A different 1860s

1891-1900 (part II).

As it concerns the state of ethnic issues in Europe and America by the end of the 19th century, certain areas (e.g. Ireland, Poland-Lithuania, Romania, the Balkans, and the Middle East) harbored serious nationalist tensions that might easily explode again in favorable circumstances. In others (e.g. Bohemia-Moravia, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Albania), minorities were content with the status quo and/or sufficiently liable to ongoing cultural and political assimilation in the dominant nationality. This was typically the result of a mix of a liberal political regime, sufficient equality and autonomy for the minority, economic prosperity and strong prestige of the state, cultural influence of the dominant nationality, and lack of serious bloody clashes in the past.

The western border areas annexed by Germany and Italy after the war with France showed a mix of both cases. The French-speaking areas (western Lorraine, Romandy, and Savoy) remained vulnerable to the siren song of French nationalism and incessant Gallic efforts to stir up trouble, even if German and Italian authorities were always on the lookout to suppress any sign of overt disloyalty or subversion. On the other hand, the German-speaking and Italian-speaking areas (Luxemburg, eastern Lorraine, Alsace, most of Switzerland, Nice, and Corsica) had thoroughly integrated in the German or Italian nations. This however did not stop the French from having an overwhelming and overbearing revanchist-expansionist complex about their neighbors’ lands if they felt entitled to claim them because of historical possession, a drive to achieve ‘natural borders’, or various other far-fetched pretexts. They disdainfully ignored the actual wishes of local population when they did not comply with the assumptions of Gallic ambitions and propaganda. Depending on circumstances, such claims might go so far as to assume everything France or Spain had historically owned or seriously tried to conquer in the past rightfully belonged to the Gallic empire.

The Low Countries were another main target of Gallic expansionism, where the Classicalists tried hard to pursue destabilization as a gateway to conquest, much the same way they had previously done with Spain and Portugal. The most vulnerable area in this regard was Belgium because of its ethnically composite character and since its national identity was always fragile to begin with. Most political, cultural, and religious factors that drove the success of the Belgian Revolution a few generations ago declined in importance or even reversed to create increasing alienation between the Flemish and the Walloons. By the end of the century, the national unity of the Belgian Kingdom seemed in serious danger as increasing political polarization fueled by ethno-linguistic and religious conflicts and unsatisfactory economic performance took root between the Flemish and Walloon communities. As the ethnic division got deeper, it looked like only political inertia, the monarchy, a ruling elite of declining size and influence invested into national unity, and the influence of Britain allowed Belgium to continue existing. Peaceful partition of Belgium between the Netherlands and France-Iberia seemed a natural solution to the crisis. However, enmity between the Gallic empire and the German-Italian alliance was so vicious it was quite doubtful division could take place without triggering a general European conflict.

In comparison, the Netherlands was rather more stable in normal circumstances, if still divided about foreign policy alignments. On one side of the debate, various factors including the Gallic threat, cultural and religious bonds, and prosperity resulting from economic ties with the CEMU bloc made Pan-Germanism and ever-closer cooperation with Germany and its allies considerably popular. On the other side, Dutch nationalism made its partisans fearful of ultimate absorption in Germany from too close collaboration with the CEMU and supportive of pro-Pillar neutrality and reliance on Britain for support. Over time, however, drifting of Britain away from ‘splendid isolation’ and towards a deal with France-Iberia made the latter option less appealing and feasible. When the choice seemed to become between German liberalism and French tyranny, however, it was no choice at all for the Dutch and Flemish. In such circumstances, they would cling like dear life to the Pillar bloc for protection and oppose Gallic ambitions down to the wire, even at the price of compromising their independence from Germany.

More or less the same basic pattern applied for Scandinavia, although in its case different geopolitical circumstances made the supporters of separate Nordic identity and neutrality rather more popular and influential than in the Low Countries. Even supporters of neutrality, however, often divided between the ones that sympathized more for Britain and the ones that preferred the Pillar bloc. As a rule, the Nordics tended to show a definite dislike of the Gallic Empire and resentment of Russia. Commitment to neutrality however did not stop Scandinavia from participating in the CEMU. The economic benefits thereof were one important reason for the relative popularity of Pan-Germanism and sympathy towards the Pillar powers.

In the Gallic empire, the Franco-Iberian union was surely stable in normal circumstances but in all likelihood, its welfare was critically reliant on the fortunes of the right-wing regime that created it. On the other hand, there were good chances Iberian unity might well survive a hypothetical fall of Classicalism, barring an extreme catastrophe. Regional autonomy and lingering shock from Carlist and Portuguese civil wars had considerably lessened potential popularity of regional separatism across Iberia. Even many liberal and leftist opponents of the Bourbon regime supported national unity of the Iberian Peninsula with a federal system, so it was getting solid non-partisan roots of its own. Such dissidents in many cases looked at the liberal powers (especially Italy, Germany, and America) as an alternative model; Italy was especially popular in this regard, because of its many affinities with Iberia. The neo-Roman ambition of a community of Mediterranean peoples the Italians often supported reaped some sympathy among Iberian dissidents.

In the Russian Empire, certain areas (e.g. most of Ukraine and Belarus, the Caucasus, Central Asia) were not as vulnerable to potential nationalist destabilization as they might have been in different circumstances. This occurred because of less autocratic policies, greater prosperity, ongoing settler colonization, or past ethnic cleansing. Things were a little more troublesome in the Baltic region since the attractive force of successful Nordic and German unifications countered factors favorable to Russia. Many Finns, Latvians, and Estonians on principle disliked Russian rule and wished for independence or more realistically union with Scandinavia or Germany. In practice, however, they mostly remained quiet. They would not act on their feelings unless a favorable opportunity showed up. Poland, Lithuania, Romania, and the western portions of Belarus and Ukraine where former PLC influence remained strong were the main nationalist trouble spots and hotbeds of national opposition to the Russian Empire. In these areas, anti-Russian activists enjoyed widespread following, and they were always on the lookout to shake off the Tsarist yoke off the back of their nations at the earliest opportunity.

In the Balkans and the Near East, the collapse of Ottoman rule had caused important demographic changes in certain areas due to substantial population transfers (usually to the detriment of Muslims) but left things mostly unchanged in others. Even so, new facts on the ground would not necessarily stop an ambitious regional player from ignoring them in favor of its own claims, or planning to alter them forcibly with their own brand of demographic changes. As a rule, the change got far short of eliminating or radically ameliorating the region’s infamous potential for factional instability and ethnic-religious strife. The vast pool of frustration and resentment the Muslims experienced due to their losses, humiliation, and condition of colonial subjugation certainly intensified latent regional instability.

In North America, the outcome of Reconstruction and acquisition of several important Spanish-speaking territories caused US society to develop an attitude towards racial issues that was similar to the Latin American one. They based racial identification on a mix of appearance, known ancestry, class, wealth, education, and self-identification. If you looked like a White, and/or you had the typical financial status, education, and mindset of a White, society treated you like a White. Few really cared about the one-drop rule notion and the idea never developed any mainstream support in American society.

Therefore, US hostility to, and brutal repression of, Amerindians got essentially focused on the ‘Wild Indians’ that violently opposed American colonization and were assumed to wastefully hoard valuable land to support a barbaric lifestyle. Few cared to discriminate Europeanized mixed-bloods and even ‘Civilized Indians’ that embraced Christianity and a European lifestyle got relative tolerance. Southern racists were certainly an important factor in regional politics but less influential on a national level than they would have otherwise been, due to the development of a significant Black and ‘poor White’ middle class to oppose their political dominance and their failure to impose their segregationist agenda. Successful integration of Canada, Northern Mexico, the Greater Antilles, and part of Central America in the Union and conversion of most American Catholics to Old Catholicism worked as a compelling precedent against WASP prejudice and in favor of assimilation of Romance-speaking areas.

Consequently, there was relatively little prejudice against further US territorial expansion in the Western Hemisphere. Successful assimilation, stability, and prosperity of the portions of North America under US rule persuaded many US citizens and Hispanic Americans alike that ’Manifest Destiny’ unification of North America by the USA was inevitable, economically and politically beneficial, or necessary for security reasons. The most ambitious supporters of US expansionism even added at least part of South America, Australasia, and the Pacific region to this agenda. British Australasia made an especially enticing prize in this regard, because of its cultural, ethnic, and political affinities with the USA, its economic and strategic value, its similar level of socio-economic development, and its apparent restiveness under British colonial rule.

Realization of this agenda essentially was a matter of opportunity, getting an excuse, and thinking the prize was worth the effort or the land was an asset instead of a burden. It was also an issue of no other great power, especially the British Empire, getting in the way. However, this was becoming less of an insurmountable obstacle every year due to growth of US power. Even that section of the American public opinion that opposed continental political union often supported Pan-Americanism, a movement for closer ties and cooperation among the states of the Americas, through diplomatic, political, economic, and social means. Political instability of Latin American states, their recurrent conflicts, suspicion of US power, and polarization caused by Anglo-American rivalry represented important obstacles to its fulfillment. Nonetheless, growing popularity of Pan-Americanism and the successful examples of the USA and Argentina were among the reasons by the end of the century a drive for regional integration mostly reorganized the political map of South America in a few large states. Another outcome of the movement was the formation of the Pan-American Conference, an international organization for inter-American economic and political cooperation.

Due to the great-power status and general success of Italy and Russia, no sane WASP or Northern European would dare regard Southern Europeans or Eastern Europeans as racially inferior. Thanks to friendly relations between America and the German-Italian bloc, German and Italian immigrants were usually welcome and highly regarded in the Americas. However, thanks to general prosperity at home and opportunity to immigrate in the colonies, not so many went to the New World. Nonetheless, demographic growth ensured a significant number still made the trip. A significant number of liberal-minded French and Iberians went to the USA or Argentina to escape political oppression at home. For similar reasons, a sizable amount of Irish, Poles, Jews, Romanians, and other Eastern European nationalities also immigrated to the New World.

In the American public, sympathy for the plight of Ireland and Poland contrasted with strong antipathy for Papal Catholicism, so acceptance of these immigrants usually required conversion to Old Catholicism. Most Catholic immigrants to the USA or Argentina were willing to compromise on this issue for the sake of assimilation; the ones that wanted to cling to their religion mostly went to Brazil instead. Demographic growth and agricultural reforms ensured many Russian peasants that were unsatisfied with their status and could not or would not find employment as industrial workers in the cities or settlers in the Asian territories became immigrants to the New World. There also was a large number of Asian immigrants, and although they suffered some serious prejudice, the vast size of the Union and relatively limited levels of racism for 19th century standards ensured America never established legal barriers to Asian immigration.

American Blacks continued to suffer a lot of socially tolerated individual racism and socio-economic inequality, but no equivalent of Jim Crow-style legal segregation or one-drop rule. Many Blacks remained a discriminated, exploited, and abused underclass, but Reconstruction reforms had allowed the growth of a sizable Black middle class that was not limited by legal segregation. Schools were mostly de facto, but not de jure segregated. Individual racial discrimination was frequent and tolerated by law in housing, employment, and at the workplace, but not in public accommodations. Society usually accepted racially mixed people as Whites that fit the appropriate mix of appearance, class, education, wealth, and self-identification criteria. This made life relatively easy for racially mixed couples of Whites and Caucasian-looking mulattoes. Couples of White and Black or African-looking mulatto people faced much social hostility, especially if the African-looking member was the male, but miscegenation was legal.

Europeans and Americans had grown accustomed to use ethnic cleansing and settler colonization to entrench their control of valuable territories if people of a different race or religion inhabited them. Their imperialist brutality might escalate to genocide because of extensive military repression, scorched earth policies, large-scale deportation, severe exploitation, or unsustainable living conditions combined with callous or culpable neglect of their humanitarian consequences. A few notable cases in the past had been colonization of the Americas, post-Ottoman ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Europe and the Near East, and ongoing European settler colonization of Northwest Africa. Many other similar cases, perhaps individually less extensive but frequent enough for their sum to be equivalent in scope, occurred in a patchwork pattern throughout the Scramble for Africa.

European and American public opinion as a rule remained almost entirely uncaring or unaware of these tragedies, due to a combination of racist prejudice, imperialist greed, distance, and lack of media coverage. A partial exception occurred for the Franco-Iberian Empire since its colonial policy became infamous and often caused humanitarian disasters due to its extreme violence, ruthless exploitation of resources, and mistreatment of indigenous peoples. Widespread international criticism occurred but the Franco-Iberian government was usually able to counter and withstand it by propaganda, suppression of evidence, censure for the domestic public, marginal reforms, and sheer refusal to bow to foreign pressure.

In this period, a widespread sense of inherent superiority of European civilization and ethnicity was part of normal worldview for an average White person. European economic, technological, political, and military dominance of the world was sufficient reason in the eyes of most Whites to justify a supremacist mindset as a plain fact. The less prejudiced usually framed European superiority in cultural terms, so they were willing to treat assimilated non-Whites as equals. They usually justified imperialism as the Whites’ right and obligation to rule over, and encourage the cultural development of, people from other cultural backgrounds until they could take their place in the world and assimilate in European civilization. They might also be willing to acknowledge valuable aspects and ideas from other civilizations, especially the most sophisticated ones such as China or India.

The more prejudiced typically assumed the inborn inferiority of other ethnic groups, justified their indefinite dependence and subjugation, and in extreme cases accepted their gradual but inevitable disappearance by attrition to be replaced by expansion of ‘superior’ peoples. They also saw almost nothing of value in other cultures. Very few opposed imperialism; almost nobody accepted other cultures as inherently equal or did not regard the least advanced ones as savage, barbaric, and entirely devoid of value. Exoticism did create a few important exceptions of relatively widespread appreciation of non-Western ideas, but usually only in such niche fields as art, design, and occultism.

Racism was thus widespread, plainly accepted, and created a powerful ideological and psychological justification for imperialist domination of non-Whites, their colonial exploitation, and brutal use of force to crush their resistance. At the same time, it universally acknowledged all Europeans as equals. Rival or hostile European nations might, and often did, frame their bad relations in terms of chauvinism and jingoism, never as the kind of racist prejudice shown for non-Whites. Apart from patriotic pride and national stereotypes, European cultures and ethno-linguistic groups widely recognized each other as similar enough to belong in the same category and bickering family. Just like Europe’s global dominance created a widespread perception of superiority, the achievements of great powers that belonged to different European cultural groups were similar enough to make them widely seen as equal.

Prejudice against Jews was long-standing but usually Western culture interpreted it in religious and cultural terms, and conversion and assimilation often might nullify it. On the other hand, Islam was widely seen as alien and hostile enough to get Arabs and Berbers typically classified and mistreated as non-Whites regardless of common ethnic roots, except perhaps in the case of conversion and cultural assimilation. Europeans had often regarded Muslims as hostile and wicked but worthy of respect in past centuries but with the rise of Europe's global dominance and the decline of Muslim powers this had been mostly replaced by contempt. On the other hand, Europeans and Americans that were knowledgeable about Asian affairs often acknowledged the Japanese Empire’s modernization achievements as impressive enough to classify the Japanese and Koreans in a different and superior category as other Asians.

An unspoken but strong cultural and psychological barrier existed against using the kind of extreme brutality with fellow Europeans that the great powers routinely employed against non-Whites. Nobody had yet made the mental leap to use large-scale ethnic cleansing to settle a persistent and intractable nationalist conflict in a developed country, apart from the special case of Muslim minorities. It would likely take a sufficiently radical shock, such as another general war or revolutionary wave, to make it happen. Mass murder of Whites in 'civilized' Europe or America seemed outlandish unless something went terribly bad in a war or revolution. The only case people seriously contemplated this possibility to fear or advocate it was a repetition of the Jacobin Reign of Terror because of a leftist revolution.

Western powers usually heeded the laws of war as commonly understood in their armed conflicts, even if their explicit codification into international law was an ongoing process at the end of the 19th century. On the other hand, they typically treated insurgents as bandits, rebels, and traitors and punished them as the worst kind of felons in the best of cases, summarily executed them if caught in the worst of cases. In this regard, the American Civil War was a noticeable exception since the Union and the Confederacy in practice treated each other as belligerent nations during the conflict. Repression of neo-Confederate paramilitary groups during Reconstruction instead followed the usual pattern, albeit the mildest portion of the spectrum.

Police repression was widely used to suppress leftist and nationalist disturbance of public order everywhere in the Western world and other kinds of political dissent in authoritarian countries. Terrorism in the form of assassination and bombing did exist as an unwelcome novelty of late 19th century. Just like impromptu rioting when favorable circumstances happened, it was a favorite tactic of radical nationalists in such turbulent places as Ireland, Poland, and the Balkans. Moreover, militant leftist groups across the Western world that believed in bloody ‘propaganda of the deed’ and revolutionary violence often used it. In both cases, it made the users widely feared and reviled outside their sympathizers' circles.

Unfortunately festering ethnic conflicts, serious social inequality, and poor living conditions of the lower classes made the sympathizer crowd large enough for the problem to be infrequent but persistent. States were never slackers, inefficient, or gentle in the repression of leftist or nationalist terrorism and rioting. They often used laws they created for this goal against the labor movement and nationalist dissent as a whole. For this reason, a growing portion of the left and the labor movement gradually became increasingly critical of violence as a disastrous and counterproductive tactic. They instead advocated peaceful, gradual, and systematic organization of left-wing parties and unions.

In the face of a clear and present existential threat, Turkey at last underwent a serious final effort to reform and modernize to avoid its own extinction as a state. This came thanks to the efforts of the Young Turks, a political reform movement that arose in Ottoman society at the end of the 19th century and favored replacement of the absolute monarchy of the Sultan with a constitutional monarchy and a series of modernizing military and political reforms. The movement arose in the aftermath of Turkey’s disastrous defeat and huge territorial losses in the Russo-Turkish war. It slowly gained strength and organization during the following two decades although for a while all its efforts to impose a constitutional reform ultimately failed. At the end of the century, it eventually gained irresistible momentum thanks to widespread perception Turkey faced imminent destruction because of its own weakness and backwardness combined with the ambitions of stronger foreign powers.

The Young Turk revolutionaries gained the support of vast sectors of the army and were able to force the Sultan to establish a constitutional monarchy. They defeated the attempt of the conservatives to seize power and exploited the Sultan’s support of the counter-coup to depose him and put a relative on the throne that was willing to collaborate with the revolutionaries. The victorious Young Turks engaged in an ambitious program of modernizing reforms according to their ideology of liberalism, secularism, and positivism. However, they split in two factions that respectively favored liberalism, democracy, and regional autonomy, or supported authoritarian constitutionalism, centralization, and nationalist unity. The latter faction won out and established a centralized regime that concentrated power in the hands of a small ruling clique, limited the powers of Parliament, and kept the Sultan as a figurehead.

Initially their movement had supported a platform of creating a common citizenship irrespective of ethnic and religious differences for all the peoples of the Balkans and the Middle East, and reuniting the former lands of the Ottoman Empire under the aegis of a secular federal union. However, this ambitious project found a serious obstacle in the new geopolitical status quo of the area. It got some support from reformist Arabs and Persians that like the Turks found themselves exposed to European colonialism and wished for an alternative. However, the Christian nationalities of the Balkans and the Middle East that had cast off the Ottoman yoke and Muslim supremacy showed no sympathy for their possible return under a new guise. They either were satisfied with their new status quo under the rule of some Balkan state or European power, or at least deemed the neo-Ottoman project a worse alternative. The Balkan states and the European powers that had gained independence or territorial possessions in the Eastern Mediterranean region after the Ottoman collapse were also radically hostile to the Young Turk ambitions for obvious reasons. Only France-Iberia, despite religious differences and its own brutal colonization policy, showed some serious sympathy for the new Turkish regime, since it was always on the lookout for opportunities to expand its own international influence.

Faced with these conditions, the Young Turk ruling elites for a while still showed some nominal adherence to liberalism and neo-Ottoman civic patriotism as their ideology, but in practice, they gradually shifted their focus to a mix of Turkish nationalism and Pan-Islamism that greatly privileged the Muslims to solidify their own power base. The regime also got increasingly authoritarian in character, and often shaped many of its policies according to the Franco-Iberian model, which it came to perceive as a good template for national rebirth. However, they still strongly supported secular modernization policies since they deemed them essential to a successful strengthening of the state. These policies granted them a sizable amount of support from the Turk people at home and to a lesser degree from Arabs and Persians abroad, since they perceived them as a viable alternative to European domination, but it drove the neighbor non-Muslim states and communities into fierce opposition. Such a policy shift drove the Turkish government into increasingly harsh treatment of its remaining minorities and liberals, although it also repressed conservative opposition to its modernization program.

The Young Turk government sought support from friendly European powers for their plans to modernize their army, economy, and transportation network. They found France-Iberia and to a lesser degree Britain were willing to grant them a generous amount of investment and support, both because they expected to profit and expand their influence and since a strong Turkey would be a useful regional ally against Russia and the German-Italian alliance. To be fair, the British initially were wary of the Young Turk regime because they were concerned its Pan-Islamist leanings and revanchist ambitions might destabilize their own sphere of influence in the Middle East. However, Britain’s alliance alignment with France-Iberia and its imperial antagonism with Russia drove it to accept Turkey as a proxy.

This alignment of Turkey soon drew the ire of the Russians that perceived it as a serious violation of their sphere of influence and threat to their imperial ambitions. It also met the hostility of Germany and Italy. The Pan-Islamist leanings of the Turkish regime and British colonial domination of large numbers of Muslims made Anglo-Turkish cooperation more than a little uneasy. Their mutual interest to gain allies and undermine Russian power as well as Franco-Iberian mediation, however, was sufficient to stabilize their alliance of convenience. By unspoken agreement, the Turks toned down their Pan-Islamist destabilization activities in British-held areas and focused them on the Russian sphere of influence.

Although the Young Turks very much wished to regain many of the areas the Ottoman Empire had lost in the last few disastrous wars, they acknowledged it would be suicidal to pick a fight with Greece or worse Russia itself without strong military support from other great powers. So they first engaged in an effort to expand their own power base in the Middle East. Instability in Persia first provided them with a good opportunity. Late 19th century Persia had been suffering pretty much the same problems (backwardness, weakness, military defeat with territorial losses, inability to counter foreign penetration and influence) as the Ottoman Empire. Although it enjoyed a less disunited society in ethnic and religious terms, crippling financial woes made worse by royal extravagance still burdened it.

The unsustainable situation came to a head through a constitutional revolution backed by a coalition of merchants, ulema (Islamic clergy), and radical reformers. The revolutionaries won and forced the Shah to grant a constitution and parliament to the people. However, a new crisis soon surfaced due to conflicts between the conservative and radical wings of the revolutionary movement that allowed the Shah to regain part of its power base. Instability worsened because of the meddling of the Turks and the British, who saw an opportunity to expand their influence, and the Russians, who sought to preserve their interests in the region, already threatened by the realignment of Turkey.

Thus, a three-way civil war ensued between the Shah’s backers, the conservative constitutionalists, and the radical reformers. It gradually got simplified to a conflict between a conservative-monarchist coalition backed by Russia, Germany, and Italy, and a radical nationalist and Pan-Islamist front that organized itself according to the Young Turk model and was supported by Britain, France-Iberia, and Turkey. The Persian civil war threatened to expand in a general war between the great powers. It only barely became frozen into an instable cease-fire that split Persia between a monarchist-conservative North and a nationalist, Pan-Islamist, and ‘Young Persian’ South. The Persian crisis and the international alignments of the warring factions became another flashpoint that increased tensions and polarization between rival great powers and their alliance systems.

Apparent resurgence of Turkey as a regional power however could do little to prevent the Muslim world from suffering severe territorial losses by the end of the 19th century. A mix of ethnic cleansing, settlement of European immigrants, Europeanization and conversion of collaborationist natives, and expansion of neighbor autochthonous Christian communities, tore away several regions from the Umma and turned them into largely Christian and European areas. These included Northwest Africa, the Balkans, coastal western Anatolia, Cyprus, the Caucasus, eastern Anatolia, Palestine and Lebanon, and Russian Central Asia. Barring a radical overturning of the international order and an inverted pattern of vast demographic changes, these changes seemed permanent for the foreseeable future. Pan-Islamists did harbor ambitions to accomplish just that kind of drastic reversal of fortunes, and gambled on enacting it through mobilization of the Muslim peoples under their leadership and their victorious participation in a general war, but the feasibility of their hopes was up in the air.