTL if its military is not built-up for quick, massive redeployment in Europe. Still, it seems misleading to call TTL EU a 'regional' power as this term gets typically used to describe entities of much lessened importance. I think it would be more appropriate to describe it as potential/quasi-superpower with limited global force projection capability. As it concerns its nuclear deterrent, if Europe does not get protected by the American one, and needs to build its own to stand up to the USSR, I think it would be at the very least a multiple of the British/French one to account for the pooled resources of W Europe (more or less, add to the French deterrent an equal amount for each of (W) Germany, Italy, Iberia, and Benelux). Not exactly as big as the US or Soviet one, not so small as the other OTL nuclear powers. 



Geography and OTL trade patterns make me very skeptical that in post-WWII circumstances the White Dominions were anything close to being 'more natural trading partners of Britain and parts of the European continent' than of the USA. Since WWII Canada seemed quite eager to bind itself tightly to the USA for integrated continental defence so I'm driven to think it joined OTL NATO much more because the USA did than because the UK did and regional geopolitical bonds were steadily replacing Imperial/Commonwealth ones in importance to determine the alignment of the Dominions after WWII. Otherwise, Australia and NZ would have joined NATO as well, instead of forming a separate defence pact with America. This leaves me skeptical Canada would be that interested in joining an otherwise purely European NATO if neither the USA nor the other two Dominions do. My expectation is in the end we get two regional defence pacts, the W European NATO (quite possibly with a different name) and a North American/Pacific-oriented alliance of the USA, Canada, and ANZUS, quite possibly with the later addition of Japan, S Korea, and least part of the other Asian tigers. Trade blocs would naturally tend to form according to the same trends, even if irreconciliable disagreements about the desired levels of integration may well get the European one to split in a subdivision between the federalizing W European EU and the looser Anglo-Norse EFTA. I concede Australia and NZ still had significant trade bonds with Britain by the time the latter joined the EU, although they were steadily getting displaced in importance by the ones with the USA as it had previously happened for Canada.



It does not seem any realistic for TTL federalizing EU to be any smaller than its well-established OTL geopolitical core, that is France, Benelux, (W) Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal (after their return to democracy of course), and Austria (after its liberation from Soviet influence of course). Anything less is Euroskeptic wishful thinking, since these nations IOTL have shown such a strong and enduring committment to the European integration project during the 20th century and/or have so strong a bond with neighbor nations that have a solid Europhile alignment, that the alternative appears simply unfeasible and outlandish. Spain and Portugal headed for EU membership pretty much the moment they achieved democracy without any sign of Euroskeptic hesitation, their historical record have been one of the most Europhile in the continent, and their economic, cultural, and (geo)political bonds were with the rest of continental Western Europe much more than with the Anglo-Celtic-Norse area that made up the core of EFTA. Portugal's pre-democratization EFTA membership was an accident of its authoritarian regime preventing admission in the EU and a fading legacy of Anglo-Portuguese ties that stopped having any importance with Britain's post-WWII decline. In this regard, it is much more geopolitically likely France and Italy pull Spain in the EU and Spain pulls Portugal, just like Germany and Italy do for Austria, than Portugal pulls Spain or Switzerland pulls Austria in the EFTA. Simply put, Spain's, Portugal's, and Austria's prevalent ties naturally pull them much more closer to their EU neighbors, and by extension W Europe as a whole, than to the peripheral and marginal EFTA bloc, and these nations do not seem to have the kind of Euroskeptic record that would drive them to go out of their way in the opposite direction. For that matter, ITTL early Cold war circumstances may well cause the kind of bloc polarization that would lead Austria to be divided like Germany and Korea, which would inevitably cause W Austria to join the EU or W Germany.

Britain, Ireland, and the Nordic states are a different case have certainly shown enough signs of having serious nationalist concerns about the European project that it seems reasonable to argue they might well take a different course andv stay in the EFTA if it seems feasible. And of course, Ireland is kind of driven to follow Britain's example as long as the N Ireland issue remains unsettled, although this seems to have limits when the practical benefits of the alternative seem too good. The Eastern European nations are a middle of the road case between these two extremes: they do have a nationalist strain because of their past bad experience as abused vassals of Russia but the historical record seems to be in favor of them preferring the practical benefits of EU membership (greater economic subsidies and investments, stronger military protection from Russian resurgence, enhanced political stabilization) to retention of full national sovreignty in an EFTA-style system. Of course, regional differences within the area may apply. Roughly speaking, the regional economic, cultural, and geopolitical vectors that may drive Eastern European nations within the EU through the attraction of border members such as Germany and Italy seem the strongest for Poland (provided of course something like its recent backsliding into nationalist authoritarianism is avoided), Hungary (likewise), Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Poland. I would make more or less the same case about the same case for the Baltic nations, on top of them having shown a consistent Europhile record, although I concede ongoing membership of Nordic nations in the EFTA might well create a different geopolitical pattern. Finland seems a wild card in this regard. I agree southeastern Europe may well have significantly greater difficulties than the rest of Eastern Europe to fulfil the federal EU's stringent membership criteria, and so gravitate in the looser EFTA by default, because of socio-economic backwardness, corruption and organized crime troubles, ethnic conflicts, and so on. In comparison, the Central European nations historically seem to have risen to the challenge of fulfilling EU membership criteria remarkably well, so I expect the same pattern would hold true ITTL (more stringent requirements would in all likelihood be balanced out by more generous assistance). And we can certainly bet Turkey would have even greater trouble than OTL finding its way into a federalizing EU.

As it concerns the Euro, I do expect the federalization process would lead to its adoption, with transition to the fiscal level of integration to iron out its OTL defects, by the W European core well before the Cold War ends (assuming its keeps roughly the same timescale of course), in much more manageable conditions. The same points I made above would likely apply as it concerns the ability and willingness of potential European candidates to federal Eurozone membership: the British and the Norse would easily be able to fulfill the criteria but might just as easily refuse for nationalist reasons, the Central European nations probably are both willing for practical reasons and able to comply with some effort, the Southeastern European nations may or may not be able or willing.

I see no good reason why one should expect integration of the Eastern European armies and defence industries in the EDC/EU common military and a Pan-European defence market should cause a negative economic or political backlash in the region, quite the contrary. Historically the perceived threat of a possible Russian comeback made these nations rather enthusiastic for anything that would bind their stronger western allies more tightly to their defence, without exceptions. To join the federal EU would mean the bulk of the Pan-European army would redeploy from the eastern borders of Germany-Austria-Italy to the border between Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space. This would ensure stronger defence of the region and economic benefits from bases placement than if the EU and Eastern Europe were 'just' allies within NATO (in the latter case, the Euros would of course still deploy some forces of theirs in the region, but on a substantially reduced size). Likewise, assimilation of the EE forces in the Pan-European army would ensure a much swifter modernization. In all likelihood the economic effects of merging the Eastern European defence industry in a Pan-European common market would replicate the wider pattern that historically applied after transition to the capitalist system and assimilation of the area in the estern bloc and the EU, which overall turned in favor of socio-economic development and modernization.



What OTL EU has so far failed to do in the military integration field is irrelevant since one of TTL main divergencies would be the success instead of the failure of the EDC/EPC, which IOTL caused the economic field instead of the military/political one to be the forerunner of the integration process. ITTL the opposite is going to apply and the military/political branch shall become the starting core of the whole process, with the economic branch coming as the as just as important round-up aspect. The EDC treaty was going to establish a pan-European army divided in national components at the battalion level, a common budget, common arms, centralized military procurement and institutions. The EPC treaty was going to establish a Pan-European government to oversee the EDC structure (and the nascent Economic Community through the Coal and Steel Community) with a directly elected assembly, a senate appointed by national parliaments, and a supranational executive accountable to the parliament. The system included a few special caveats about the chain of command of German forces, which had a lessened national component in comparson to the other forces, to appease concerns about German rearmament so soon after WWII. We may expect these exceptions to be repealed over time, as the political status of W Germany within Europe normalizes. It took the mid 50s IOTL for W German rearmament under national leadership within the NATO framework to be accepted after the EDC project failed, so ITTL we expect the German special status to be repealed by the late 50s - early 60s at the latest. Once TTL circumstances causes the treaties to be ratified, the EDC/EPC/EEC system would arise pretty much like OTL NATO and early EU, wrinkles might occur but the overwhelming reasons for cooperation would iron them out.

As it concerns the development of an EDC/EU nuclear deterrent, it is going to occur after the conventional Pan-European army has been set up, and it would be an outgrowth of the same. IOTL it took France till the early 60s to develop its own nukes. With the pooled economic resources and know-how of W Europe, the added pressure from the lack of American umbrella, and the US and UK likely sharing data with their allies, I expect Euro nukes by the late 50s. If we assume disengagement of US forces from Europe ca. 1950, and since the UK got its own deterrent in the early 50s, the timetable should more or less work, if we assume the British grant their own umbrella to their continental allies in the crucial gap period, and the Euros later return the favor by establishing extensive sharing of their by then larger arsenal with their insular allies. No doubt withdrawal of the US umbrella is going to drive the British and the W Europeans alike to invest like crazy in their own nuclear programs and air defence, until they feel they have bridged the deterrence gap with the Soviets. I am not entirely sure how much economically feasible it would be in the 50s, but I assume there would be a most serious attempt to push the envelope in comparison to OTL timetable.



Well, the say in the matter of the new members would be their voices and votes in the federal system, and their share in the political game thereof, no more and no less. This is the whole democratic point of the exercise in this kind of situation. If the new members get more regulations to comply with, they also get more opportunities of assistance to ease their adaptation, by accession in this kind of system, than if they join a much looser free-trade zone, where you get less standards to comply with, but also almost no mutual support from other members. As it concerns the CAP, I seem to remember IOTL its extension to Eastern Europe caused no overwhelming trouble for the EU, and I fail to see how federalization would change the equation.



TTL EU is likely not going to have a nuclear arsenal as large as the US one for various reasons, but also not as small as the OTL British or French ones, because they have substantially Greater resources and they cannot rely on the American umbrella to deter the Soviets. I struggle to find the most appropriate point between these two extremes. So far, the best I could envision is to multiply the OTL British/French one by the ratio between TTL EU's population/GDP and these states. I welcome ideas. Since TTL EU is essentially going to work like a federal union in most regards, most definitely including its military and civilian chain of command thereof according to the EDC/EPC framework, pretty much the same conditions apply about control and placement of its conventional and WMD arsenal as for the USA (or India, for that matter). The correct answer to 'who manufactures, controls, and houses the weapons' is 'whom the European legislature, executive, and equivalent of the Pentagon choose'. The main difference between the US and TTL EU situations is the US army was geared to fight an enemy the other side of the world, and for the Euros it would be at their eastern doorstep, so the deployment stratgy would have to change accordingly. Also the more crowded demographic pattern of W Europe in comparison to N America or Russia might make deployment of a land-based Euro missile force a bit Tricky, and perhaps drive the EU to focus on strategic bombers and SLBMs. Then again, France kept a land-based force, and NATO deployed US medium-range missiles throughout Western Europe, for most of the Cold War. So the difficulty is not unsurmountable. The argument about sharing in the EU nuclear force being a possible deterrent to EU membership frankly seems grasping at straws. Heck, if anything lack of the American umbrella is likely going to make Europe as a whole more open-minded about nukes. E.g. OTL Sweden toyed a lot with the idea of building its own nukes. ITTL, such a program is much more likely to go through if the Nordic countries stay in the EFTA.



I am not entirely averse to the idea the EU would follow the UK/French model in kind, even if the size would likely be larger. Yes, ITTL the EU (and its NATO allies) would necessarily approximate US levels of defence spending throughout the Cold War, especially in the conventional field. Not that much more since its GDP would be smaller than the US one, but not that smaller, and the Euros would probably try to compensate by focusing their resources on the European theater and its 'near abroad' and neglecting excessive force projection in the rest of the world, seriously going for quality vs. Soviet brute-force quantity (kind of what the Israelis did vs. the Arabs), and ruthlessly going for streamlining and optimization. There is not going to be much room for bureaucratic fat, despite the stereotype. And the stereotype has not much actual basis in fact. OTL EU runs itself with a smaller civil service than London, and its quality is far from mediocre. Federalization is of course going to expand its size and complexity, albeit partially with a parallel reduction of the national ones, but not at the point of exceeding US levels. Admittedly the economic effort of rearmament is going to be the worst for W Europe early in the Cold War, when part of the continent is still in need of reconstruction and development, and get lesser later in the period, when rebuilding and industrialization gradually closes the economic gap with the USA. The attempt to lessen the burden may indeed be one of the main reasons TTL Europeans aggressively pursue federalization at the EU level, and close integration at the NATO level. Even if the European bloc may stay divided in the political and economic fields in the EU and EFTA blocs, optimization pressure may well cause TTL NATO to be more militarily integrated than its OTL counterpart.

Unfortunately I took me a few hours to finalize my own post, I had to move between locations in the meanwhile, and did not want to lose what I had already written so for a while my post was a confusing mess of my points being written and your text being quoted, sorry. I suggest to re-read my completed and edited post for clarity.

b) Relatively bigger in a smaller EU? It does not seem really so, at least not for most of the EU's existence. Early in the Cold War, W Germany would be the same exact size (give or take the possible annexation of W Austria if Austria gets divided, but it wouldn't make that much of a difference) and the EU would be the same six founding members. Admittedly early federalization of the EU may cause Euroskeptic Britain and Scandinavia to stay apart, but Europhile Iberia is almost sure to go the way of the founding members. So significantly smaller but not that smaller during the Cold War. After Communism falls, at least the Central European and Baltic post-communist states have shown they have both the capability to comply with EU standards and they are more interested in the economic and TTL military benefits of EU membership than of full national sovreignty. Greece and Southeast Europe may indeed fail to comply, be sidetracked because of nationalist trouble, or be kept off the door for similar reasons. Again, smaller but not that smaller. Most importantly, most of OTL counterbalances to Germany (France, Italy, Spain, the Visegrad Group) would still be within.

c) I suggest you check the historical record of the various nations' attitudes to the European integration project, instead of projecting your own radical dislike of centralization on everyone indiscriminately. Spain and Portugal have been radically different from Euroskeptic Britain or the Nordic countries in this regard, and much, much close to the Europhile founding members, even surpassing them at times. As it concerns the E Europeans, they have consistently shown a pattern of "the more the better" as it concerns getting economic assistance and military protection from the stronger members of the Western bloc, and deeming such practical benefits more important than absolute national sovreignty almost all the time. ITTL, the federal EU stands to be a better provider of such benefits than EFTA and outer NATO, hence my prediction most of the area would choose the EU just like OTL. Federalization of the EU is going to provide fiscal integration and hence a solution to all the current problems of incomplete and unbalanced economic integration. As it concerns military affairs, TTL EU is going to be born with advanced integration in the field from the beginning, because the PoD is going to force this kind of development as the very reason for the system to come into existence.

d) This argument has some merit, except postwar Britain was economically declining dramatically, despite its EFTA membership and its trade links with the Dominions. It did not start to turn the tide until some time it joined the EU, and a frantic search for a means to invert the decline was a major reason it banged to the dorr of the EU. If it stays apart, how exactly continued prevalent ties to Scandinavia and the Dominions are going to change the picture? And how much a declining UK is going to stay that good of a primary market for the Dominions, especially Canada which was not so primary Sector-oriented as ANZ? As it concerns a return of US protectionism, it might happen but there is a lot of ground between pulling its armies out from Europe after the postwar situation seems stabilized and complete restoration of interwar policies. If nothing else because if the most extreme version of US isolationism prevails the Soviets are going to gobble the entire continent.

e) It seems we are trapped in a semantic dispute about the meaning of 'superpower' and 'regional power', so to address your specific points: yes, TTL quasi-federal EU is essentially going to be really important and interested in Europe, the Med, most of Africa, and the Middle East. They are going to be the main Western agent in the first three areas, share involvement and influence in the Middle East with the USA more or less on equal terms, and leave management of Western interests in the rest of the world to the USA. However, in terms of overall power they are not going to be much distant from the USSR at least, even if in certain regards it is going to be a contest of quality vs. quantity, or skill vs. brute force. As it concerns OTL French involvements in Cold War foreign wars applied to the unified EU superstate, I would more or less assume the following: Indochina, probably unfolding with little or much lesser European involvement than OTL, because impending US withdrawal makes the French more focused on Soviet containment in Europe and less willing to be engaged in distant adventures in Asia. Algeria, takes place more or less the same way as OTL only with Pan-European military involvement instead of just a French one, because Algeria was a special case for France and the French bargain support of the rest of W Europe for intervention with concessions to their Euro partners elsewhere. EU involvement likely does not radically change the course of the conflict, but forces a compromise outcome more favorable to Euro interests. Suez, full-fledged Euro intervention alongside the British and the Israelis, because all the EU partners can acknowledge the vast importance of the Suez Canal for their economies. This and lesser US involvement in the crisis because of partial disengagement from the theater leads to either a) decisive Western victory with fall of the Nasserite regime b) European equivalent of the Cuban Missile Crisis, major NATO-USSR military confrontation, hopefully compromise solution that saves face to both sides. Africa, it is still quite important for the EU as a whole for its resources and relatively close to its main turf (like the Middle East, it is Europe's 'near abroad', troublesome but important for its resources), so the equivalent of OTL French interventions still take place, because they are minor enough to be pinpricks for the EU in military, economic, and political terms, the main difference is they are more widespread across the continent and not so focused on the French former colonies.

As it concerns the Germans' attitude to European rearmament and interventionism, Germany's contribution to EU military power is going to be vital enough to contain the Soviet existential challenge that in all likelihood there shall be an unspoken but very real bargain between the Germans and the other Europeans: the Germans don't go as pacifist as OTL, and their neighbors allow them to feel less guilty and self-flagellating about their Nazi past, more or less the same way as Italy. In all likelihood, there shall be a big concerted effort to cast all the blame for Nazi crimes on the Nazis specifically, whitewash German militarism, and rehabilitate the Wehrmacht and German civilians. Pretty much all the blame on Hitler, his cronies, and the SS, almost none on the German generals and soldiers. Hope you fancy Rommel and Stauffenberg, because you are going to hear a lot of flattering stuff about them.

f) See above as it concerns TTL likely attitude of Germany and the rest of the EU and NATO about German involvement in Euro rearmament. Early on, there shall be a lot of effort to make the system look and work like the Germans are not really in charge of anything, and dutifully follow the lead of the other partners. As PR rehabilitation of Germany proceeds, Germany's role within the system shall gradually match the one of the other partners. The Germans shall bargain cooperation for rehabilitation, and exchange feeling not so guilty for not becoming that pacifist, more or less like the Italians. In due time, their influence within the system shall normalize at the same level as the French and the Italians within the EU, or the British within NATO.