Soviet Domination - A Red Dawn story

I start to wonder if Saddam willingness to help the Soviets in Iran would mean a start of a war we know.

That is going to be a giant mess in the Middle East which is think will draw in more players creating a even bigger mess.

(21)

August 1979:

As Saddam believed, there were the wrong type of communists in-charge in Iran as far as the Soviets were now concerned. Everything with the Tudeh had been done in a rush, that adventurism that Andropov’s opponents were concerned about but had been unable to halt. While the general secretary was no dictator and unable to act unchecked, the Politburo was increasingly coming under his control as opposition was ebbing away all the time. Recent events in Iran threatened that. The communists there were too used to acting independently, as should have been expected from the underground movement which they long were, and continued to do that now that they were in power. What Tehran said wasn’t being followed far from the Iranian capital. There was the strong influence of Islam in many of the members, especially the new ones who’d hitched themselves to the bandwagon when the Tudeh moved towards the power that it now had. Revolutionary justice being implemented in Iran was getting out of hand. The firing squads were being given far too much latitude to shoot whomever offended them today. Efforts by the new government to build a functioning state, one which Moscow wanted to see, were being disrupted by all of this killing: much of it seemed to be to do with personal grudges and also ethnicity rather than ridding the country of ‘enemies of the people’ as was supposed to be the case. There were also many of those who had come into the government who weren’t communists and had attained their position with bribes to get them to stop fighting in the civil war: these influential figures were working to bring down the Tudeh from within and possibly replace them because the number of true communists was very small and they were divided themselves on countless domestic issues. Kianouri faced an attempted coup d’état – including a serious effort made to murder him; he was Moscow’s chosen man to lead Iran – and the reaction from the Iranians themselves to address the causes of that plus find those really responsible, those who were behind it in terms of the plotting, was unsatisfactory to the Soviet Union.

At the urging of Chebrikov, supported by Ustinov who too had people in Iran and was getting some negative feedback from there like the KGB head, the Politburo commissioned a panel of experts to deliver them a report on the situation in that country. There was already an ongoing effort to do the same with neighbouring Afghanistan. Academics, theologians, diplomats and senior intelligence people were working together on what was first two reports but which soon became one due to the similarities between both nations on what was going on internally in each. That was linked to how internal matters would affect the relationship that the Soviet Union had with each country. The report was compiled throughout the summer. The Politburo waited for it to reach them with the idea then to reflect on what was said before doing anything rash. There was already a thinking from many that something would have to be done with regards to solving the problems in the two countries on their southern border but they waited to have that spelt out to them. There would need to be recommendations too, measures suggested to be debated. Once the report was finished though.

Thank you.
No, just in the minds of the men in the Kremlin.

Lets make the 100 post in this thread and just say that where ever you look in this universe, war is not far away.

(23)

September 1979:

Cuban troops were sent to Central America. American intelligence efforts missed their deployment due to a little bit of subterfuge on the part of Raúl Castro – Cuba’s defence minister – in how they were deployed. Cuban special forces went to the fight against Somoza via Panama and then moved across Costa Rica up into Nicaragua. When inside Nicaragua, they wore the uniforms of the Sandinistas and were limited in their activities away from where Cuban intelligence said that Americans could be encountered. Small but lethal attacks were made by them against government forces where they hit isolated garrisons and wiped them out as well as running ambushes against patrols. Overall, their impact in the fighting was minimal yet it was important though for they were the first wave of many more to come afterwards, those who wouldn’t be under such stringent conditions when they arrived of where and who they could fight either. Information was brought to Somoza through his own sources and from the Americans through the month of what was going on with the seemingly brilliant successes being had by the Sandinistas. There was a strong suspicion that this was Cuban activity. No proof was available though. That was then sought as both the CIA and Nicaragua’s own intelligence agents went looking for it. What they needed was to capture one of these Cubans, alive preferably. The challenge was difficult though not regarded as impossible, especially if they got lucky. Then, with a live Cuban prisoner, evidence could be presented to the Ford Administration of direct, undeniable Cuban involvement with troops inside Central America: the lack of such troops was what those down in Nicaragua were being told was the reason why the United States had yet to overtly act against Cuba.

Across in Guatemala, it wasn’t the Cubans involved in the upsurge in fighting there but rather those Cuban-trained guerrillas with the EGP. The Guatemalan Army attacked the rebel-controlled areas and won a major victory through the highlands. The few guerrillas who knew what they were doing couldn’t make up for the lack of capability nor inability to stand in the face of Guatemalan fire-power when caught by them in open battle as was the case with the rest of the rebel force. There were American advisors with the Guatemalans though also some others from abroad too including fellow Latin American countries such as Argentina and Chile. A retreat was made afterwards by whatever guerrillas were left and the army moved in to begin an orgy of repression through the areas where the EGP had taken under temporary control. As usual, that repression was brutal. Civilians bore the brunt of the activity from the soldiers who robbed, raped and murdered their way through the countryside when they were meant to be pursing their beaten enemy. Such was the Guatemalan Army’s fight against rebels. Away from that battle and its aftereffects, inside the country’s capital of Guatemala City, Lucas García was facing a different kind of conflict. There was a lot of dissatisfaction with his rule by others of influence within the country. The landowners who held most of the nation’s wealth along with corrupt military officers (who held most of the rest) were fed up with how their president was putting them all at risk. They had no intention of giving into the rebels or anything silly like that. What they wanted was someone who could deal better with guerrillas and also secure further support from the Americans. Lucas García was tainted as far as they were concerned. They wanted a strongman who could also negotiate better foreign support than Lucas García was bringing. They plotted and searched for such a figure.