Successful Weimar Germany

raunchel Commander Posts: 1,795 Likes: 1,182	Successful Weimar Germany Apr 25, 2018 17:19:54 GMT via mobile Quote Select Post Deselect Post Link to Post Member Give Gift Back to Top Post by raunchel on Apr 25, 2018 17:19:54 GMT steffen I really like those ideas. I unfortunately don't have the knowledge, bit you're right. A timeline on that premise would be amazing.

steffen
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Successful Weimar Germany Apr 26, 2018 13:18:14 GMT

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Post by steffen on Apr 26, 2018 13:18:14 GMT

Yes,

my problem is: i have much knowledge, lack any "writer capabilities"...

my idea: Give some input for a general development, but that also could twist and change a bit.

Example:
That germany will be way weaker as OTL Nazis, because the nazis
a.) had a knack for "young" officers with new ideas - a weimar-timeline will be less innovative, just because the radical and combined with the ideology development of military equipment will be slowed down. So some v.Manstein still could raise high, but he need more "senior officers" to change... Rommel would stay a division-commander, at maximum a corps comander, but one wiht lots of enemies and so no carrier to speak about.
You lack Hitler, who "love" some one and push him beyond any rules. In Weimar things are way more conventional.
b.) were mad in armament. They ruined the state. A lot people ignore the fact that - without the Anschluss and the sudeten-crisis going in hitlers way germany would have been bankrupted in 1938. No weimar government would in peacetime act that way.

The advantage in this:
you get more reasonable products, these will work better. You have still lots of rivality but someone like Porsche will not go to hitler and get his expensive mid-war-madness-production allowed and fueled with ressources (even if no tank had the same kill-ratio as the Elefant (it is often ignored because of some propaganda-stories), it was way to expensive, used lots of copper and was - all in all to much of a prototype

The same - force of cost efficency - mean that the variants of 10 different airplanes for one purpose would not happen.
But also the competitions will be fair - not influenced by political "sanity"... also the better plane can be pushed cause if you ignore such things in a young democracy the media will slaughter the politicans...
The madness of Goering is also avoided...

that germany in 1940 would be stronger as OTL nazi germany, even without conquering the benelux, france and poland. Just because a sane(r) economy grow slower but steady without going near bankrupted.

If you use index... you could see it this way:
OTL development:
1936: 100
1938: 150
1940: 20 (without war)

(All based on the economic growth and productivity... not the healthy style)
now the ATL economy
1936: 80
1938: 110
1940: 140
1942: 170
1944: 250
(all without war, only for the boundary of the german reich (without eventually taken areas (Austria, Sudetenareas, Danzig, etc)

But the most important thing: In science the germans stay "non touchable nr.1", because Weimar would not force out all the scientists, neither the foreign ones (Niels Bohr for example, but also Edward Teller and others who were in germany in the 20ties and early 30ties and left it based on the nazis) nor the german ones (without them, you basically have nil nuclear program in the allied nations, nada)

Maybe Einstein still goes to the USA, but he never would push the nuclear weapons, also he would not give up the german passport.

How massive the damage to the science in germany was is well seen by Nobel-prices... Germany pre1933 was basically the same as the USA is today...

So yes - such timeline is very complex and needs lots of reading, but more so the understanding how much these people changed the developments in these states.
It is very realistic that the first nuclear powerplant would be in germany, propably the first (war)ship with nuclear propulsion would start in germany (nukes i see not so early, but a smaller reactor to extend the range of cruiser/battleship-size ships... that is to good to ignore, also more nuclear power plants mean that germany can use coal for other demands (like the fuel production in case of troubles with the Entente - not only the nazis hoped to get independent from foreign ressources - most politicans of weimar suffered by the british blocade, too. So a state that produce more at home would be seen as good)

Germany in 1930 wasn´t a "good leftis who wanted world peace and surrendered nationality versus evil war seeking nazis", but more a "95% of german people wanted to fix the "unfair Versailles", ideally without a war, but the demand to integrate all the germans outside german borders would be strong in all parties - even the communist one (even if here only to be a strong communist state with maximum people). Even me - from a 1930 POV would push for revision of the Versailles treaty.

For sure - a black german citizen would have in such a weimar-1945-time a better life and much more rights as in 1960 USA. What is often ignored, other countries were very bad in racism or supression of people... we modern ones just compare em all with the nazis or - if we leave them out - the stalinistic russians and suddenly they look like angles. But if you leave these two out, they are bad, evil or outright racistic. A surviving and modernizing Weimar could be a port of democracy and security for such people who could be killed or tortured in other (democratic) countries... ironically i see jews from poland leaving it and moving to germany in significant numbers. INstead of reducing the numbers by the nazis from 500k to near nil you could see them raising to 1 or 1,5 Mio...

How rich in cultural or scientific areas this germany would be...

eurofed
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Successful Weimar Germany May 8, 2018 2:09:43 GMT

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Post by eurofed on May 8, 2018 2:09:43 GMT

Apr 21, 2018 19:32:06 GMT futurist said:

Oct 27, 2017 18:13:25 GMT eurofed said:

As requested in another thread, here is a scenario for a successful Weimar Germany. Possible PoDs for this may vary, one of my preferred ones is Chancellor Heinrich Bruning getting successful in his schemes during the early 1930s. He sets up a customs union between Germany and Austria in 1931 which soon evolves in a democratic Anschluss. France is unable to interfere by sabotaging the German and Austrian banking system because the Great Depression hits it harder than OTL. Germany buys Mussolini's compliance by giving it a compensation package that includes German support for Italian ambitions in Ethiopia and the Balkans, as well as a deal to transfer the German-speaking population of South Tyrol to Germany.

Bruning engineers Germany's political stabilization by organizing a deal between the DNVP, the SPD, the Zentrum, and the Liberals to restore the Hohenzollern monarchy with the former Crown Prince or one of his sons on the throne. The former Kaiser is unable to veto the deal because of his early death, and his son approves it, securing full support from Hindenburg and the Nationalists. The Reichstag cancels the 1932 presidential election, extends Hindenburg's term, and proclaims a monarchy with Hindenburg as regent. Upon Hindenburg's death, Crown Prince William or one of his sons gets invited to assume the throne. The restored Kaiser more or less keeps the Reichspresident's powers, although most of his political decisions require the assent of the Chancellor or the competent Minister. The German government indefinitely suspends payment of reparations and starts a massive public-works program that significatively lessens unemployment.

These policies please the German public opinion and support for the NSDAP and the KPD substantially lessens. The government picks the excuse of Nazi and Communist involvement in street violence to ban both parties. When their militias try to stage a clumsy uprising in a uneasy alliance of convenience, the army crushes them without too much effort with the support of the Nationalist and Socialist militias. Bruning takes the opportunity of monarchical restoration and the failed Commie-Nazi uprising to enact a comprehensive constitutional reform. It includes introduction of constructive vote of no confidence, an electoral law reform to curb political fragmentation and ban extremist parties, a change of German states' borders to make federalism balanced, and a restoration of the most prestigious German dynasties besides the Hohenzollern as heads of state in various states, such as the Wettin in Saxony, the Wittelsbach in Bavaria, the Welf in Hanover, and the Habsburg in Austria. Political reforms, foreign-policy successes, and economic recovery spurred by public-works and rearmament programs stabilize German democracy and drain support for extremist movements to fringe insignificance. The new constitutional monarchy system proves a compromise all major German political factions (Nationalists, Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals) and the Heer can more or less support in good faith.

Germany re-establishes conscription, expands the army to full size, and scraps all weapons limitations, with the aim of land and air military parity with the Entente powers and the USSR. However it offers a deal to France and Britain for mutual and balanced arms limitations in Western Europe that would not endanger Germany on its eastern border nor Anglo-French control of the colonies. It scraps unilateral demilitarization of the Rhineland but offers the French to establish a mutual, balanced demilitarization of Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhineland. It signs a version of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement with an extension of naval limitations to submarines. Negotiations for a forces limitation and border demilitarization treaty in Western Europe prove complex but ultimately successful between Germany, France, and Britain.

When German rearmament has progressed enough, the German government starts to put increasing pressure on Czechoslovakia and Poland for a revision of the status of the Sudetenland, Danzig, and the Corridor by internationally-supervised plebiscites. Britain and France do not really care to risk a general war for the sake of territorial integrity of the Polish and Czechoslovak states, for the usual appeasement reasons magnified by the non-threatening attitude of democratic Germany and its ability to use national self-determination of ethnic Germans to win sympathy for its cause. The Czechs eventually cave in to international pressure and isolation; the Soviets offer military help but it proves impossible to provide after the Poles and the Romanians refuse to give passage to the Red Army. A plebiscite gives the Sudetenland to Germany and southern Slovakia to Hungary.

The Poles stubbornly cling to the Versailles status quo and refuse all German requests about a revision of the status of Danzig and the Corridor. Out of nationalist pride and overconfidence, they overestimate their own importance and military capabilities, and underestimate resurgent German military power, the threat of Soviet intervention, and their own growing isolation. The pro-German government of the Free City of Danzig eventually loses patience and sets up a plebiscite under its own authority. When it approves union with Germany, the Danzig authorities move to enact it and sever all ties with Poland. The Poles send their army in the Free City to suppress the union, and the Danzig Germans appeal to Berlin for military protection. Fighting between German and Polish troops starts in the Free City and soon escalates to a state of war.

Britain and France refuse any aid to Poland under these premises and the German army proves much more effective than the Poles had expected, quickly seizing the upper hand. The fate of Poland is sealed when the Soviets opportunistically invade the eastern Polish territories; the Polish army is utterly crushed in the two-front war, despite the poor performance of the Red Army. Despite mutual distrust, the Germans and the Soviets agree out of common interest to a partial partition of Poland. Germany annexes Danzig, the Corridor, and Upper Silesia. Being mindful of their past bad experiences with Polish separatism, the Germans enact a forced population exchange of the Polish population in the annexed territories and the remaining German minority in Poland. The USSR annexes the eastern Polish territories, and their inhabitants become subject to Stalinist terror.

This scenario is generally pretty realistic, but I think that it would better serve Germany's interests to keep the Sudeten Germans inside of Czechoslovakia so that they can act as a Trojan Horse there. Specifically, Germany could push the Sudeten Germans to push Czechoslovak politics forward in the direction of some kind of economic union with Germany. For instance, this can be done by having the Sudeten German political party/parties make closer economic ties with Germany a precondition for being a part of any Czechoslovak governing coalition.

As for Poland, I think that Britain and France might need some kind of German and perhaps Soviet "concession" to save face. Perhaps Poland is allowed to keep Gdynia and Lviv and a plebiscite is held in the remainder of the Polish Corridor?

Not really. Germany can easily absorb post-Munich Czechoslovakia into its sphere of influence without sacrificing any of its irredentist claims. Even IOTL, in the period between the Munich Accords and Czechoslovakia's downfall, the Czechoslovak government spontaneously adopted a pro-German stance that made it a client state of Berlin. Apart from the total seizure of Czechia's industrial resources and gold reserves, Hitler's occupation of Bohemia-Moravia was needless overkill for conqueror's pride's sake that severely harmed Germany's reputation for no clear foreign-policy gain and precipitated the collapse of appeasement. The pro-Entente nationalists like Benes went into exile and pro-German opportunists like Hacha took over. This is even more likely to occur ITTL since Czechoslovakia's geopolitical situation would be just the same and collaboration with a democratic Germany much easier to accept. In the unlikely case this spontaneous realignment of Czechoslovakia does not occur and Prague remains hostile, Germany can apply pressure by supporting Slovakia's secession, just like OTL but without military occupation of Bohemia-Moravia. In such a case, the grateful Slovaks would naturally ally with Berlin. Czechia would then be entirely encircled by Germany or its allies, and forced to bargain with Berlin on its terms. In either case, it would be relatively easy for the Germans to talk the Czechs into accepting a customs union and military alliance, esp. if the deal ultimately proves beneficial for Czech economy and security too.

As it concerns Poland, I'm skeptical Britain and France would care enough in these circumstances about Poland's territorial integrity to exercise serious diplomatic pressure to make the peace deal less harsh than Germany's and the USSR's long-standing claims. Especially not after the Poles brought disaster upon themselves with their intransigence. ITTL Britain would not have any diplomatic or strategic committment whatsoever to support Poland's Versailles borders, its access to the sea, or its control of the eastern territories, certainly not at the price of alienating Germany and Russia. They weren't even that enthused about this stuff in 1919-21, it was France's idea. As it concerns the French, after occupation of the Ruhr turned a disaster they would never do anything rash without the British having 100% of their back, and would inevitably follow London's lead. By the time the Polish crisis occurs, Britain and France would be fully in appeasement mood, and TTL's much more reasonable stance of Germany would make even more acceptable for the Western powers to support a satisfaction of Germany's reasonable claims. ITTL the Germans would not do anything to betray the Western powers' trust, so appeasement would be vindicated. ITTL the likes of Chamberlain are going to be hailed as wise statesmen that protected peace, and the likes of Churchill be ostracized as extremist warmongers.

Even more so if Germany, Britain, and France are able to achieve a regional forces limitation and border demilitarization deal in Western Europe that greatly lessens the risk of war on the Rhine. This would all but entirely eliminate any strategic interest of the Western powers to support the Versailles status quo in Eastern Europe against a sane Germany. They would retain an interest to contain Stalinist Russia, but they can delegate this task to a rearmed Weimar Germany, keeping the Germans satisfied and suitably busy, and focus on their own imperial interests and emergent colonial troubles. This was what appeasement was trying to do and with a sane, democratic Germany, all the pieces of the puzzle would fall into place.

The Entente powers may indeed prefer the continued existence of a suitably humbled and downsized Polish state, and given the circumstances it would be something Germany and the USSR are willing to concede. But after Poland lost the war, the 1914 eastern borders of Germany and the Curzon Line would be well-established precedents and the natural template for a peace deal. Diplomatic variables indeed may or may not leave Gdynia and/or Livno to Poland, but that's it. The Germans would never accept anything less than near-complete recovery of Danzig, the Corridor, and Upper Silesia after winning a war - although they may easily come to see Posen as more trouble than it is worth - and the Soviets would never accept anything less than near-complete recovery of the Kresy. Plebiscites for the contested territories of course would have been a natural solution if the crisis had been settled by diplomatic compromise, but once the crisis escalated to the point of war and Poland got its butt on a plate, they would be off the table. Any demographic facts on the ground that do not fit the territorial claims of the victorious Germans and Soviets are simply going to be rectified by forced population transfers, which by pre-WWII standards were an acceptable tool to settle intractable ethnic conflicts that destabilize political borders. The Poles in the territories annexed by Germany and the USSR are going to be forcibly transferred to the shrunken Polish state and that's the end of the issue for the foreseeable future, just like the other cases of population transfers in the 1919-1945 period. It is better than being sent to the Gulag, and TTL Poles shall never know how big a bullet they dodged with being humbled by a sane Germany.

As a matter of fact, it is entirely possible and even likely that after it settled its irredentist claims to its satisfaction, Weimar Germany offers the Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks a bargain including economic and military cooperation, free-trade access to the Baltic, strategic protection from the Soviet threat, and willing participation in a Mitteleuropa system, and circumstances drive these nations to accept, notwithstanding any lingering bad blood from territorial losses. The Munich Agreement and the Polish-German-Soviet war are going to make the Poles and the Czechoslovaks realize their post-Versailles foreign policy was unsustainable and cooperation with one of their great-power neighbors the only realistic option for survival. Democratic Germany would then look like a much more acceptable patron than Soviet Russia. Given the circumstances, Hungary and the Baltic states, quite possibly Finland too, are also going to be interested in getting the same Mitteleuropa deal.

Last Edit: May 9, 2018 13:06:57 GMT by eurofed

steffen
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Successful Weimar Germany May 8, 2018 17:15:43 GMT

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Post by steffen on May 8, 2018 17:15:43 GMT

May 8, 2018 2:09:43 GMT eurofed said:

Apr 21, 2018 19:32:06 GMT futurist said:

This scenario is generally pretty realistic, but I think that it would better serve Germany's interests to keep the Sudeten Germans inside of Czechoslovakia so that they can act as a Trojan Horse there. Specifically, Germany could push the Sudeten Germans to push Czechoslovak politics forward in the direction of some kind of economic union with Germany. For instance, this can be done by having the Sudeten German political party/parties make closer economic ties with Germany a precondition for being a part of any Czechoslovak governing coalition.

As for Poland, I think that Britain and France might need some kind of German and perhaps Soviet "concession" to save face. Perhaps Poland is allowed to keep Gdynia and Lviv and a plebiscite is held in the remainder of the Polish Corridor?

Not really. Germany can easily absorb post-Munich Czechoslovakia into its sphere of influence without sacrificing any of its irredentist claims. Even IOTL, in the period between the Munich Accords and Czechoslovakia's downfall, the Czechoslovak government spontaneously adopted a pro-German stance that made it a client state of Berlin. Apart from the total seizure of Czechia's industrial resources and gold reserves, Hitler's occupation of Bohemia-Moravia was needless overkill that severely harmed Germany's reputation for no clear foreign-policy gain and precipitated the collapse of appeasement. The pro-Entente nationalists like Benes went into exile and pro-German opportunists like Hacha took over. This is even more likely to occur ITTL since Czechoslovakia's geopolitical situation would be just the same and collaboration with a democratic Germany much easier to accept. In the unlikely case this spontaneous realignment of Czechoslovakia proves does not occur and Prague remains hostile, Germany can apply pressure by supporting Slovakia's secession, just like OTL but without military occupation of Bohemia-Moravia. In such a case, the grateful Slovaks would naturally ally with Berlin. Czechia would then be entirely encircled by Germany or its allies, and forced to bargain with Berlin. In both cases, it would be easy for the Germans to talk the Czechs into accepting a customs union and military alliance, esp. since the deal would be beneficial for Czech economy too.

As it concerns Poland, I'm skeptical Britain and France would care enough in these circumstances about Poland's territorial integrity to exercise serious diplomatic pressure to make the peace deal less harsh than Germany's and the USSR's long-standing claims. Especially not after the Poles brought disaster upon themselves with their intransigence. ITTL Britain would not have any diplomatic or strategic committment whatsoever to support Poland's Versailles borders, its access to the sea, or its control of the eastern territories, certainly not at the price of simultaneously alienating Germany and Russia. They weren't even that enthused about this stuff in 1919-21, it was France's idea. As it concerns the French, after occupation of the Ruhr turned a disaster they would never do anything rash without the British having 100% of their back, and would inevitably follow London's lead. By the time the Polish crisis occurs, Britain and France would be fully in appeasement mood, and TTL's much more reasonable stance of Germany would make even more acceptable for the Western powers to support a satisfaction of Germany's reasonable claims. ITTL the Germans would not do anything to betray the Western powers' trust, so appeasement would be vindicated. ITTL the likes of Chamberlain are going to be hailed as wise statesmen that protected peace, and the likes of Churchill be ostracized as extremist warmongers.

Even more so if Germany, Britain, and France are able to achieve a regional forces limitation and border demilitarization deal in Western Europe that greatly lessens the risk of war on the Rhine. This would all but entirely eliminate any strategic interest of the Western powers to support the Versailles status quo in Eastern Europe against a sane Germany. They would retain an interest to contain Stalinist Russia, but they can delegate this task to a rearmed Weimar Germany and its allies, keeping the Germans satisfied and suitably busy, and focus on their own imperial interests and emergent colonial troubles. This was what appeasement was trying to do and with a sane, democratic Germany, all the pieces of the puzzle would fall into place.

The Entente powers may indeed prefer the continued existence of a suitably humbled and downsized Polish state, and given the circumstances it would be something Germany and the USSR are willing to concede. But after Poland lost the war, the 1914 eastern borders of Germany and the Curzon Line would be a well-established precedent and the natural template for a peace deal. Diplomatic variables indeed may or may not leave Gdynia and/or Livno to Poland, but that's it. The Germans would never accept anything less than near-complete recovery of Danzig, the Corridor, and Upper Silesia after winning a war - although they may easily come to see Posen as more trouble than it is worth - and the Soviets would never accept anything less than near-complete recovery of the Kresy. Plebiscites for the contested territories of course would have been a natural solution if the crisis had been settled by diplomatic compromise, but once the crisis escalated to the point of war and Poland got its butt on a plate, they would be entirely off the table. Any demographic facts on the ground that do not fit the territorial claims of the victorious Germans and Soviets are simply going to be rectified by forced population transfers, which by pre-WWII standards were an acceptable tool to settle intractable ethnic conflicts that destabilize political borders. The Poles in the territories annexed by Germany and the USSR are going to be forcibly transferred to the shrunken Polish state and that's the end of the issue for the foreseeable future, just like the other OTL cases of population transfers after the World Wars. It is better than being sent to the Gulag, and TTL Poles shall never know how big a bullet they dodged with being humbled by a sane Germany.

As a matter of fact, it is entirely possible and even likely that much like Czechia and Slovakia, Germany in the end offers the Poles free access to all of its Baltic ports in exchange for Poland willingly joining its sphere of influence. The war would make the Poles realize their interwar foreign policy was suicidal and cooperation with one of its great-power neighbors the only realistic option for survival. Democratic Germany then would easily be a much more acceptable patron than Soviet Russia. IOTL Hungary and Romania made a similar choice, and TTL Germany would be a much nicer version of a patron. In this scenario, postwar Germany and Poland may easily end up bargaining economic and military cooperation in exchange for free access to the Baltic and protection from further Soviet threats. The deal would be beneficial to both sides, so once the bad blood settles down and Stalinist Russia becomes an ever more threatening bogeyman, Germany, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, and the Baltic states can easily build a Mitteleuropa economic union and military alliance based on willing cooperation.

The problem with a weimar germany in such conditions is, that has a complete different base to jump from.
Example 1: Weimar never would raise its military power the way the nazis did - by basically ruining the economy in mid terms for short term enlargement.
So in 1938 a weimar germany - even with a healthy recovery and similar moves to rearmament - would have a weaker military as Hitlers germany.
Till 1940 this would change, but in the critical phase of the late 30ties it is a different.
So Benes and co would propably fight, hoping that france would jump to their help. Would they? Propably... so you face war in 1938 with a much weaker germany, that is engaged against the chechoslovaks and france. Maybe poland would attack the chechs to gain ground - but not fight the french and not help the germans?
Puh, could be quite complicated.

But - nr.2 - the Weimarers never would risk war.
Yes, they would risk as much as possible, they would try to get the sudetenareas into the reich, esp. after they included austria.

So the steps for weimar would be similar to Hitler:
secret rearment -> remilitarize the rhineland (would work) -> Saarland come back (guaranteed - OTL even the most antinazi germans in the saar region voted pro germany, here it is even a better result) -> public rearmament (based on the facts that the other nations did not disarm as promised) -> recovery of the german economy and a drop of unemployment (similar to the nazis, but lesser but healthier)
-> Poland would still act the way they did otl, the polish government from 1936 was basically a military dictatorship, insane and stupid.

If the germans play their cards smart, they could gain austria earlier, without war threatening... just by asking the people in both countries. Result: quite sure pro unification.

After this it start to get tricky.
One thing is the reaction of the chechs, with austria beeing german their whole defence is gone.
If they give the sudeten more rights as OTL, would they want to stay there? I still doubt it, esp. with a democratic germany raising in power. So the pressure to let the sudeten leave, combined with benes (a very unnice person) leads to a conflict.

We need to know how italy reacted to austrian unification? Are they still isolated? If yes (my suggestion) the germans could play their cards well. Support Yugoslavia, contain italy (gaining plus in UK), the italian threat could be used to push rearment more... (because with mad dog benny at the frontier the democratic germany need a stronger army, right?)

Just say the sudetenareas go to germany, the slovaks get massive support by germany, breaking that state apart. Suddenly the chechs are surounded by germany or german allies. So they no longer are a problem/useful tool for the french.

France would for sure invest in poland, not because they fear evil germany but because they NEED an allied state they could work with against germany. Any germany.
This has interesting fallout in UK, if the british distant themself from france by that politics the french could be in deep troubles.
Also - that weimar germany has no troubles with the dutch or belgians... they hate the french (any german did that in this time), they maybe demand some corrections in the north (denmarks "interesting" gains after ww1) but i doubt it.
The only existing "problem" is poland.
Germany will have good relations to yugoslavia, hell they even could enter an alliance of defence, so italy attacking them attack also germany. With tons of in germany produced weapons sold to the yugoslavians (payed in strategic raw matrials), helping german unemployed to get jobs

Spain is a big ?, because in weimar they would love to see Franco win, but i doubt they send a legion fighting side with side with the italians?

Weaponwide the germans would still try to build cheap guns in numbers, so rocket artillery. The Nebelwerfer (from 81mm to 150mm to 210 and 300mm) are cheap, quick to manufacture and need no skilled workers to do so). You still need traditional artillery, but with no hitler you lack the megalaniac weapons.

The Stuka, the "Schnellbomber" and the Panzers would be developted, but i can see a "mark-IV-only" mass production, because you easily can swap a 50mm-Antitank-Gun with a 75mm HE-gun.
If the Skoda-works get into german hands (i think they will stay independent) they get some excellent ideas, maybe they buy the chechian T38, because they want some other tanks.

But poland would not be attacked in an insane strike.

Danzig would be demanded... in the League.. if the league accept the facts and poland invade danzig, germany would strike and that war would be no nice thing. Germany hated poland with passion, because the most germans belived that they got betrayed and "german ground stolen by the polish". But the racist elements of the nazi invasion would not be in, just like the Wehrmacht would have other leaders, all that political "rearrangement" that happened prewar would be avoided. Propably also no intense "mobile army", more a slower but better trained testbed...
say 4 tank divisions raised in 1935, fully build up till 1938, then 8 more till 1940, another 8 from 1942 on - but as a mobilisation force.
In that time they would improve the transport capacities... propably some motorised guns, some Stugs (for the infantry as mobile artillery), also the dive bombers and the mediums to support the advancing armies.

But in the same time the germans (from 1933 till propably around 1938) would work still with the russians, maybe getting some more informations here? Also the russians could benefit from the germans (say every tank a radio instead only every lead tank?)

But lets say the polish invade danzig after they declare they join germany. This war would start around 1940/41, the french would have finished their defence, would be more or less through their modernisation (lots of better airplanes), first mechanised corps (3 divisions)

the navy would be behind, esp. the british one... germany would not rearm in that speedy way, so UK would not rearm as much, too.
No Goering -> independent german naval airforce... so that would be some signifiant change.
Something like the Bismark could be build, but propably 3-4 years later, so it could be ready in 1942 (some less delays, but with modifications)
The german navy would be strong enough to defend the german bight and would dominate the baltics... against france some raiders (PBB, maybe some S and G) would be ready, maybe the first carrier (a mistake - the Zeppelin would need modernisation, so basically a harbour queen) and naval planes.

Germany would have more ties to the dutch, maybe even send forces to the pacific (PBB and S and G, some cruisers and destroyers) for help against a threatening japan...

Back to poland - secret negotiations with russia maybe? So russia could strike if the polish attack germany because of danzig? That could be a strategy... that could help to win a similar victory...

Just that a rump poland (as buffer between germany and russia) would be kept, in that the germans dump, err. resettle the new polish settlers in "old german" grounds... around 1 million or so).
For sure poland would be plundered, maybe the slovaks would join to get back some areas.

France would not be amused, but starting a war with germany AND russia for polish agressions? I doubt it. Esp., with italy making serious troubles (Albania, greece maybe) in the mediterain.

In the end (around 1943-45) you have a german lead economic block (propably with some eastern european countries (poland, hungaria?, bulgaria?, romania?, greece, yugoslavia), maybe denmark and sweden, and maybe one or two of the baltic states, maybe the netherlands (only economically and against japan military- the german idea behind that "maybe we get back our colonies from japan, in case of war, otherwise we could test our navy)

With yugoslavia you could finally see weimar entering into a war against italy... (again with the idea of getting something from italy from the ww1).

France would stay isolated, maybe together with spain (who knows how this would end). the german economic block would be working in a free-trade-zone, with the chechs, slowaks, hungarians, poles, etc. together... if some local war in the pacific happens the german navy suffers huge casulties in surface ships (S and G versus Kida Butai means "gluck gluck gluck", but german subs from dutch bases would hurt the japanese merchant fleet, later german long range bombers - together with british and american ones? - would strike back. Japan is doomed in this scenario, germany would demand back their "old" colonies from the japanese, maybe other japanese isles? who knows.
China for sure would not fell into communism

Stalin would or would noth fight the finns, but not pushing it over the edge. The baltics, at last the ones who are german partners, stay free and sometimes around 1945 a war between russia and the "german bloc + UK" could no longer happens... just because in technology the germans are leading in critical (hint - nuclear energy, jet power,missles, chemical weapons) areas.

France is interesting in this scenario, the same with italy.France could fell into socialism, later communism, trying a two-front-war with russia against germany.
Italy propably will overplay its cards and conquered by the central powers... either in greece (after albania) or if they try something with yugoslavia... with germany AND UK not delivering enough coal italy is a paper tiger... but Mussolini still could be in power.

Roosevelt would still try to rally his americans against germany, but after two terms he would be out, otl "famous" officers would be not so famous in this TL, because the german army - modern, but with bugs, would not fight that blitz-wars it was known for in OTL.

Sometimes a nuke make boom and i bet it will be a german nuke, but i have no clue what year it will be... propably around 1950-55.
Japan was beaten at this time, germany propably get back its pacific colonies from japan (not from UK), so they could test it here.. . YOu would have strange ideas (genetics, race theories, such nonsense), lots of racism... with no holocaust i can´t see the survivors ending in palestine... more realistic is that germany could be such place - refugees from russia and poland leave for germany. Maybe some "Uganda-plan" or maybe germany get back Deutsch-Ostafrika and start a settlersprogram, so in 1960 the majority of people here are german-jewish, who knows?

The empire still will fell appart, propably in the same time. Russia would finance lots of "liberty fighters", the communism as an idea would be at last as strong as OTL, but no iron curtain, or one at the russian-baltics-rump-polish-romanian borders

With no devasting war in central europe much more people would have a higher living standard...
i lack the knowledge if the dutch colonies could stay longer with them, propably not because the colonists mostly mistreated the natives and sometimes the idea of independence is to strong.

China could be a game changer... either a testbed for weapons, used in fights between warlords, or a strong, unified dicatorship with the whites, pro-american leadership, but also communist terrorism.

If japan come out lightly, they mabye could keep korea (shudder), but if they avoid the korean war, who knows how this works. Germany would loose its "newly gained" colonies 20-30 years later, but maybe some stronger ties?

eurofed
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Successful Weimar Germany May 9, 2018 18:31:22 GMT

Quote

Post by eurofed on May 9, 2018 18:31:22 GMT

May 8, 2018 17:15:43 GMT steffen said:

The problem with a weimar germany in such conditions is, that has a complete different base to jump from.
Example 1: Weimar never would raise its military power the way the nazis did - by basically ruining the economy in mid terms for short term enlargement.
So in 1938 a weimar germany - even with a healthy recovery and similar moves to rearmament - would have a weaker military as Hitlers germany.
Till 1940 this would change, but in the critical phase of the late 30ties it is a different.
So Benes and co would propably fight, hoping that france would jump to their help. Would they? Propably... so you face war in 1938 with a much weaker germany, that is engaged against the chechoslovaks and france. Maybe poland would attack the chechs to gain ground - but not fight the french and not help the germans?
Puh, could be quite complicated.

But - nr.2 - the Weimarers never would risk war.
Yes, they would risk as much as possible, they would try to get the sudetenareas into the reich, esp. after they included austria.

So the steps for weimar would be similar to Hitler:
secret rearment -> remilitarize the rhineland (would work) -> Saarland come back (guaranteed - OTL even the most antinazi germans in the saar region voted pro germany, here it is even a better result) -> public rearmament (based on the facts that the other nations did not disarm as promised) -> recovery of the german economy and a drop of unemployment (similar to the nazis, but lesser but healthier)
-> Poland would still act the way they did otl, the polish government from 1936 was basically a military dictatorship, insane and stupid.

If the germans play their cards smart, they could gain austria earlier, without war threatening... just by asking the people in both countries. Result: quite sure pro unification.

After this it start to get tricky.
One thing is the reaction of the chechs, with austria beeing german their whole defence is gone.
If they give the sudeten more rights as OTL, would they want to stay there? I still doubt it, esp. with a democratic germany raising in power. So the pressure to let the sudeten leave, combined with benes (a very unnice person) leads to a conflict.

We need to know how italy reacted to austrian unification? Are they still isolated? If yes (my suggestion) the germans could play their cards well. Support Yugoslavia, contain italy (gaining plus in UK), the italian threat could be used to push rearment more... (because with mad dog benny at the frontier the democratic germany need a stronger army, right?)

Just say the sudetenareas go to germany, the slovaks get massive support by germany, breaking that state apart. Suddenly the chechs are surounded by germany or german allies. So they no longer are a problem/useful tool for the french.

France would for sure invest in poland, not because they fear evil germany but because they NEED an allied state they could work with against germany. Any germany.
This has interesting fallout in UK, if the british distant themself from france by that politics the french could be in deep troubles.
Also - that weimar germany has no troubles with the dutch or belgians... they hate the french (any german did that in this time), they maybe demand some corrections in the north (denmarks "interesting" gains after ww1) but i doubt it.
The only existing "problem" is poland.
Germany will have good relations to yugoslavia, hell they even could enter an alliance of defence, so italy attacking them attack also germany. With tons of in germany produced weapons sold to the yugoslavians (payed in strategic raw matrials), helping german unemployed to get jobs

Spain is a big ?, because in weimar they would love to see Franco win, but i doubt they send a legion fighting side with side with the italians?

Weaponwide the germans would still try to build cheap guns in numbers, so rocket artillery. The Nebelwerfer (from 81mm to 150mm to 210 and 300mm) are cheap, quick to manufacture and need no skilled workers to do so). You still need traditional artillery, but with no hitler you lack the megalaniac weapons.

The Stuka, the "Schnellbomber" and the Panzers would be developted, but i can see a "mark-IV-only" mass production, because you easily can swap a 50mm-Antitank-Gun with a 75mm HE-gun.
If the Skoda-works get into german hands (i think they will stay independent) they get some excellent ideas, maybe they buy the chechian T38, because they want some other tanks.

But poland would not be attacked in an insane strike.

Danzig would be demanded... in the League.. if the league accept the facts and poland invade danzig, germany would strike and that war would be no nice thing. Germany hated poland with passion, because the most germans belived that they got betrayed and "german ground stolen by the polish". But the racist elements of the nazi invasion would not be in, just like the Wehrmacht would have other leaders, all that political "rearrangement" that happened prewar would be avoided. Propably also no intense "mobile army", more a slower but better trained testbed...
say 4 tank divisions raised in 1935, fully build up till 1938, then 8 more till 1940, another 8 from 1942 on - but as a mobilisation force.
In that time they would improve the transport capacities... propably some motorised guns, some Stugs (for the infantry as mobile artillery), also the dive bombers and the mediums to support the advancing armies.

But in the same time the germans (from 1933 till propably around 1938) would work still with the russians, maybe getting some more informations here? Also the russians could benefit from the germans (say every tank a radio instead only every lead tank?)

But lets say the polish invade danzig after they declare they join germany. This war would start around 1940/41, the french would have finished their defence, would be more or less through their modernisation (lots of better airplanes), first mechanised corps (3 divisions)

the navy would be behind, esp. the british one... germany would not rearm in that speedy way, so UK would not rearm as much, too.
No Goering -> independent german naval airforce... so that would be some signifiant change.
Something like the Bismark could be build, but propably 3-4 years later, so it could be ready in 1942 (some less delays, but with modifications)
The german navy would be strong enough to defend the german bight and would dominate the baltics... against france some raiders (PBB, maybe some S and G) would be ready, maybe the first carrier (a mistake - the Zeppelin would need modernisation, so basically a harbour queen) and naval planes.

Germany would have more ties to the dutch, maybe even send forces to the pacific (PBB and S and G, some cruisers and destroyers) for help against a threatening japan...

Back to poland - secret negotiations with russia maybe? So russia could strike if the polish attack germany because of danzig? That could be a strategy... that could help to win a similar victory...

Just that a rump poland (as buffer between germany and russia) would be kept, in that the germans dump, err. resettle the new polish settlers in "old german" grounds... around 1 million or so).
For sure poland would be plundered, maybe the slovaks would join to get back some areas.

France would not be amused, but starting a war with germany AND russia for polish agressions? I doubt it. Esp., with italy making serious troubles (Albania, greece maybe) in the mediterain.

In the end (around 1943-45) you have a german lead economic block (propably with some eastern european countries (poland, hungaria?, bulgaria?, romania?, greece, yugoslavia), maybe denmark and sweden, and maybe one or two of the baltic states, maybe the netherlands (only economically and against japan military- the german idea behind that "maybe we get back our colonies from japan, in case of war, otherwise we could test our navy)

With yugoslavia you could finally see weimar entering into a war against italy... (again with the idea of getting something from italy from the ww1).

France would stay isolated, maybe together with spain (who knows how this would end). the german economic block would be working in a free-trade-zone, with the chechs, slowaks, hungarians, poles, etc. together... if some local war in the pacific happens the german navy suffers huge casulties in surface ships (S and G versus Kida Butai means "gluck gluck gluck", but german subs from dutch bases would hurt the japanese merchant fleet, later german long range bombers - together with british and american ones? - would strike back. Japan is doomed in this scenario, germany would demand back their "old" colonies from the japanese, maybe other japanese isles? who knows.
China for sure would not fell into communism

Stalin would or would noth fight the finns, but not pushing it over the edge. The baltics, at last the ones who are german partners, stay free and sometimes around 1945 a war between russia and the "german bloc + UK" could no longer happens... just because in technology the germans are leading in critical (hint - nuclear energy, jet power,missles, chemical weapons) areas.

France is interesting in this scenario, the same with italy.France could fell into socialism, later communism, trying a two-front-war with russia against germany.
Italy propably will overplay its cards and conquered by the central powers... either in greece (after albania) or if they try something with yugoslavia... with germany AND UK not delivering enough coal italy is a paper tiger... but Mussolini still could be in power.

Roosevelt would still try to rally his americans against germany, but after two terms he would be out, otl "famous" officers would be not so famous in this TL, because the german army - modern, but with bugs, would not fight that blitz-wars it was known for in OTL.

Sometimes a nuke make boom and i bet it will be a german nuke, but i have no clue what year it will be... propably around 1950-55.
Japan was beaten at this time, germany propably get back its pacific colonies from japan (not from UK), so they could test it here.. . YOu would have strange ideas (genetics, race theories, such nonsense), lots of racism... with no holocaust i can´t see the survivors ending in palestine... more realistic is that germany could be such place - refugees from russia and poland leave for germany. Maybe some "Uganda-plan" or maybe germany get back Deutsch-Ostafrika and start a settlersprogram, so in 1960 the majority of people here are german-jewish, who knows?

The empire still will fell appart, propably in the same time. Russia would finance lots of "liberty fighters", the communism as an idea would be at last as strong as OTL, but no iron curtain, or one at the russian-baltics-rump-polish-romanian borders

With no devasting war in central europe much more people would have a higher living standard...
i lack the knowledge if the dutch colonies could stay longer with them, propably not because the colonists mostly mistreated the natives and sometimes the idea of independence is to strong.

China could be a game changer... either a testbed for weapons, used in fights between warlords, or a strong, unified dicatorship with the whites, pro-american leadership, but also communist terrorism.

If japan come out lightly, they mabye could keep korea (shudder), but if they avoid the korean war, who knows how this works. Germany would loose its "newly gained" colonies 20-30 years later, but maybe some stronger ties?

I agree with most of your ideas and it seems our analysis of the scenario is largely convergent. I only have a few points to make:

Re. Italy and Yugoslavia, it is my reasoned opinion in economic and strategic terms it would be much preferable for a resurgent Weimar Germany to side with a great power like Italy, albeit of the junior tier, than with an instable minor power like Yugoslavia, which, if the OTL 1941 coup is anything to go by, would not even be much reliable as an ally of Germany. The only good reason for Germany to do the opposite would be if it is implacably determined to get South Tyrol, and IMO recovery of South Tyrol from Italy and Alsace-Lorraine from France was much more trouble than it was worth. Berlin should pursue those acquisitions if and only if Italy and/or France prove radically hostile on their own initiative. Even Hitler followed this course IOTL.

Friendship of Italy would be quite valuable to Germany to pave the way to an painless Anschluss, expand its sphere of influence and trade bloc, and broaden its reach in the Med, esp. once conquest of Ethiopia causes solidarity between Italy and the Entente powers to break down. Without the Nazi regime's recklessness and brutality to enable his own, Mussolini would not be that troublesome an ally for Weimar Germany, not more so than various right-wing dictatorships were for the USA during the Cold War. The Germans may reliably buy his friendship and satisfy his ambitions without excessive trouble by supporting Italy in its expansionist ventures against those entities Britain and France did not care about to the point of fighting or getting radically alienated, such as Ethiopia, Republican Spain during the civil war, Albania, and Yugoslavia.

According to this strategy, Germany should support Italian acquisition of Ethiopia and Albania, and cooperate with Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria to back the separatist activities of restive Yugoslav nationalities, such as the Croats, Macedonian Bulgarians, and Kosovo Albanians. When civil war explodes in Yugoslavia as a result, a front of its neighbors would have an excellent pretext to intervene and impose the controlled breakup and 1941-style partition of Yugoslavia according to their own interests. Germany would get northern Slovenia, autonomy for Banat under the control of its German community, and closer alliance ties with Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Italy would seize southern Slovenia, coastal Dalmatia, the Adriatic islands, Kosovo for its Albanian protectorate, and Montenegro as a client state. Hungary would get its 1941 annexations. Bulgaria would annex Vardar Macedonia. Croatia would become independent as a client state of Italy and Germany with the 1939 Banovina of Croatia borders. This way, Germany and its allies would bring the Western Balkans under their control and eliminate another potentially hostile spawn of Versailles. Britain did not really care much about the integrity of Albania or Yugoslavia, and France would have little to complain if Yugoslavia seemingly collapses and is carved up by its neighbors as a result of its own internal instability. On the other hand, going after Greece is too dangerous for Italy and its allies because of the risk of antagonizing Britain, and Germany should firmly discourage this course. On the gripping hand, if he can net the above gains, Mussolini should be satisfied enough to leave Greece alone.

As it concerns the Spanish Civil War, in the absence of the Nazi regime the Nationalists are in all likelihood going to look like the lesser evil in comparison to the Communist-dominated Republicans for the Western conservative ruling elites and public opinion, no matter what the local far-leftists may say or do. The only possible exception may be France if the Popular Front is in power, and even so the French left-wingers cannot go too far to support the Republicans, or they would suffer a radical backlash from French right-wingers, quite possibly all the way to the fall of the Third Republic. Therefore, it should be safe for Germany and Italy to cooperate and support the Nationalists all the way to victory, quite likely with the benevolence of the Conservative British government. If this causes severe political instability in France, all the better for Berlin and Rome.

Notwithstanding the personal sympathies and antipathies of FDR, there is pretty much nothing in the actions and character of TTL Weimar Germany he may exploit to justify an anti-German foreign policy platform to the Congress, US public opinion, and the rest of the American ruling elites. So he shall mind his own business. TTL America is going to stay isolationist and basically unconcerned with European events. The 1936 Olympics shall be a PR triumph for Germany, unsullied by any controversy.

Despite the stereotype, with a PoD in the early 1930s, events in East Asia might take various different courses. Japanese seizure of Manchuria is pretty much a given, but invasion of China proper and rampage in South East Asia are not, by any means. Political conflict in Japan might lead to a defeat and purge of the ultra-nationalist faction in the armed forces, binding Japan to a moderate foreign-policy platform that is satisfied with Manchuria and at most projecting influence in North China through the support of pro-Japanese warlords and KMT dissidents. Or tensions with the USSR may worry Japan enough it never feels safe to go on a military adventure in China. Under Chiang's leadership, Nationalist China is going to stay focused on repression of Communists, corralling of the warlords, and internal stabilization and development for a good while, and do not really contest control of Manchuria to Japan.

Or Stalin may decide the only safe avenue for expansion is East Asia, and got to war with Japan for control of Manchuria and North China. Japan would likely lose (assuming the effects of the purges and the logistic bottleneck are not too burdersome for the Red Army), although it would keep Korea (its conquest would be a bridge too far with an intact and undistracted IJA and IJN) and seize all of Sakhalin as a consolation prize. If this conflict occurs, China is likely to get divided between a Communist North and a Nationalist South. Otherwise, if Japan stays put as described above, the KMT is going to finish purging the CCP, and consolidate its regime.

Besides possible military adventures in East Asia, and eating itself alive with purge after purge, the USSR is going to continue its rearmament, carve its slice of Poland when the Danzig crisis explodes into war with Warsaw as the aggressor, and gobble the Baltic states (unless Germany shelters them under its strategic umbrella). Other expansionist initiatives against Finland, Romania, or Turkey are possible but would carry an high risk of the European power forming an united anti-Communist front and intervening or drawing a line in the sand. Of course, it is entirely possible Stalin miscalculates and stumbles in a general conflict with Europe. Otherwise, the USSR is going to focus on destabilization of the European colonial empires. This, Soviet rearmament, and the brutal nature of the Stalinism greatly magnified by the absence of Nazism is going to make the USSR more and more like the main international threat and rogue actor for all the other great powers.

Last Edit: May 10, 2018 3:40:24 GMT by eurofed

steffen
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Successful Weimar Germany May 10, 2018 10:43:09 GMT

Quote

Post by steffen on May 10, 2018 10:43:09 GMT

May 9, 2018 18:31:22 GMT eurofed said:

May 8, 2018 17:15:43 GMT steffen said:

The problem with a weimar germany in such conditions is, that has a complete different base to jump from.
Example 1: Weimar never would raise its military power the way the nazis did - by basically ruining the economy in mid terms for short term enlargement.
So in 1938 a weimar germany - even with a healthy recovery and similar moves to rearmament - would have a weaker military as Hitlers germany.
Till 1940 this would change, but in the critical phase of the late 30ties it is a different.
So Benes and co would propably fight, hoping that france would jump to their help. Would they? Propably... so you face war in 1938 with a much weaker germany, that is engaged against the chechoslovaks and france. Maybe poland would attack the chechs to gain ground - but not fight the french and not help the germans?
Puh, could be quite complicated.

But - nr.2 - the Weimarers never would risk war.
Yes, they would risk as much as possible, they would try to get the sudetenareas into the reich, esp. after they included austria.

So the steps for weimar would be similar to Hitler:
secret rearment -> remilitarize the rhineland (would work) -> Saarland come back (guaranteed - OTL even the most antinazi germans in the saar region voted pro germany, here it is even a better result) -> public rearmament (based on the facts that the other nations did not disarm as promised) -> recovery of the german economy and a drop of unemployment (similar to the nazis, but lesser but healthier)
-> Poland would still act the way they did otl, the polish government from 1936 was basically a military dictatorship, insane and stupid.

If the germans play their cards smart, they could gain austria earlier, without war threatening... just by asking the people in both countries. Result: quite sure pro unification.

After this it start to get tricky.
One thing is the reaction of the chechs, with austria beeing german their whole defence is gone.
If they give the sudeten more rights as OTL, would they want to stay there? I still doubt it, esp. with a democratic germany raising in power. So the pressure to let the sudeten leave, combined with benes (a very unnice person) leads to a conflict.

We need to know how italy reacted to austrian unification? Are they still isolated? If yes (my suggestion) the germans could play their cards well. Support Yugoslavia, contain italy (gaining plus in UK), the italian threat could be used to push rearment more... (because with mad dog benny at the frontier the democratic germany need a stronger army, right?)

Just say the sudetenareas go to germany, the slovaks get massive support by germany, breaking that state apart. Suddenly the chechs are surounded by germany or german allies. So they no longer are a problem/useful tool for the french.

France would for sure invest in poland, not because they fear evil germany but because they NEED an allied state they could work with against germany. Any germany.
This has interesting fallout in UK, if the british distant themself from france by that politics the french could be in deep troubles.
Also - that weimar germany has no troubles with the dutch or belgians... they hate the french (any german did that in this time), they maybe demand some corrections in the north (denmarks "interesting" gains after ww1) but i doubt it.
The only existing "problem" is poland.
Germany will have good relations to yugoslavia, hell they even could enter an alliance of defence, so italy attacking them attack also germany. With tons of in germany produced weapons sold to the yugoslavians (payed in strategic raw matrials), helping german unemployed to get jobs

Spain is a big ?, because in weimar they would love to see Franco win, but i doubt they send a legion fighting side with side with the italians?

Weaponwide the germans would still try to build cheap guns in numbers, so rocket artillery. The Nebelwerfer (from 81mm to 150mm to 210 and 300mm) are cheap, quick to manufacture and need no skilled workers to do so). You still need traditional artillery, but with no hitler you lack the megalaniac weapons.

The Stuka, the "Schnellbomber" and the Panzers would be developted, but i can see a "mark-IV-only" mass production, because you easily can swap a 50mm-Antitank-Gun with a 75mm HE-gun.
If the Skoda-works get into german hands (i think they will stay independent) they get some excellent ideas, maybe they buy the chechian T38, because they want some other tanks.

But poland would not be attacked in an insane strike.

Danzig would be demanded... in the League.. if the league accept the facts and poland invade danzig, germany would strike and that war would be no nice thing. Germany hated poland with passion, because the most germans belived that they got betrayed and "german ground stolen by the polish". But the racist elements of the nazi invasion would not be in, just like the Wehrmacht would have other leaders, all that political "rearrangement" that happened prewar would be avoided. Propably also no intense "mobile army", more a slower but better trained testbed...
say 4 tank divisions raised in 1935, fully build up till 1938, then 8 more till 1940, another 8 from 1942 on - but as a mobilisation force.
In that time they would improve the transport capacities... propably some motorised guns, some Stugs (for the infantry as mobile artillery), also the dive bombers and the mediums to support the advancing armies.

But in the same time the germans (from 1933 till propably around 1938) would work still with the russians, maybe getting some more informations here? Also the russians could benefit from the germans (say every tank a radio instead only every lead tank?)

But lets say the polish invade danzig after they declare they join germany. This war would start around 1940/41, the french would have finished their defence, would be more or less through their modernisation (lots of better airplanes), first mechanised corps (3 divisions)

the navy would be behind, esp. the british one... germany would not rearm in that speedy way, so UK would not rearm as much, too.
No Goering -> independent german naval airforce... so that would be some signifiant change.
Something like the Bismark could be build, but propably 3-4 years later, so it could be ready in 1942 (some less delays, but with modifications)
The german navy would be strong enough to defend the german bight and would dominate the baltics... against france some raiders (PBB, maybe some S and G) would be ready, maybe the first carrier (a mistake - the Zeppelin would need modernisation, so basically a harbour queen) and naval planes.

Germany would have more ties to the dutch, maybe even send forces to the pacific (PBB and S and G, some cruisers and destroyers) for help against a threatening japan...

Back to poland - secret negotiations with russia maybe? So russia could strike if the polish attack germany because of danzig? That could be a strategy... that could help to win a similar victory...

Just that a rump poland (as buffer between germany and russia) would be kept, in that the germans dump, err. resettle the new polish settlers in "old german" grounds... around 1 million or so).
For sure poland would be plundered, maybe the slovaks would join to get back some areas.

France would not be amused, but starting a war with germany AND russia for polish agressions? I doubt it. Esp., with italy making serious troubles (Albania, greece maybe) in the mediterain.

In the end (around 1943-45) you have a german lead economic block (propably with some eastern european countries (poland, hungaria?, bulgaria?, romania?, greece, yugoslavia), maybe denmark and sweden, and maybe one or two of the baltic states, maybe the netherlands (only economically and against japan military- the german idea behind that "maybe we get back our colonies from japan, in case of war, otherwise we could test our navy)

With yugoslavia you could finally see weimar entering into a war against italy... (again with the idea of getting something from italy from the ww1).

France would stay isolated, maybe together with spain (who knows how this would end). the german economic block would be working in a free-trade-zone, with the chechs, slowaks, hungarians, poles, etc. together... if some local war in the pacific happens the german navy suffers huge casulties in surface ships (S and G versus Kida Butai means "gluck gluck gluck", but german subs from dutch bases would hurt the japanese merchant fleet, later german long range bombers - together with british and american ones? - would strike back. Japan is doomed in this scenario, germany would demand back their "old" colonies from the japanese, maybe other japanese isles? who knows.
China for sure would not fell into communism

Stalin would or would noth fight the finns, but not pushing it over the edge. The baltics, at last the ones who are german partners, stay free and sometimes around 1945 a war between russia and the "german bloc + UK" could no longer happens... just because in technology the germans are leading in critical (hint - nuclear energy, jet power,missles, chemical weapons) areas.

France is interesting in this scenario, the same with italy.France could fell into socialism, later communism, trying a two-front-war with russia against germany.
Italy propably will overplay its cards and conquered by the central powers... either in greece (after albania) or if they try something with yugoslavia... with germany AND UK not delivering enough coal italy is a paper tiger... but Mussolini still could be in power.

Roosevelt would still try to rally his americans against germany, but after two terms he would be out, otl "famous" officers would be not so famous in this TL, because the german army - modern, but with bugs, would not fight that blitz-wars it was known for in OTL.

Sometimes a nuke make boom and i bet it will be a german nuke, but i have no clue what year it will be... propably around 1950-55.
Japan was beaten at this time, germany propably get back its pacific colonies from japan (not from UK), so they could test it here.. . YOu would have strange ideas (genetics, race theories, such nonsense), lots of racism... with no holocaust i can´t see the survivors ending in palestine... more realistic is that germany could be such place - refugees from russia and poland leave for germany. Maybe some "Uganda-plan" or maybe germany get back Deutsch-Ostafrika and start a settlersprogram, so in 1960 the majority of people here are german-jewish, who knows?

The empire still will fell appart, propably in the same time. Russia would finance lots of "liberty fighters", the communism as an idea would be at last as strong as OTL, but no iron curtain, or one at the russian-baltics-rump-polish-romanian borders

With no devasting war in central europe much more people would have a higher living standard...
i lack the knowledge if the dutch colonies could stay longer with them, propably not because the colonists mostly mistreated the natives and sometimes the idea of independence is to strong.

China could be a game changer... either a testbed for weapons, used in fights between warlords, or a strong, unified dicatorship with the whites, pro-american leadership, but also communist terrorism.

If japan come out lightly, they mabye could keep korea (shudder), but if they avoid the korean war, who knows how this works. Germany would loose its "newly gained" colonies 20-30 years later, but maybe some stronger ties?

I agree with most of your ideas and it seems our analysis of the scenario is largely convergent. I only have a few points to make:

Re. Italy and Yugoslavia, it is my reasoned opinion in economic and strategic terms it would be much preferable for a resurgent Weimar Germany to side with a great power like Italy, albeit of the junior tier, than with an instable minor power like Yugoslavia, which, if the OTL 1941 coup is anything to go by, would not even be much reliable as an ally of Germany. The only good reason for Germany to do the opposite would be if it is implacably determined to get South Tyrol, and IMO recovery of South Tyrol from Italy and Alsace-Lorraine from France was much more trouble than it was worth. Berlin should pursue those acquisitions if and only if Italy and/or France prove radically hostile on their own initiative. Even Hitler followed this course IOTL.

Friendship of Italy would be quite valuable to Germany to pave the way to an painless Anschluss, expand its sphere of influence and trade bloc, and broaden its reach in the Med, esp. once conquest of Ethiopia causes solidarity between Italy and the Entente powers to break down. Without the Nazi regime's recklessness and brutality to enable his own, Mussolini would not be that troublesome an ally for Weimar Germany, not more so than various right-wing dictatorships were for the USA during the Cold War. The Germans may reliably buy his friendship and satisfy his ambitions without excessive trouble by supporting Italy in its expansionist ventures against those entities Britain and France did not care about to the point of fighting or getting radically alienated, such as Ethiopia, Republican Spain during the civil war, Albania, and Yugoslavia.

According to this strategy, Germany should support Italian acquisition of Ethiopia and Albania, and cooperate with Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria to back the separatist activities of restive Yugoslav nationalities, such as the Croats, Macedonian Bulgarians, and Kosovo Albanians. When civil war explodes in Yugoslavia as a result, a front of its neighbors would have an excellent pretext to intervene and impose the controlled breakup and 1941-style partition of Yugoslavia according to their own interests. Germany would get northern Slovenia, autonomy for Banat under the control of its German community, and closer alliance ties with Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Italy would seize southern Slovenia, coastal Dalmatia, the Adriatic islands, Kosovo for its Albanian protectorate, and Montenegro as a client state. Hungary would get its 1941 annexations. Bulgaria would annex Vardar Macedonia. Croatia would become independent as a client state of Italy and Germany with the 1939 Banovina of Croatia borders. This way, Germany and its allies would bring the Western Balkans under their control and eliminate another potentially hostile spawn of Versailles. Britain did not really care much about the integrity of Albania or Yugoslavia, and France would have little to complain if Yugoslavia seemingly collapses and is carved up by its neighbors as a result of its own internal instability. On the other hand, going after Greece is too dangerous for Italy and its allies because of the risk of antagonizing Britain, and Germany should firmly discourage this course. On the gripping hand, if he can net the above gains, Mussolini should be satisfied enough to leave Greece alone.

As it concerns the Spanish Civil War, in the absence of the Nazi regime the Nationalists are in all likelihood going to look like the lesser evil in comparison to the Communist-dominated Republicans for the Western conservative ruling elites and public opinion, no matter what the local far-leftists may say or do. The only possible exception may be France if the Popular Front is in power, and even so the French left-wingers cannot go too far to support the Republicans, or they would suffer a radical backlash from French right-wingers, quite possibly all the way to the fall of the Third Republic. Therefore, it should be safe for Germany and Italy to cooperate and support the Nationalists all the way to victory, quite likely with the benevolence of the Conservative British government. If this causes severe political instability in France, all the better for Berlin and Rome.

Notwithstanding the personal sympathies and antipathies of FDR, there is pretty much nothing in the actions and character of TTL Weimar Germany he may exploit to justify an anti-German foreign policy platform to the Congress, US public opinion, and the rest of the American ruling elites. So he shall mind his own business. TTL America is going to stay isolationist and basically unconcerned with European events. The 1936 Olympics shall be a PR triumph for Germany, unsullied by any controversy.

Despite the stereotype, with a PoD in the early 1930s, events in East Asia might take various different courses. Japanese seizure of Manchuria is pretty much a given, but invasion of China proper and rampage in South East Asia are not, by any means. Political conflict in Japan might lead to a defeat and purge of the ultra-nationalist faction in the armed forces, binding Japan to a moderate foreign-policy platform that is satisfied with Manchuria and at most projecting influence in North China through the support of pro-Japanese warlords and KMT dissidents. Or tensions with the USSR may worry Japan enough it never feels safe to go on a military adventure in China. Under Chiang's leadership, Nationalist China is going to stay focused on repression of Communists, corralling of the warlords, and internal stabilization and development for a good while, and do not really contest control of Manchuria to Japan.

Or Stalin may decide the only safe avenue for expansion is East Asia, and got to war with Japan for control of Manchuria and North China. Japan would likely lose (assuming the effects of the purges and the logistic bottleneck are not too burdersome for the Red Army), although it would keep Korea (its conquest would be a bridge too far with an intact and undistracted IJA and IJN) and seize all of Sakhalin as a consolation prize. If this conflict occurs, China is likely to get divided between a Communist North and a Nationalist South. Otherwise, if Japan stays put as described above, the KMT is going to finish purging the CCP, and consolidate its regime.

Besides possible military adventures in East Asia, and eating itself alive with purge after purge, the USSR is going to continue its rearmament, carve its slice of Poland when the Danzig crisis explodes into war with Warsaw as the aggressor, and gobble the Baltic states (unless Germany shelters them under its strategic umbrella). Other expansionist initiatives against Finland, Romania, or Turkey are possible but would carry an high risk of the European power forming an united anti-Communist front and intervening or drawing a line in the sand. Of course, it is entirely possible Stalin miscalculates and stumbles in a general conflict with Europe. Otherwise, the USSR is going to focus on destabilization of the European colonial empires. This, Soviet rearmament, and the brutal nature of the Stalinism greatly magnified by the absence of Nazism is going to make the USSR more and more like the main international threat and rogue actor for all the other great powers.

Hi,

for sure it would be good (with hindsight) to outplay italy, use them to get a peacefull Anschluss and then – with Mussolini going into war mode in europe – drop em like a hot stone (best time – after Germany had established enough military power to hold their own against france and Poland – in my opinion a Weimar Germany would reach this point (with Austria and without the economy of the chechs) around 1940/41).

But that would be unrealistic – Weimar was no friend of Italy, Italy had troubles with Germany (they were still enemies to the old Austrians and they tried to push Austria into their own sphere of influence. Think also about the facist regime in Austria). I can´t see a development in that Germany and Austria (the majority of the people) want to unify and Italy stand positive to that. So I think that Germany and Italy in this scenario (without Hitlers admiration of Mussolini and copying him) will not be at best terms.

For sure german coal would help to reduce troubles, but it will be no Achse as OTL. Weimar will look for the own interests ONLY, so a UK that give something for Germany standing neutral/against Italy is more interesting for Weimar as standing loyal to the Duce.

Germany – and here esp the scientists who count – will have a more civil and peacedirected approach, so the massacres and killings in northern Africa and ethopia by the Italians will ruin any stand they have in Germany. Again – no Hitler means the Italians will be seen as what they are – brutal occupiers and gassing civilian killers. Even if you make money with them, propably selling coal for informations, technology, rights to explore ressources, propably also weapons and such stuff) you are no allied nation.

This will have impact on Italy, because it is alone more or less. With no strong nazi Germany in the north we do not know if Mussolini will push into Greece. Hopefully he will not do that.

Yugoslavia wasn´t a choice of the hearth, but the idea is that this Weimar Germany, even with the Austrian part will have no interests in Yugoslavian areas – similar to china after they lost tsingtau – and could do true economic deals without territorital interests. With Yugoslavia OTL leaning to nazi Germany I think Weimar will have no troubles with Yugoslavia, even less in this time. I can also see NO regime change, that happened in WW2 with the people leaning to the Allies and the government working with the Nazis. Here – no Nazis, no war (at last I see no big war). Why should they exchange the government? So Germany has its economic deals (they needed stuff and ressources out of Yugoslavia, selling weapons (as long as they care for arms limitations they could produce stuff and sell it to them).

Overall I do not see Weimar as the “good state”, they will do everything to cheat for Versailles and any government, from far left to far right will try to get back the 1914-borders. They even accept local wars, say with Poland, to get back what was – in their eyes – rightfull german. Modern poles would disagree STRONGLY, but I try to see it with the eyes of 1920er and 1930er germans.

I am undecided with the Sudetenareas, but I think, if they unify with Austria most governments in Germany will look for “Unification of most german speaking areas into german borders”.

So – if france would give something, they would drop their demands on Elsass-Lothringen, esp. with so many French living here and only a few “germans” existing in it, but if the hate is still there, Germany would –in case of war and victory – punish france HARD. So the Elsass get back, also industrial areas to cripple france. But that depends on wars. If no war get started, the germans would still hate france with passion, propably the French will also hate the germans, but also fear them.

UK could near Germany, because the USSR gets more and more powerful, also the situation in the pacific could bring UK into such a situation that they want the germans to fight japan, too.

Could Japan and the general situation in the pacific change?

I doubt it, japan was since 1905 on a path to “hell”, it could have been stopped since around 1915, but from that date japan had decided it wanted to dominate china, because they feared them. You cannot solve that problem, esp. with the underlaying fear of Chinese dominance and the racist attitude in japan. Their mistreatment of “colonial” people, like the manchuko-chinese, but more so the Koreans make clear that japan will at one point in time start some colonial war. Either against a “weak appearing” European country, here propably the Dutch – they have everything japan needs, or they run into a war with Russia – OTL they get beaten and were quite terrified, I think this could/would repeat itself.

Some things cannot be stopped with the TL starting in Weimar “surviving”. Even if you go as far as 1923 – to remove hitler early on – the Japanese had decided that they want to be “the” pacific power -> so a conflict with the USA is in the cards and also UK had already dropped japan for the USA.

But you could see – say around 1935 a local war with a conflict around the dutch colonies. The dutch had some opposition in their colonies. If the Japanese – with no war in the west and no chance to use that – start supporting independence movements, they could support em, call for help for suppressed people and by that start a prepared conflict with the dutch. All the time they fight in china. So the dutch, with some british and german help – Britain under the deck, Germany openly – they would still have interests in china and without Hitler and the Nazis the germans would have supported the Chinese… similar to the USA based on economic interests. So a war, the dutch and germans, later maybe the USA against japan.

Japan would win, the german navy would suffer defeats, but sometimes the USA enters and then the allies (Dutch, Germany, USA, propably UK too) would beat the Japanese.

If the USA give the Philippines independence in 1936 instead of 1946 you also could see interesting developments. But that is near ASB.

For sure the European nations will feel independence-movements, esp. the dutch and the French and the british. Maybe japan – if they do not start a war in the 40ties will be seen at the early 50ties as a supporter of liberty? They still would slaughter Koreans, kill millions of Chinese, but in the former colonies they could be seen as welcome help to get rid of evil European colonialism?

The main point about Weimar Germany is something different.

With them gaining or at last pushing for collecting all germans at their borders they get a serious country that is way to strong for the French and also later UK. If the USSR do not start a war – I can´t see em doing much with Stalin at the helm – he was very carefully and allways acted ONLY if he knew he could not loose – OTL finnland, the Baltics, Poland… only with mad hitler he made a mistake, but I think he knew that the Nazis would strike… - Germany gain at some point (either in the mid 40ties or early 50ties) the economic dominance in Europe. Basically the economic output of UK and france, later the Empire and france together. How this will affect politics in a “non-ww2”-timeline is very interesting.

We should also not forget, in UK the influencing politicans did STRONGLY belive that the “evil Prussians” were the true leaders of nazi Germany. Here – with a more conservative, but still democratic Germany that is way to powerful (from a british POV) and also leading in all technological areas (computers, chemistry, physics, nuclear power) the fear of that “evil hun try to conquer the world” would propably be an obsession. For Weimar the deciding point is when the british would turn their opinion in that direction and how much they could be distracted by foreign events.

The Danzig-crisis - i like that wording - could lead to a local war in that poland loose most of the eastern areas to russia (basically reduce em in the east) and the old german areas in the west. Basically a rump poland, in that both winning countries could dump "to much polish" people in their own borders. In the same time this poland would propably turn antisemitic like hell, seeking (and finding) the old "evil guilty jews"... so you could see a stream of jewish refugees running from poland to the USA, but also germany.

Stalin would propably gamble with finland after that, with similar results as OTL (not necessary the war, but the loosing territority for finnland). The western countries could or would try to supply finnland, esp. with germany turning neutral about that.
I cannot see Stalin risiking much in romania, with the romanians turning quickly to the central block around germany.
So basically a cool down between germany and allies versus russia after the deal was made for poland. The rump poland would be used to avoid a direct border and to calm down upset western europeans.
If Weimar stay smart (and i have the strong feeling it will) they will push for an european tax free zone, basically Mitteleuropa... that could be highly attractive for smaller countries, esp in the east, coming with a military defence pact. For germany they could get a cheap market and a buffer without needing "german princes" as is often used in "CP wins early ww1"-scenarios. If you give this concept some years to develop, more and more countries would try to join, just as i mentioned the dutch, propably denmark and the scandinavian countries norway (much later) and sweden (very early), but also the eastern european nations (Hungary, romania, bulgaria, yugoslavia, greece propably too, to avoid conflict with italy)
that would not be an EU-design, but more an EWG (Europäische Wirtschaftszone, european economic zone), with a dominant germany but also with more and more connecting economies...
they would keep out france - to much hate by the germans, belgium could be welcomed, if they accept border corrections about Eupen-Malmedy (that seems to be a big fish in that time for germany)...

The moment denmark joins UK would be nervous, because this mean german warships could be placed in iceland and the farör islands...

The french and italy could be forced into an alliance, because both would fear that bloc, but also the italians knows they could not "expand" without a strong partner.
UK could join this counter alliance, too. But i doubt it. The USSR would face a strong defence bloc, in that more and more superior weapons would be aviable. I still cannot see Stalin gambling a war, esp., with him as an agressor.

Maybe if france run mad, together with italy and france russia could think about "sharing europe", but i have problems to see this happen.

Germany will gain sometimes the nuclear propulsion, also the bomb. They also would push rockets...

How affected the USA would be? They will have interests in china (like germany), they are no friends of japan and -after Roosevelts 2 terms will also cool down in their symphaty with the USSR. Lots of antigerman feelings - by the roosevelt government could vanish, if some conflict in the pacific force em to work together. Or not.

The world would be much more interesting...we could have
a.) Japan and its imperial state, supressing korea and manchuko, financing liberation forces around the colonies
b.) the USSR, they would do the same - fighting the british and french empires
c.) the Mitteleuropa-bloc, if without the dutch they have zero colonies and each year without a war they would gain more and more wealth by working together... still quite powerful and to strong for the USSR and the french together.
d.) France, struggeling to keep their colonial empire together, looking for alliances against the evil hun
e.) the british empire - also fighting liberty fighters, slowly bleeding to death but compared to OTL in a much better position.
f.) the USA - without WW2 not so dominant, propably the Nr2 in nuclear weapons, but compared to OTL 10 years behind. Maybe 15 years.

Italy could run into a civil war, financed by the russians (communists) against the facists, later fueled by UK, france and Mitteleuropa, or - if Mussolini gambles together with france, they could cause an european war that ends BAD for france and italy... also if UK enters on their side, they too would be doomed.
Why? they would lack the support of the USA, but i cannot see UK joining such war of agression for italian interests in albania or greece.

eurofed
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Successful Weimar Germany May 17, 2018 19:37:17 GMT

Quote

Post by eurofed on May 17, 2018 19:37:17 GMT

May 10, 2018 10:43:09 GMT steffen said:

for sure it would be good (with hindsight) to outplay italy, use them to get a peacefull Anschluss and then – with Mussolini going into war mode in europe – drop em like a hot stone (best time – after Germany had established enough military power to hold their own against france and Poland – in my opinion a Weimar Germany would reach this point (with Austria and without the economy of the chechs) around 1940/41).

But that would be unrealistic – Weimar was no friend of Italy, Italy had troubles with Germany (they were still enemies to the old Austrians and they tried to push Austria into their own sphere of influence. Think also about the facist regime in Austria). I can´t see a development in that Germany and Austria (the majority of the people) want to unify and Italy stand positive to that. So I think that Germany and Italy in this scenario (without Hitlers admiration of Mussolini and copying him) will not be at best terms.

For sure german coal would help to reduce troubles, but it will be no Achse as OTL. Weimar will look for the own interests ONLY, so a UK that give something for Germany standing neutral/against Italy is more interesting for Weimar as standing loyal to the Duce.

Germany – and here esp the scientists who count – will have a more civil and peacedirected approach, so the massacres and killings in northern Africa and ethopia by the Italians will ruin any stand they have in Germany. Again – no Hitler means the Italians will be seen as what they are – brutal occupiers and gassing civilian killers. Even if you make money with them, propably selling coal for informations, technology, rights to explore ressources, propably also weapons and such stuff) you are no allied nation.

This will have impact on Italy, because it is alone more or less. With no strong nazi Germany in the north we do not know if Mussolini will push into Greece. Hopefully he will not do that.

Yugoslavia wasn´t a choice of the hearth, but the idea is that this Weimar Germany, even with the Austrian part will have no interests in Yugoslavian areas – similar to china after they lost tsingtau – and could do true economic deals without territorital interests. With Yugoslavia OTL leaning to nazi Germany I think Weimar will have no troubles with Yugoslavia, even less in this time. I can also see NO regime change, that happened in WW2 with the people leaning to the Allies and the government working with the Nazis. Here – no Nazis, no war (at last I see no big war). Why should they exchange the government? So Germany has its economic deals (they needed stuff and ressources out of Yugoslavia, selling weapons (as long as they care for arms limitations they could produce stuff and sell it to them).

Overall I do not see Weimar as the “good state”, they will do everything to cheat for Versailles and any government, from far left to far right will try to get back the 1914-borders. They even accept local wars, say with Poland, to get back what was – in their eyes – rightfull german. Modern poles would disagree STRONGLY, but I try to see it with the eyes of 1920er and 1930er germans.

I am undecided with the Sudetenareas, but I think, if they unify with Austria most governments in Germany will look for “Unification of most german speaking areas into german borders”.

So – if france would give something, they would drop their demands on Elsass-Lothringen, esp. with so many French living here and only a few “germans” existing in it, but if the hate is still there, Germany would –in case of war and victory – punish france HARD. So the Elsass get back, also industrial areas to cripple france. But that depends on wars. If no war get started, the germans would still hate france with passion, propably the French will also hate the germans, but also fear them.

UK could near Germany, because the USSR gets more and more powerful, also the situation in the pacific could bring UK into such a situation that they want the germans to fight japan, too.

Could Japan and the general situation in the pacific change?

I doubt it, japan was since 1905 on a path to “hell”, it could have been stopped since around 1915, but from that date japan had decided it wanted to dominate china, because they feared them. You cannot solve that problem, esp. with the underlaying fear of Chinese dominance and the racist attitude in japan. Their mistreatment of “colonial” people, like the manchuko-chinese, but more so the Koreans make clear that japan will at one point in time start some colonial war. Either against a “weak appearing” European country, here propably the Dutch – they have everything japan needs, or they run into a war with Russia – OTL they get beaten and were quite terrified, I think this could/would repeat itself.

Some things cannot be stopped with the TL starting in Weimar “surviving”. Even if you go as far as 1923 – to remove hitler early on – the Japanese had decided that they want to be “the” pacific power -> so a conflict with the USA is in the cards and also UK had already dropped japan for the USA.

But you could see – say around 1935 a local war with a conflict around the dutch colonies. The dutch had some opposition in their colonies. If the Japanese – with no war in the west and no chance to use that – start supporting independence movements, they could support em, call for help for suppressed people and by that start a prepared conflict with the dutch. All the time they fight in china. So the dutch, with some british and german help – Britain under the deck, Germany openly – they would still have interests in china and without Hitler and the Nazis the germans would have supported the Chinese… similar to the USA based on economic interests. So a war, the dutch and germans, later maybe the USA against japan.

Japan would win, the german navy would suffer defeats, but sometimes the USA enters and then the allies (Dutch, Germany, USA, propably UK too) would beat the Japanese.

If the USA give the Philippines independence in 1936 instead of 1946 you also could see interesting developments. But that is near ASB.

For sure the European nations will feel independence-movements, esp. the dutch and the French and the british. Maybe japan – if they do not start a war in the 40ties will be seen at the early 50ties as a supporter of liberty? They still would slaughter Koreans, kill millions of Chinese, but in the former colonies they could be seen as welcome help to get rid of evil European colonialism?

The main point about Weimar Germany is something different.

With them gaining or at last pushing for collecting all germans at their borders they get a serious country that is way to strong for the French and also later UK. If the USSR do not start a war – I can´t see em doing much with Stalin at the helm – he was very carefully and allways acted ONLY if he knew he could not loose – OTL finnland, the Baltics, Poland… only with mad hitler he made a mistake, but I think he knew that the Nazis would strike… - Germany gain at some point (either in the mid 40ties or early 50ties) the economic dominance in Europe. Basically the economic output of UK and france, later the Empire and france together. How this will affect politics in a “non-ww2”-timeline is very interesting.

We should also not forget, in UK the influencing politicans did STRONGLY belive that the “evil Prussians” were the true leaders of nazi Germany. Here – with a more conservative, but still democratic Germany that is way to powerful (from a british POV) and also leading in all technological areas (computers, chemistry, physics, nuclear power) the fear of that “evil hun try to conquer the world” would propably be an obsession. For Weimar the deciding point is when the british would turn their opinion in that direction and how much they could be distracted by foreign events.

The Danzig-crisis - i like that wording - could lead to a local war in that poland loose most of the eastern areas to russia (basically reduce em in the east) and the old german areas in the west. Basically a rump poland, in that both winning countries could dump "to much polish" people in their own borders. In the same time this poland would propably turn antisemitic like hell, seeking (and finding) the old "evil guilty jews"... so you could see a stream of jewish refugees running from poland to the USA, but also germany.

Stalin would propably gamble with finland after that, with similar results as OTL (not necessary the war, but the loosing territority for finnland). The western countries could or would try to supply finnland, esp. with germany turning neutral about that.
I cannot see Stalin risiking much in romania, with the romanians turning quickly to the central block around germany.
So basically a cool down between germany and allies versus russia after the deal was made for poland. The rump poland would be used to avoid a direct border and to calm down upset western europeans.
If Weimar stay smart (and i have the strong feeling it will) they will push for an european tax free zone, basically Mitteleuropa... that could be highly attractive for smaller countries, esp in the east, coming with a military defence pact. For germany they could get a cheap market and a buffer without needing "german princes" as is often used in "CP wins early ww1"-scenarios. If you give this concept some years to develop, more and more countries would try to join, just as i mentioned the dutch, propably denmark and the scandinavian countries norway (much later) and sweden (very early), but also the eastern european nations (Hungary, romania, bulgaria, yugoslavia, greece propably too, to avoid conflict with italy)
that would not be an EU-design, but more an EWG (Europäische Wirtschaftszone, european economic zone), with a dominant germany but also with more and more connecting economies...
they would keep out france - to much hate by the germans, belgium could be welcomed, if they accept border corrections about Eupen-Malmedy (that seems to be a big fish in that time for germany)...

The moment denmark joins UK would be nervous, because this mean german warships could be placed in iceland and the farör islands...

The french and italy could be forced into an alliance, because both would fear that bloc, but also the italians knows they could not "expand" without a strong partner.
UK could join this counter alliance, too. But i doubt it. The USSR would face a strong defence bloc, in that more and more superior weapons would be aviable. I still cannot see Stalin gambling a war, esp., with him as an agressor.

Maybe if france run mad, together with italy and france russia could think about "sharing europe", but i have problems to see this happen.

Germany will gain sometimes the nuclear propulsion, also the bomb. They also would push rockets...

How affected the USA would be? They will have interests in china (like germany), they are no friends of japan and -after Roosevelts 2 terms will also cool down in their symphaty with the USSR. Lots of antigerman feelings - by the roosevelt government could vanish, if some conflict in the pacific force em to work together. Or not.

The world would be much more interesting...we could have
a.) Japan and its imperial state, supressing korea and manchuko, financing liberation forces around the colonies
b.) the USSR, they would do the same - fighting the british and french empires
c.) the Mitteleuropa-bloc, if without the dutch they have zero colonies and each year without a war they would gain more and more wealth by working together... still quite powerful and to strong for the USSR and the french together.
d.) France, struggeling to keep their colonial empire together, looking for alliances against the evil hun
e.) the british empire - also fighting liberty fighters, slowly bleeding to death but compared to OTL in a much better position.
f.) the USA - without WW2 not so dominant, propably the Nr2 in nuclear weapons, but compared to OTL 10 years behind. Maybe 15 years.

Italy could run into a civil war, financed by the russians (communists) against the facists, later fueled by UK, france and Mitteleuropa, or - if Mussolini gambles together with france, they could cause an european war that ends BAD for france and italy... also if UK enters on their side, they too would be doomed.
Why? they would lack the support of the USA, but i cannot see UK joining such war of agression for italian interests in albania or greece.

Again, I'm essentially in agreement with a large part of your assessment, especially as it concerns the role and actions of Weimar Germany itself in the TL. As it concerns Italy, I am bound to disagree since I really don't see that many good reasons for Germany and Italy to be hostile ITTL once the bad blood from WWI fades away, nor for things to turn bad for fascist Italy w/o WWII. Sure, there won't likely be a close alliance like OTL Axis, but the two powers are still going to share a common strategic interest to revise the Versailles status quo. This may easily trump any possible antagonism about the status of Austria and South Tyrol, esp. since Mussolini was open-minded to bargain about the former, and just like Alsace-Lorraine the latter ranked very low in the priority scale of German irredentism. I am persuaded this may happen even if the two nations don't share a close ideological affinity. Moreover, Berlin and Rome would also have much to gain in the economic field from friendly cooperation, Italy to free itself from excessive trade and know-how dependency on the Western powers, Germany to substantially expand its Mitteleuropa trade bloc, even more so once Italy starts to develop into a major industrial powers and exploit Libyan oil.

In alternative, the Franco-Italian alliance you suggest is entirely possible (especially if Paris and Rome would find themselves otherwise isolated) but not so easy or likely since France and Italy had been rivals in the Med pretty much since Italy's unification, even more so once the demise of Austria-Hungary removed the other traditional rival of Italy. If you ask my opinion, a practical-minded bargain between Berlin and Rome to exchange Italian acceptance of the Anschluss for German support of Italian expansion in East Africa and the Western Balkans and share mutually-beneficial economic cooperation is just as feasible and likely as the many cases of collaboration between the Western powers and Third World dictatorships during and after the Cold War, and even more so w/o the massive popularity boost left-winger activism and bleeding-heart liberalism got from WWII and the Holocaust.

In the absence of the Nazi regime enabling and reinforcing the worst aspects of fascist Italy, I'm also skeptical Mussolini would become so unpopular as to be an international pariah, or get so reckless as to stumble in a war with the Western powers. His actions before the alliance with Nazi Germany suggest the contrary, for all his braggadocio rethoric he was actually fairly cautious in foreign policy, and he enjoyed a good amount of benevolent tolerance in the democratic countries before WWII got on the horizon. Neither Weimar Germany nor the Western powers cared anywhere near enough about most of his likely expansionist targets (Ethiopia, Albania, Yugoslavia) as to use armed force, start economic warfare, or otherwise become seriously hostile. Before WWII the victims of Mussolini's brutality were left-winger dissidents whose fate only like-minded activists in other countries really cared about, or colonial peoples Western public opinion cared even less about for reasons of racism, distance, and low socio-economic and political status. In most cases, the democratic powers did not treat their own colonial subjects much better than fascist Italy did and I doubt a democratic Germany would have a much different attitude.

Sure, Britain and France made a ineffectual show of opposition to the conquest of Ethiopia, and even the pretense was enough to piss off Mussolini in changing alliances, but appeasement-minded London and Paris steered well clear of using armed force or imposing sanctions with real teeth, such as an oil embargo or closing the Suez Canal. They did even less about Albania or the Spanish Civil War, and IMO it would not be any different for Yugoslavia, especially if Italy organizes a revisionist front with Hungary and Bulgaria, and exploits nationalist instability as a destabilization tool and pretext for intervention. Sure, it would be different if Mussolini goes after Greece or worse Anglo-French holdings in the Med, but there were much less risky targets available. I can't see any good reason why Weimar Germany should care about this stuff any more than the other democratic powers.

I'm also quite skeptical in no-WWII conditions, things for fascist Italy would turn so bad as to make a civil war any barely likely. In the 1930s, the fascist regime had quite a solid support base, the economic situation was not so bad, achievements such as the Concordat, conquest of Ethiopia, state-driven industrialization, corporatist welfare, and public works programs were popular. The communists, socialists, and other anti-fascist dissidents had been crushed into an ineffectual fringe hunted by the secret police or driven into exile, it took the WWII military catastrophe to change the picture. Just like Nazi Germany if Hitler dies and a more cautious successor avoids WWII, any communist attempt to destabilize the fascist regimes in peacetime would just result in a few more Comintern agents killed or jailed, that ship had sailed for a generation when the fascists won the struggle for power.

Quite the contrary, in all likelihood the fascist regime would experience a slow and relatively graceful decline much like Francoist Spain IOTL, as Italy gradually develops into a major industrial power like the post-WWII boom (especially likely if it integrates in Germany's Mitteleuropa trade bloc as a broad analogue of the EU) and exploits Libyan oil. It is likely to eventually lose at least part of its East African holdings to decolonization, but odds are it is able to put enough settlers in Libya, and quite possibly Eritrea-Tigray as well, to keep these lands bound to Italy for all time. And the Albanians may well find a confederation/associated state relationship with Italy acceptable for the foreseeable future. Fascist Italy is in all likelihood going to return to liberal democracy at some point w/o excessive trouble, probably when Mussolini or his successor die or retire, and/or the next generation comes of age, more or less the same way Iberia and Eastern Europe did IOTL.

Britain's attitude towards a resurgent Weimar Germany that gets satisfied with Austria, the Sudetenland, and 1914 claims from Poland may vary, but as long as Soviet Russia keeps rearming, supporting destabilization in the European colonial empires, messing in East Asia and Eastern Europe, and otherwise acting as the main international rogue power and blood-soaked bogeyman in the absence of Nazi Germany, it is most likely the UK stays friendly to Berlin in order to harness Mitteleuropa as an anti-Soviet bulwark. Concerns about the growing economic power of Weimar Germany would be seen as simply less important.

I'm not persuaded Japan was irrevocably bound to follow its self-destructive path to the 2nd Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War after WWI. The power struggle between the moderates and the ultra-nationalists in the Japanese ruling elites and armed forces could have ensued in a defeat or marginalization of the extremists as late as 1936-37, pretty much the same way Weimar Germany could have survived, and various circumstances might have persuaded the Japanese to stay content with Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, and projecting influence in China proper by supporting friendly warlords and KMT factions, as it happened in 1931-36. The world could easily live with that, and even Nationalist China with Chiang at the helm would be willing to for quite some time as it focused on internal stabilization and development. Even if the 2nd Sino-Japanese War occurs, in the absence of WWII circumstances might easily let the conflict stay localized, as the Japanese find themselves trapped in a bloody, exhausting quagmire, the Western powers put Japan in the doghouse but aren't driven to pick a collision couse by imposing serious economic sanctions as it happened in 1937-39. Or if they do, the Japanese realize their isolation and despite the stereotype aren't mad enough to pick a wholly suicidal fight against a united front of the Western powers and Weimar Germany. In either case, one of the worst risks Japan would face is the Soviets deciding Manchuria and North China are a low-hanging fruit and one of the least risky expansion targets for their empire.

Otherwise, assuming Japan is able to avoid a exhausting quagmire in China or a disastrous clash with the Western powers or the USSR, it is entirely possible it switches to support anti-colonial unrest in the Dutch East Indies and/or French Indochina as a proxy to expand their influence in South East Asia. This is especially likely if the Japanese avoided an armed conflict with China and kept projecting influence in China proper by supporting friendly warlords and KMT factions, since they would be accustomed to work with this kind of strategy and would not have spoilt their reputation and Pan-Asian credentials in the eyes of South East Asians too much. This might escalate to an armed clash with the colonial powers, but may well stay to the level of Cold War-style antagonism and proxy conflict, same as OTL and TTL Soviet support for anti-colonial movements.

I would not overemphasize the worst aspects of Japanese rule in Korea too much, it was a wholly different situation from the blood-soaked humanitarian disaster that happened in China proper with the Japanese invasion, and even rather more nuanced than the situation in most European colonies. Despite post-WWII Korean nationalists' pretensions and exaggerations to the contrary, it was not all Japanese brutal repression and naked exploitation of a Korean people bound to oppose their domination. Japanese rule of Korea also involved a genuine effort to modernize and develop the Korean Peninsula much like Japan remade itself in the previous century, and assimilate the Koreans culturally, politically, and economically in the Japanese Empire. This process was well underway by the 1930s with good chances of success, with a sizable portion of Koreans being collaborators. In the absence of a military catastrophe, odds are it is successful enough that Taiwan (which before WWII had gone even further in terms of assimilation) and Korea stay bound to Japan by the 21st century, even if at some point democratization, federal devolution, and cultural autonomy for the overseas territories would likely become inevitable and politically necessary. They also were entirely feasible by gradual political evolution if OTL slide into self-destructive extremism is to be avoided in order to preserve the Japanese Empire from disaster.

Admittedly control of Manchuria may easily turn much more difficult to maintain for Japan in the long term, even if they successfully defend it from Soviet or Chinese military threats, because of its large Han population and its bond to Chinese nationalism fuelled by a resurgent China across the border, unless the Japanese eventually resort to extensive ethnic cleansing of the Han and their replacement with Japanese and Korean settlers, and/or get rather successful with fostering a distinct identity among most Manchurians, and/or things in China stay so bad that Japanese rule simply looks much more appealing to a practical-minded majority.

Last Edit: May 18, 2018 0:27:17 GMT by eurofed

steffen
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Successful Weimar Germany May 18, 2018 6:36:19 GMT

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Post by steffen on May 18, 2018 6:36:19 GMT

May 17, 2018 19:37:17 GMT eurofed said:

May 10, 2018 10:43:09 GMT steffen said:

for sure it would be good (with hindsight) to outplay italy, use them to get a peacefull Anschluss and then – with Mussolini going into war mode in europe – drop em like a hot stone (best time – after Germany had established enough military power to hold their own against france and Poland – in my opinion a Weimar Germany would reach this point (with Austria and without the economy of the chechs) around 1940/41).

But that would be unrealistic – Weimar was no friend of Italy, Italy had troubles with Germany (they were still enemies to the old Austrians and they tried to push Austria into their own sphere of influence. Think also about the facist regime in Austria). I can´t see a development in that Germany and Austria (the majority of the people) want to unify and Italy stand positive to that. So I think that Germany and Italy in this scenario (without Hitlers admiration of Mussolini and copying him) will not be at best terms.

For sure german coal would help to reduce troubles, but it will be no Achse as OTL. Weimar will look for the own interests ONLY, so a UK that give something for Germany standing neutral/against Italy is more interesting for Weimar as standing loyal to the Duce.

Germany – and here esp the scientists who count – will have a more civil and peacedirected approach, so the massacres and killings in northern Africa and ethopia by the Italians will ruin any stand they have in Germany. Again – no Hitler means the Italians will be seen as what they are – brutal occupiers and gassing civilian killers. Even if you make money with them, propably selling coal for informations, technology, rights to explore ressources, propably also weapons and such stuff) you are no allied nation.

This will have impact on Italy, because it is alone more or less. With no strong nazi Germany in the north we do not know if Mussolini will push into Greece. Hopefully he will not do that.

Yugoslavia wasn´t a choice of the hearth, but the idea is that this Weimar Germany, even with the Austrian part will have no interests in Yugoslavian areas – similar to china after they lost tsingtau – and could do true economic deals without territorital interests. With Yugoslavia OTL leaning to nazi Germany I think Weimar will have no troubles with Yugoslavia, even less in this time. I can also see NO regime change, that happened in WW2 with the people leaning to the Allies and the government working with the Nazis. Here – no Nazis, no war (at last I see no big war). Why should they exchange the government? So Germany has its economic deals (they needed stuff and ressources out of Yugoslavia, selling weapons (as long as they care for arms limitations they could produce stuff and sell it to them).

Overall I do not see Weimar as the “good state”, they will do everything to cheat for Versailles and any government, from far left to far right will try to get back the 1914-borders. They even accept local wars, say with Poland, to get back what was – in their eyes – rightfull german. Modern poles would disagree STRONGLY, but I try to see it with the eyes of 1920er and 1930er germans.

I am undecided with the Sudetenareas, but I think, if they unify with Austria most governments in Germany will look for “Unification of most german speaking areas into german borders”.

So – if france would give something, they would drop their demands on Elsass-Lothringen, esp. with so many French living here and only a few “germans” existing in it, but if the hate is still there, Germany would –in case of war and victory – punish france HARD. So the Elsass get back, also industrial areas to cripple france. But that depends on wars. If no war get started, the germans would still hate france with passion, propably the French will also hate the germans, but also fear them.

UK could near Germany, because the USSR gets more and more powerful, also the situation in the pacific could bring UK into such a situation that they want the germans to fight japan, too.

Could Japan and the general situation in the pacific change?

I doubt it, japan was since 1905 on a path to “hell”, it could have been stopped since around 1915, but from that date japan had decided it wanted to dominate china, because they feared them. You cannot solve that problem, esp. with the underlaying fear of Chinese dominance and the racist attitude in japan. Their mistreatment of “colonial” people, like the manchuko-chinese, but more so the Koreans make clear that japan will at one point in time start some colonial war. Either against a “weak appearing” European country, here propably the Dutch – they have everything japan needs, or they run into a war with Russia – OTL they get beaten and were quite terrified, I think this could/would repeat itself.

Some things cannot be stopped with the TL starting in Weimar “surviving”. Even if you go as far as 1923 – to remove hitler early on – the Japanese had decided that they want to be “the” pacific power -> so a conflict with the USA is in the cards and also UK had already dropped japan for the USA.

But you could see – say around 1935 a local war with a conflict around the dutch colonies. The dutch had some opposition in their colonies. If the Japanese – with no war in the west and no chance to use that – start supporting independence movements, they could support em, call for help for suppressed people and by that start a prepared conflict with the dutch. All the time they fight in china. So the dutch, with some british and german help – Britain under the deck, Germany openly – they would still have interests in china and without Hitler and the Nazis the germans would have supported the Chinese… similar to the USA based on economic interests. So a war, the dutch and germans, later maybe the USA against japan.

Japan would win, the german navy would suffer defeats, but sometimes the USA enters and then the allies (Dutch, Germany, USA, propably UK too) would beat the Japanese.

If the USA give the Philippines independence in 1936 instead of 1946 you also could see interesting developments. But that is near ASB.

For sure the European nations will feel independence-movements, esp. the dutch and the French and the british. Maybe japan – if they do not start a war in the 40ties will be seen at the early 50ties as a supporter of liberty? They still would slaughter Koreans, kill millions of Chinese, but in the former colonies they could be seen as welcome help to get rid of evil European colonialism?

The main point about Weimar Germany is something different.

With them gaining or at last pushing for collecting all germans at their borders they get a serious country that is way to strong for the French and also later UK. If the USSR do not start a war – I can´t see em doing much with Stalin at the helm – he was very carefully and allways acted ONLY if he knew he could not loose – OTL finnland, the Baltics, Poland… only with mad hitler he made a mistake, but I think he knew that the Nazis would strike… - Germany gain at some point (either in the mid 40ties or early 50ties) the economic dominance in Europe. Basically the economic output of UK and france, later the Empire and france together. How this will affect politics in a “non-ww2”-timeline is very interesting.

We should also not forget, in UK the influencing politicans did STRONGLY belive that the “evil Prussians” were the true leaders of nazi Germany. Here – with a more conservative, but still democratic Germany that is way to powerful (from a british POV) and also leading in all technological areas (computers, chemistry, physics, nuclear power) the fear of that “evil hun try to conquer the world” would propably be an obsession. For Weimar the deciding point is when the british would turn their opinion in that direction and how much they could be distracted by foreign events.

The Danzig-crisis - i like that wording - could lead to a local war in that poland loose most of the eastern areas to russia (basically reduce em in the east) and the old german areas in the west. Basically a rump poland, in that both winning countries could dump "to much polish" people in their own borders. In the same time this poland would propably turn antisemitic like hell, seeking (and finding) the old "evil guilty jews"... so you could see a stream of jewish refugees running from poland to the USA, but also germany.

Stalin would propably gamble with finland after that, with similar results as OTL (not necessary the war, but the loosing territority for finnland). The western countries could or would try to supply finnland, esp. with germany turning neutral about that.
I cannot see Stalin risiking much in romania, with the romanians turning quickly to the central block around germany.
So basically a cool down between germany and allies versus russia after the deal was made for poland. The rump poland would be used to avoid a direct border and to calm down upset western europeans.
If Weimar stay smart (and i have the strong feeling it will) they will push for an european tax free zone, basically Mitteleuropa... that could be highly attractive for smaller countries, esp in the east, coming with a military defence pact. For germany they could get a cheap market and a buffer without needing "german princes" as is often used in "CP wins early ww1"-scenarios. If you give this concept some years to develop, more and more countries would try to join, just as i mentioned the dutch, propably denmark and the scandinavian countries norway (much later) and sweden (very early), but also the eastern european nations (Hungary, romania, bulgaria, yugoslavia, greece propably too, to avoid conflict with italy)
that would not be an EU-design, but more an EWG (Europäische Wirtschaftszone, european economic zone), with a dominant germany but also with more and more connecting economies...
they would keep out france - to much hate by the germans, belgium could be welcomed, if they accept border corrections about Eupen-Malmedy (that seems to be a big fish in that time for germany)...

The moment denmark joins UK would be nervous, because this mean german warships could be placed in iceland and the farör islands...

The french and italy could be forced into an alliance, because both would fear that bloc, but also the italians knows they could not "expand" without a strong partner.
UK could join this counter alliance, too. But i doubt it. The USSR would face a strong defence bloc, in that more and more superior weapons would be aviable. I still cannot see Stalin gambling a war, esp., with him as an agressor.

Maybe if france run mad, together with italy and france russia could think about "sharing europe", but i have problems to see this happen.

Germany will gain sometimes the nuclear propulsion, also the bomb. They also would push rockets...

How affected the USA would be? They will have interests in china (like germany), they are no friends of japan and -after Roosevelts 2 terms will also cool down in their symphaty with the USSR. Lots of antigerman feelings - by the roosevelt government could vanish, if some conflict in the pacific force em to work together. Or not.

The world would be much more interesting...we could have
a.) Japan and its imperial state, supressing korea and manchuko, financing liberation forces around the colonies
b.) the USSR, they would do the same - fighting the british and french empires
c.) the Mitteleuropa-bloc, if without the dutch they have zero colonies and each year without a war they would gain more and more wealth by working together... still quite powerful and to strong for the USSR and the french together.
d.) France, struggeling to keep their colonial empire together, looking for alliances against the evil hun
e.) the british empire - also fighting liberty fighters, slowly bleeding to death but compared to OTL in a much better position.
f.) the USA - without WW2 not so dominant, propably the Nr2 in nuclear weapons, but compared to OTL 10 years behind. Maybe 15 years.

Italy could run into a civil war, financed by the russians (communists) against the facists, later fueled by UK, france and Mitteleuropa, or - if Mussolini gambles together with france, they could cause an european war that ends BAD for france and italy... also if UK enters on their side, they too would be doomed.
Why? they would lack the support of the USA, but i cannot see UK joining such war of agression for italian interests in albania or greece.

Again, I'm essentially in agreement with a large part of your assessment, especially as it concerns the role and actions of Weimar Germany itself in the TL. As it concerns Italy, I am bound to disagree since I really don't see that many good reasons for Germany and Italy to be hostile ITTL once the bad blood from WWI fades away, nor for things to turn bad for fascist Italy w/o WWII. Sure, there won't likely be a close alliance like OTL Axis, but the two powers are still going to share a common strategic interest to revise the Versailles status quo. This may easily trump any possible antagonism about the status of Austria and South Tyrol, esp. since Mussolini was open-minded to bargain about the former, and just like Alsace-Lorraine the latter ranked very low in the priority scale of German irredentism. I am persuaded this may happen even if the two nations don't share a close ideological affinity. Moreover, Berlin and Rome would also have much to gain in the economic field from friendly cooperation, Italy to free itself from excessive trade and know-how dependency on the Western powers, Germany to substantially expand its Mitteleuropa trade bloc, even more so once Italy starts to develop into a major industrial powers and exploit Libyan oil.

In alternative, the Franco-Italian alliance you suggest is entirely possible (especially if Paris and Rome would find themselves otherwise isolated) but not so easy or likely since France and Italy had been rivals in the Med pretty much since Italy's unification, even more so once the demise of Austria-Hungary removed the other traditional rival of Italy. If you ask my opinion, a practical-minded bargain between Berlin and Rome to exchange Italian acceptance of the Anschluss for German support of Italian expansion in East Africa and the Western Balkans and share mutually-beneficial economic cooperation is just as feasible and likely as the many cases of collaboration between the Western powers and Third World dictatorships during and after the Cold War, and even more so w/o the massive popularity boost left-winger activism and bleeding-heart liberalism got from WWII and the Holocaust.

In the absence of the Nazi regime enabling and reinforcing the worst aspects of fascist Italy, I'm also skeptical Mussolini would become so unpopular as to be an international pariah, or get so reckless as to stumble in a war with the Western powers. His actions before the alliance with Nazi Germany suggest the contrary, for all his braggadocio rethoric he was actually fairly cautious in foreign policy, and he enjoyed a good amount of benevolent tolerance in the democratic countries before WWII got on the horizon. Neither Weimar Germany nor the Western powers cared anywhere near enough about most of his likely expansionist targets (Ethiopia, Albania, Yugoslavia) as to use armed force, start economic warfare, or otherwise become seriously hostile. Before WWII the victims of Mussolini's brutality were left-winger dissidents whose fate only like-minded activists in other countries really cared about, or colonial peoples Western public opinion cared even less about for reasons of racism, distance, and low socio-economic and political status. In most cases, the democratic powers did not treat their own colonial subjects much better than fascist Italy did and I doubt a democratic Germany would have a much different attitude.

Sure, Britain and France made a ineffectual show of opposition to the conquest of Ethiopia, and even the pretense was enough to piss off Mussolini in changing alliances, but appeasement-minded London and Paris steered well clear of using armed force or imposing sanctions with real teeth, such as an oil embargo or closing the Suez Canal. They did even less about Albania or the Spanish Civil War, and IMO it would not be any different for Yugoslavia, especially if Italy organizes a revisionist front with Hungary and Bulgaria, and exploits nationalist instability as a destabilization tool and pretext for intervention. Sure, it would be different if Mussolini goes after Greece or worse Anglo-French holdings in the Med, but there were much less risky targets available. I can't see any good reason why Weimar Germany should care about this stuff any more than the other democratic powers.

I'm also quite skeptical in no-WWII conditions, things for fascist Italy would turn so bad as to make a civil war any barely likely. In the 1930s, the fascist regime had quite a solid support base, the economic situation was not so bad, achievements such as the Concordat, conquest of Ethiopia, state-driven industrialization, corporatist welfare, and public works programs were popular. The communists, socialists, and other anti-fascist dissidents had been crushed into an ineffectual fringe hunted by the secret police or driven into exile, it took the WWII military catastrophe to change the picture. Just like Nazi Germany if Hitler dies and a more cautious successor avoids WWII, any communist attempt to destabilize the fascist regimes in peacetime would just result in a few more Comintern agents killed or jailed, that ship had sailed for a generation when the fascists won the struggle for power.

Quite the contrary, in all likelihood the fascist regime would experience a slow and relatively graceful decline much like Francoist Spain IOTL, as Italy gradually develops into a major industrial power like the post-WWII boom (especially likely if it integrates in Germany's Mitteleuropa trade bloc as a broad analogue of the EU) and exploits Libyan oil. It is likely to eventually lose at least part of its East African holdings to decolonization, but odds are it is able to put enough settlers in Libya, and quite possibly Eritrea-Tigray as well, to keep these lands bound to Italy for all time. And the Albanians may well find a confederation/associated state relationship with Italy acceptable for the foreseeable future. Fascist Italy is in all likelihood going to return to liberal democracy at some point w/o excessive trouble, probably when Mussolini or his successor die or retire, and/or the next generation comes of age, more or less the same way Iberia and Eastern Europe did IOTL.

Britain's attitude towards a resurgent Weimar Germany that gets satisfied with Austria, the Sudetenland, and 1914 claims from Poland may vary, but as long as Soviet Russia keeps rearming, supporting destabilization in the European colonial empires, messing in East Asia and Eastern Europe, and otherwise acting as the main international rogue power and blood-soaked bogeyman in the absence of Nazi Germany, it is most likely the UK stays friendly to Berlin in order to harness Mitteleuropa as an anti-Soviet bulwark. Concerns about the growing economic power of Weimar Germany would be seen as simply less important.

I'm not persuaded Japan was irrevocably bound to follow its self-destructive path to the 2nd Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War after WWI. The power struggle between the moderates and the ultra-nationalists in the Japanese ruling elites and armed forces could have ensued in a defeat or marginalization of the extremists as late as 1936-37, pretty much the same way Weimar Germany could have survived, and various circumstances might have persuaded the Japanese to stay content with Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, and projecting influence in China proper by supporting friendly warlords and KMT factions, as it happened in 1931-36. The world could easily live with that, and even Nationalist China with Chiang at the helm would be willing to for quite some time as it focused on internal stabilization and development. Even if the 2nd Sino-Japanese War occurs, in the absence of WWII circumstances might easily let the conflict stay localized, as the Japanese find themselves trapped in a bloody, exhausting quagmire, the Western powers put Japan in the doghouse but aren't driven to pick a collision couse by imposing serious economic sanctions as it happened in 1937-39. Or if they do, the Japanese realize their isolation and despite the stereotype aren't mad enough to pick a wholly suicidal fight against a united front of the Western powers and Weimar Germany. In either case, one of the worst risks Japan would face is the Soviets deciding Manchuria and North China are a low-hanging fruit and one of the least risky expansion targets for their empire.

Otherwise, assuming Japan is able to avoid a exhausting quagmire in China or a disastrous clash with the Western powers or the USSR, it is entirely possible it switches to support anti-colonial unrest in the Dutch East Indies and/or French Indochina as a proxy to expand their influence in South East Asia. This is especially likely if the Japanese avoided an armed conflict with China and kept projecting influence in China proper by supporting friendly warlords and KMT factions, since they would be accustomed to work with this kind of strategy and would not have spoilt their reputation and Pan-Asian credentials in the eyes of South East Asians too much. This might escalate to an armed clash with the colonial powers, but may well stay to the level of Cold War-style antagonism and proxy conflict, same as OTL and TTL Soviet support for anti-colonial movements.

I would not overemphasize the worst aspects of Japanese rule in Korea too much, it was a wholly different situation from the blood-soaked humanitarian disaster that happened in China proper with the Japanese invasion, and even rather more nuanced than the situation in most European colonies. Despite post-WWII Korean nationalists' pretensions and exaggerations to the contrary, it was not all Japanese brutal repression and naked exploitation of a Korean people bound to oppose their domination. Japanese rule of Korea also involved a genuine effort to modernize and develop the Korean Peninsula much like Japan remade itself in the previous century, and assimilate the Koreans culturally, politically, and economically in the Japanese Empire. This process was well underway by the 1930s with good chances of success, with a sizable portion of Koreans being collaborators. In the absence of a military catastrophe, odds are it is successful enough that Taiwan (which before WWII had gone even further in terms of assimilation) and Korea stay bound to Japan by the 21st century, even if at some point democratization, federal devolution, and cultural autonomy for the overseas territories would likely become inevitable and politically necessary. They also were entirely feasible by gradual political evolution if OTL slide into self-destructive extremism is to be avoided in order to preserve the Japanese Empire from disaster.

Admittedly control of Manchuria may easily turn much more difficult to maintain for Japan in the long term, even if they successfully defend it from Soviet or Chinese military threats, because of its large Han population and its bond to Chinese nationalism fuelled by a resurgent China across the border, unless the Japanese eventually resort to extensive ethnic cleansing of the Han and their replacement with Japanese and Korean settlers, and/or get rather successful with fostering a distinct identity among most Manchurians, and/or things in China stay so bad that Japanese rule simply looks much more appealing to a practical-minded majority.

Hi,

i will answer longer later (next week).

But - i do not say that germany (weimar) should act that way, i wrote that they WOULD act this way.
Why? With the Anschluss and the staying democratic power germany will have no positive reflections on Italy. Italy was way better as nazi germany OTL, but still a brutal mass murdering regime of terror.

So the democratic and leftist leaning german newspapers will paint italy as black as it was.

Japan - full agree about that possible way of "intervention in colonial affairs"

But - Japan was as bad in Korea, generally koreans were half humans for japanese... OTL in the war they ATE (!) their forced korean workers... living livestock they were.
A culture who accept eating humans, because they are less worth is so rotten that it can´t change without massive force from outside.

In asia i PRAY for a silly mistake by japan, so the western countries can crush that evil empire.
Many forget that Japan was even more evil as nazi germany in terms of "mass murdering enemies" (numbers of killed enemies!)

steffen
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Successful Weimar Germany May 22, 2018 14:44:14 GMT

Quote

Post by steffen on May 22, 2018 14:44:14 GMT

May 18, 2018 6:36:19 GMT steffen said:

May 17, 2018 19:37:17 GMT eurofed said:

Again, I'm essentially in agreement with a large part of your assessment, especially as it concerns the role and actions of Weimar Germany itself in the TL. As it concerns Italy, I am bound to disagree since I really don't see that many good reasons for Germany and Italy to be hostile ITTL once the bad blood from WWI fades away, nor for things to turn bad for fascist Italy w/o WWII. Sure, there won't likely be a close alliance like OTL Axis, but the two powers are still going to share a common strategic interest to revise the Versailles status quo. This may easily trump any possible antagonism about the status of Austria and South Tyrol, esp. since Mussolini was open-minded to bargain about the former, and just like Alsace-Lorraine the latter ranked very low in the priority scale of German irredentism. I am persuaded this may happen even if the two nations don't share a close ideological affinity. Moreover, Berlin and Rome would also have much to gain in the economic field from friendly cooperation, Italy to free itself from excessive trade and know-how dependency on the Western powers, Germany to substantially expand its Mitteleuropa trade bloc, even more so once Italy starts to develop into a major industrial powers and exploit Libyan oil.

In alternative, the Franco-Italian alliance you suggest is entirely possible (especially if Paris and Rome would find themselves otherwise isolated) but not so easy or likely since France and Italy had been rivals in the Med pretty much since Italy's unification, even more so once the demise of Austria-Hungary removed the other traditional rival of Italy. If you ask my opinion, a practical-minded bargain between Berlin and Rome to exchange Italian acceptance of the Anschluss for German support of Italian expansion in East Africa and the Western Balkans and share mutually-beneficial economic cooperation is just as feasible and likely as the many cases of collaboration between the Western powers and Third World dictatorships during and after the Cold War, and even more so w/o the massive popularity boost left-winger activism and bleeding-heart liberalism got from WWII and the Holocaust.

In the absence of the Nazi regime enabling and reinforcing the worst aspects of fascist Italy, I'm also skeptical Mussolini would become so unpopular as to be an international pariah, or get so reckless as to stumble in a war with the Western powers. His actions before the alliance with Nazi Germany suggest the contrary, for all his braggadocio rethoric he was actually fairly cautious in foreign policy, and he enjoyed a good amount of benevolent tolerance in the democratic countries before WWII got on the horizon. Neither Weimar Germany nor the Western powers cared anywhere near enough about most of his likely expansionist targets (Ethiopia, Albania, Yugoslavia) as to use armed force, start economic warfare, or otherwise become seriously hostile. Before WWII the victims of Mussolini's brutality were left-winger dissidents whose fate only like-minded activists in other countries really cared about, or colonial peoples Western public opinion cared even less about for reasons of racism, distance, and low socio-economic and political status. In most cases, the democratic powers did not treat their own colonial subjects much better than fascist Italy did and I doubt a democratic Germany would have a much different attitude.

Sure, Britain and France made a ineffectual show of opposition to the conquest of Ethiopia, and even the pretense was enough to piss off Mussolini in changing alliances, but appeasement-minded London and Paris steered well clear of using armed force or imposing sanctions with real teeth, such as an oil embargo or closing the Suez Canal. They did even less about Albania or the Spanish Civil War, and IMO it would not be any different for Yugoslavia, especially if Italy organizes a revisionist front with Hungary and Bulgaria, and exploits nationalist instability as a destabilization tool and pretext for intervention. Sure, it would be different if Mussolini goes after Greece or worse Anglo-French holdings in the Med, but there were much less risky targets available. I can't see any good reason why Weimar Germany should care about this stuff any more than the other democratic powers.

I'm also quite skeptical in no-WWII conditions, things for fascist Italy would turn so bad as to make a civil war any barely likely. In the 1930s, the fascist regime had quite a solid support base, the economic situation was not so bad, achievements such as the Concordat, conquest of Ethiopia, state-driven industrialization, corporatist welfare, and public works programs were popular. The communists, socialists, and other anti-fascist dissidents had been crushed into an ineffectual fringe hunted by the secret police or driven into exile, it took the WWII military catastrophe to change the picture. Just like Nazi Germany if Hitler dies and a more cautious successor avoids WWII, any communist attempt to destabilize the fascist regimes in peacetime would just result in a few more Comintern agents killed or jailed, that ship had sailed for a generation when the fascists won the struggle for power.

Quite the contrary, in all likelihood the fascist regime would experience a slow and relatively graceful decline much like Francoist Spain IOTL, as Italy gradually develops into a major industrial power like the post-WWII boom (especially likely if it integrates in Germany's Mitteleuropa trade bloc as a broad analogue of the EU) and exploits Libyan oil. It is likely to eventually lose at least part of its East African holdings to decolonization, but odds are it is able to put enough settlers in Libya, and quite possibly Eritrea-Tigray as well, to keep these lands bound to Italy for all time. And the Albanians may well find a confederation/associated state relationship with Italy acceptable for the foreseeable future. Fascist Italy is in all likelihood going to return to liberal democracy at some point w/o excessive trouble, probably when Mussolini or his successor die or retire, and/or the next generation comes of age, more or less the same way Iberia and Eastern Europe did IOTL.

Britain's attitude towards a resurgent Weimar Germany that gets satisfied with Austria, the Sudetenland, and 1914 claims from Poland may vary, but as long as Soviet Russia keeps rearming, supporting destabilization in the European colonial empires, messing in East Asia and Eastern Europe, and otherwise acting as the main international rogue power and blood-soaked bogeyman in the absence of Nazi Germany, it is most likely the UK stays friendly to Berlin in order to harness Mitteleuropa as an anti-Soviet bulwark. Concerns about the growing economic power of Weimar Germany would be seen as simply less important.

I'm not persuaded Japan was irrevocably bound to follow its self-destructive path to the 2nd Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War after WWI. The power struggle between the moderates and the ultra-nationalists in the Japanese ruling elites and armed forces could have ensued in a defeat or marginalization of the extremists as late as 1936-37, pretty much the same way Weimar Germany could have survived, and various circumstances might have persuaded the Japanese to stay content with Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, and projecting influence in China proper by supporting friendly warlords and KMT factions, as it happened in 1931-36. The world could easily live with that, and even Nationalist China with Chiang at the helm would be willing to for quite some time as it focused on internal stabilization and development. Even if the 2nd Sino-Japanese War occurs, in the absence of WWII circumstances might easily let the conflict stay localized, as the Japanese find themselves trapped in a bloody, exhausting quagmire, the Western powers put Japan in the doghouse but aren't driven to pick a collision couse by imposing serious economic sanctions as it happened in 1937-39. Or if they do, the Japanese realize their isolation and despite the stereotype aren't mad enough to pick a wholly suicidal fight against a united front of the Western powers and Weimar Germany. In either case, one of the worst risks Japan would face is the Soviets deciding Manchuria and North China are a low-hanging fruit and one of the least risky expansion targets for their empire.

Otherwise, assuming Japan is able to avoid a exhausting quagmire in China or a disastrous clash with the Western powers or the USSR, it is entirely possible it switches to support anti-colonial unrest in the Dutch East Indies and/or French Indochina as a proxy to expand their influence in South East Asia. This is especially likely if the Japanese avoided an armed conflict with China and kept projecting influence in China proper by supporting friendly warlords and KMT factions, since they would be accustomed to work with this kind of strategy and would not have spoilt their reputation and Pan-Asian credentials in the eyes of South East Asians too much. This might escalate to an armed clash with the colonial powers, but may well stay to the level of Cold War-style antagonism and proxy conflict, same as OTL and TTL Soviet support for anti-colonial movements.

I would not overemphasize the worst aspects of Japanese rule in Korea too much, it was a wholly different situation from the blood-soaked humanitarian disaster that happened in China proper with the Japanese invasion, and even rather more nuanced than the situation in most European colonies. Despite post-WWII Korean nationalists' pretensions and exaggerations to the contrary, it was not all Japanese brutal repression and naked exploitation of a Korean people bound to oppose their domination. Japanese rule of Korea also involved a genuine effort to modernize and develop the Korean Peninsula much like Japan remade itself in the previous century, and assimilate the Koreans culturally, politically, and economically in the Japanese Empire. This process was well underway by the 1930s with good chances of success, with a sizable portion of Koreans being collaborators. In the absence of a military catastrophe, odds are it is successful enough that Taiwan (which before WWII had gone even further in terms of assimilation) and Korea stay bound to Japan by the 21st century, even if at some point democratization, federal devolution, and cultural autonomy for the overseas territories would likely become inevitable and politically necessary. They also were entirely feasible by gradual political evolution if OTL slide into self-destructive extremism is to be avoided in order to preserve the Japanese Empire from disaster.

Admittedly control of Manchuria may easily turn much more difficult to maintain for Japan in the long term, even if they successfully defend it from Soviet or Chinese military threats, because of its large Han population and its bond to Chinese nationalism fuelled by a resurgent China across the border, unless the Japanese eventually resort to extensive ethnic cleansing of the Han and their replacement with Japanese and Korean settlers, and/or get rather successful with fostering a distinct identity among most Manchurians, and/or things in China stay so bad that Japanese rule simply looks much more appealing to a practical-minded majority.

Hi,

i will answer longer later (next week).

But - i do not say that germany (weimar) should act that way, i wrote that they WOULD act this way.
Why? With the Anschluss and the staying democratic power germany will have no positive reflections on Italy. Italy was way better as nazi germany OTL, but still a brutal mass murdering regime of terror.

So the democratic and leftist leaning german newspapers will paint italy as black as it was.

Japan - full agree about that possible way of "intervention in colonial affairs"

But - Japan was as bad in Korea, generally koreans were half humans for japanese... OTL in the war they ATE (!) their forced korean workers... living livestock they were.
A culture who accept eating humans, because they are less worth is so rotten that it can´t change without massive force from outside.

In asia i PRAY for a silly mistake by japan, so the western countries can crush that evil empire.
Many forget that Japan was even more evil as nazi germany in terms of "mass murdering enemies" (numbers of killed enemies!)

Quoting my last post...
here the promised longer answer:
1.) Weimar will allways try to get rid of any versailles limitations. That is 100% given, even a communist weimar (will not happen) would push for that. With no nazis and no war started by germany they will eat in parts this "contract"... so you see some remilitarisation of the ruhr - not to start a war but to gain full souveranity of it. You see germany try to gain "control" of large german groups outside germany... here the sudetenareas are the most numerous group. The chechs are in deep troubles, with every year german will be stronger and sometimes the demand to "unify" them will be to strong. UK and france could start a war about it, but it will be them how would start it, with no suppport of the rest of the world. It is the old problem for democracies. If you are a democratic state you can´t stop a unification (peacefully) by the will of the people - or you turn yourself in a brutal non democratic state. The Sudetenareas are very important for the chechs, but at some point these would want to join their "german" brothers and sisters.
the same is true for austria - it was the lost second world war that eneded the wish of unification, also the lie about the "first fictim myth" by the austrians. No WW2 and at some point germany and austria WILL unify.

Danzig is the next big bomb that could or could not explode. It is german, want to be unified with germany and it WILL unify... you need the expulsion/Slaughter of the germans here to avoid it.
Weimar - different to the nazis could wait and raise the pressure... they will demand a vote about it and at some point they get it.
That vote will be 99% for german "anschluss".
So if the League will not support it, the league is dead. Just like historical it was.
Poland could not avoid that unification with germany, esp. with eastern prussia having a border to Danzig.
Only a war, started by poland could stop it.
But that mean poland attack germany/danzig after a referendum. This means that france and UK have to support a military intervention, based on hot air by poland or ignore it.
I bet they will ignore it, because they cannot gain enough support internal for such war.
this means it is poland versus germany.
The result of this is allways a german victory...
Either by a quick "blitzkrieg" or a slower more bloody war. With or without russian support FOR germany.

After that war germany will get back its old 1914-border... mission accomplished.
On the other side, poland of the 30ties is no state who will accept the danzig-anschluss, even with their own port.

So i see allways - that means in any scenarios from 1932 - with a nonhitler germany - a conflict for Danzig sometimes around 1939-42.
The germans would not push for danzig if they have not rearmed.

So any timeline see these changes.

a.) Austrain "Anschluss" between 1934 and 1940
b.) a Danzig-conflict, propably a war between germany and allies (propably the chechs) and poland... maybe some deal with the chechs gaining larger areas of poland but accept the loss of the sudetenareas? - that is open to discuss, the sudetenareas could be delayed till 1950 to join germany, but i think at some point they WILL join. If by a miracle poland do not start a war with germany for danzig, they keep most areas, but germany would demand the respect of the original votes in 1919-20, in that germany could keep more areas of now poland.

Beyond the former eastern german border (all Weimar governments will try to reestablish the 1914 border) germany has no more interests... maybe get back the colonies (they were theoreticaly only under Leage-controll)

only if germany get nukes they would demand more... but again a democratic weimar germany would not start a war like hitler... but having nukes they would use em to force the 1914-eastern border (if not allready happened) and the anschluss of the sudetenareas.
Weimar was deeply interested in the "bring into our borders all german areas"... so Danzig, the former 1914-borders in the east, the sudetenareas AFTER the Anschluss of Austria

For its neighbours this germany - with no insane nazi rulers - will be a very strong obstacle and france would propably sell its soul to feel "save". France of the 30ties will bunker itself deep behind the Maginot-line, UK will see more and more other problems in their falling appart empire. USA is still isolaltionsitic, but China could solve that.

For germany of 1932 they had invested money in china, were well seen here. THis will intensify with a restrenghed german economy.
China would happily buy german weapons, also american weapons.Both have an interest in stopping japanese agressive moves, combined with the brutality of the japanese regime.

So germany allways support the chinese against japan, either to get back their colonies from japan (even if they only need a test platform for weapons) and to make money.
With no colonies germany also has a good reputation in the colonies of the european countries.

For germany it is basically this timeline
a.) get back all german speaking areas at the borders (Saar is a given, remilitarisation of the rhineland between 1935 and 1940 also, the austrian anschluss between 1934 and 1940, too. Danzig, again, the old 1914-borders could be get back, if poland start a war for the Danzig Anschluss) parallel germany get rid of versailles, similar to OTL

Weimar had good relationship to china and the netherlands, improving relationship to belgium. Bad relationship to UK, but with a pro-german policies in the 20ties and 30ties this could change. France is an enemy, hostile. But this is more a french problem... germany will not take back alsac by force... if the french attack germany at some point and loose, they take it from france, otherwise - not.

But france and germany will be enemies and they will stay enemies. In germany (weimar) they will not love france, with not second war and the second defeat germany will have no interest in france beyond anger them. I could see germany invest in algerian liberation forces... say in 1955-60 algerians are welcome in germany, get intense training in guerillia war, german weapons are given to these forces. The same could be true for all other now OTL former french colonies.
Allways a similar system.In the french colony is a liberation group formed. Germany invest in them, helping em to get a logistic and military organisation. German trading ships could be used for smuggling liberations forces (in france seen as terror funding) to get that colony liberated.
The second france has to give up that colony germany will recognice it as a free country and german money will be poured in it. German companies will try to get contracts in that colony, german media will paint french military actions in the worst possible way. German weapons, german "Military advisors" and german free forces will be send to keep that new state free from french influence.

France cannot do much against this, only declare war. But to do that they need allies.. .allies they don´t get. Germany help supressed colonial servants to get rid of the evil colonial masters.. .so why should one help france (or belgium -> congo) to do that?

It could be a wonderful timeline (wonderful to write - nothing wonderful in it if you are pro france)...

There will be different german groups...
the hard leftists (communists) would finance red cells in colonial areas, training them there... with 15-20% for the communists, germany sometimes (with a more leftist democratic elected government) will turn a blind eye if communists e.g. finance communists in kenya, to get rid of british rule, if the more conservatives rule in weimar, they will end this and use it as evidence for communist evilness... financing more conservative "oppositions" in the same kenya

You even could see germans finance red and conservatives in the same time. So german weapons get sold to both rebellious groups against colonial masters.

Sometimes india gets independence (i see around 1950), germany would MASSIVLY support the new state, trying to gain new markets.

Colonial rulers are between a hard rock and a stony ground, but in the same time you could see UK and france together with germany fighting the japanese agression in the south pacific.

That germany will be leading in technological developments, could be easily the biggest supporter of the state israel (say after some polish military dictatorship help lots of massacres in that poland), full of eastern polish refugees fleeing to germany

In the same time the die hard rightists in germany would cry havoc about this, lots of terrorists from the right try to kill jewish politicans

Italy could cause a conflict... or a slow down of "german unification", with french help.Basically you could see a new alliance by france AND italy, to stop germany gaining power, maybe with poland.

UK could support germany against italy, getting "lost" in a polish-italian-french war of agression against germany, breaking the old alliance. That would be no total war, i think such "worst case scenario" for the weimar-timeline could be this:
1935/36 the austrians seek again the anschluss at germany, some conservative government overplay its hand - in the same time Danzig is pushing for anschluss (Double-anschluss-scenario).

Now france and poland plan for a war, in that italy could join in.
Such war could lead to a german-british-chech alliance, that break appart after germany also secretly negotiate the USSR entering on the german side. In that time germany is military to weak, so they need russia to tear poland appart and germany need time to defend its western borders.
THis war could end in a draw, italy stay in modern austria, fighing nominally for its independence, supporting massive the austro nazis.
Poland and france get defeated, but UK drop germany the second russia invade eastern poland to take a part of it.Poland get it the same hard way as OTL, just that german occupation is 1000 times better as OTL. Germany establish some rump poland (the OTL Generalgouvernament), that is a german vasall.
in the east germany establish its old 1914 borders, the polish republic also loose areas to the chechs, that force em in the german boat.

France and germany have established a new hate-scenario, in that open hostiles end only after UK force em into a status-quo-ante... such war costs germany around 200-400.000 new deads, france 200-400.000 new deads, poland 200-700.000 deads (depends on how long they fight after russia invades eastern poland, taking "back" what they lost in the east after 1921 and maybe 10.000 deady for the chechs, italy loose around 100k casulties, but austria is nominally a neutral state, but will join "suddenly" sometimes in the early 40ties...

UK is again in the french boat after weimar overplay its cards, but still hostile to italy.
You have now a multi polar scenario...

with france and italy strong allies, uk beeing supporting france in case germany attack france, but make clear they are hostile to italy (forcing em out of parts of austria). THey stay hostile neutral to germany, because they stop an anschluss of austria in 1936.
the checs are firmly in the german camp, but in the same time look with troubles if german hardliners talk about the sudenten-question.

France is unhappy, because with italy they have a problematic ally... who could trigger a small second war...
germany will rearm strongly, nominally to defend against french agressions... this could lead to the german nuke, UK, france and italy will try to end the german-russian alliance, that is also not very stable... sometimes if spain burns the russians could strike against finland, taking their pound of flesh.
UK will try to ease the german-french rivality, but will not support the austrian anschluss, so ending this.
France is open hostile to germany, but to weak to strike together with france. Belgium give france the finger, the same is true for the netherlands.

Germany would still rearm, but - if smart - offer the dutch support against hostile nations in the pacific, but neutrality in europe. By this germany can build lots of global moving warships, operating from dutch bases against the japanese. Japan will be not happy with germany still supporting china, get support by france - against germany but not against the dutch (for not loosing the british)

The USA - as long as Roosevelt is president will be antigerman, but not as openly as OTL, lacking the nazi evilness and no antisemitism, he could be a one-term-president (OTL his "new deal" was a desaster)

Lots of interesting developments and strange ad-hoc alliances... in case of a conflict with japan UK will support germany in defending their chinese interests and defending the dutch, but stay hostile neutral in europe, supporting france.
In the same time italy would propably overplay at some point its cards in the balkan, giving germany the chance to reshuffle their options, trying to get austria included and supporting any enemy of italy.

So you could see german manned subs fighting against italy, for e.g. greece... with a free german armed force helping greece, blitzing north italian citie, with a 100% angered but helpless france not able to strike against germany, because of british interests, basically germany and UK fight toghether wiht yugoslavia against italy (if italy is as mad as attacking yugoslavia), or if they are a bit smarter, in greece.
But, any fall of italy is stopped cold by france...

a wonderful timeline to describe... lots of possibilities... If a second (or third) german-french war starts, uk will support france, even if france is the agressor, but in that scenario the british will not send an army to help france, but make clear to germany that they not allow the germans to win this... as long as they defeat the french armies trying to enter germany, but not achive somehting, they will stay neutral...

so sometimes the germans get the nuke - propably also by help from fled italian, hungarian and other scientists, nuking paris - shocking the world in a final french-german war.
Honestly i see france starting a war if the think they and italy could win it and after they get the british info that they will not fight UK in such war.Germany, still not as armed as the otl nazis, are to weak to "Blitz" the french, after some french city bombardments against ruhr cities a retalitaiton attack nuke paris. That is the moment germany wins that war, but UK will now "for ever" join the french camp.
But germany also will tell UK that they also could nuke London, so it is more a cold war scenario.IN UK they will try VERY hard to gain the nuke, too... just like the soviets try to get info about it (lots of red scientists, also in a german nuke program)

In such dark scenario germany will beat france (by nukes), force the alsace and propably some northern french industrial zone (but more so to get rid of the maginot-line), expulsing the french living here.
As OTL, with nukes you are no longer to defeat... france will suffer a bit, but Weimar is not nazi germany... basically they will get their austrian unification (if not happened till this moment), france is shocked, loose propably large sums of money, is forced to drop italy as an allied nation and maybe is forced to also give back former german colonies (Kamerun, Togo)

But the more realistic scenario is that weimar achive the same as Hitler.- just slower and with no bloody war with poland.
So around 1942 germany has included
Saarland (1935 as OTL), the full souveranity about the rhineland (1938, not 35), austrian anschluss (1940 - peacefully, after the italians are trapped in a greece war they start to loose), Danzig - a 1941-short-but-bloody-war-with poland, but no interference by russia and (coin flip) the sudetenareas sometimes between 1940 and 1945. But also it is possible that the sudeten get huge minority rights by a frightened "ally" chechoslovakia, turning the whole thing in the next 10 years in a true alliance, in that it isn´t important that the sudetenareas are NOT german.
IF danzig lead to a war with poland, it will be a short, but still brutal and bloody war. In that Poland loose also the old 1914-areas, that germany get, the chechs get parts ot poland beyond the Teschen-area (basically this is for support and the start of the end of a sudenten-anschluss-scenario).
France would still be hostily, italy will be mad, but beaten by the greec in a humiltiation way. In that war they loose also the tripolitain area, that go back to turkey (!), a stunt the germans would do to avoid getting involved openly. But this give germany another big diplomatic victory... they also help the turks to get back the islands, these do not end in greece hands.
Greece is still a progerman state, in that the relationship with UK was improved.
in such less bloody scenario - poland beaten in a short war, getting back the former border ends any german interests in expansion in europe.THey still understood that UK is pro french, so they look for a cheap mass destruction weapon they could use to keep armament costs at a sane level (high but not to high). Poland -after a defeat unfortunatly will look for a "Südenbock", and i honestly fear they find in in the large jewish minority (they speek jiddish, are some halfgermans and for centuries a scapegoat for polish problems - so some very bad post-war progroms cause 1 million jews leaving the country for - how ironic - germany. This raise antiemitism in germany, but also - my personal opinion, this weimar will hit hard the small but influencing anitsemitic right (around 10%). THis attract more and more jews from other antisemitic states in europe (hungary, romania to name two)

around 1942-43 Stalin could threaten in that scenario finland - after a short but bloody war - to give up areas (karelia)... the new red thread could cause the defeated poland to seek a strong and firm alliance with france and UK, helping germany (they would not enter an alliance, but they gain things from UK allowing them to move military stuff by Danzig (now germany) into poland.. i also see the baltic states entering a full flat allianc with germany in the time of the short polish war (1941). Now Stalin has two different blocs against him, the Entente (France, UK, Poland, propably romania) and the german alliance (with the baltics and sweden, after seeing the finnish war).
Denmark is a german leaning neutral, the same could happen with norway (pro british, but with both blocs against red russia i could see the strange thing with both having good relationships with norway).
Germany will demand a broad demilitarisied zone in poland, also looking for more and more allies in the balkan (hungaria could be one, yugoslavia will be a strong allied, especially with italy beeing hostile neutral here) greece and turkey could be german allies, also bulgaria, but that is open, with bulgaria beeing also pro russian but also neutral about Stalin. But Bulgaria would exclude turkey, so i see germany more seeking an alliance with ataturk turkey, but no in the sense of agressive war seeking but more a full fledged defence alliance.
Germany - having achived everything in europe with a strong chechian partner who is more and more bound to germany (no vasal, but strong economic ties on both sides - this could be a first true partner of mitteleuropa, others could be - belgium (?), the netherlands, hugaria (outside the Horty regime),....

sometime germany WILL have nukes also in this scenario.. also nuclear propulsion.
THe question is, will germany get back sometimes their pacific colonies from japan in some japan-conflict?Again a coinflip... i see this happen around 1943-44, in a bloody war that see japan overplaying its cards, causing china, germany, the dutch, the USA, UK and its dominions ending the japanese menace... in a bloody, very bloody pacific war, liberating all chinese areas from japanese rule, learning more and more about the absolut brutal rule of japan in china. This could cause this strange alliance to end also japanese rule in korea, forming a neutral korea, that has its independence guaranteed by USA, UK and germany (!), germany take back its former colonies form japan - germany want a distant area for missle starts and nuclear devlopment... so the marshalls, and maybe truk and pelieu getting again german rule... if that changed germany is truly smart, they give em full german rights, so they have oversea-dependences like UK and france.
5 years later the germans will have their first nuke, secretly exploded in the marshall islands... with only some tight secrets, the german area will be not overly militarized... this first nukes could be joind by extended rocket starts,as near as possible at the equator area.

Around 1950 germany announce they have started a ballistic missle into the orbit, putting satellites into that area.Latest this will cause some serious reactions in russia, USA and UK.
But germany could have a serious lead (10 years), that USA close in around 5 years, russia in 6 months (later - by espionage) and UK in 15 years.

So the trigger of the first amerian bomb explode in 1955, first russian bomb in 1957 (but the true start is only AFTER Stalins dead), UK start its bomb in 1965... the same time germany start its first hydrogen bomb...
this brings germany on par with USSR and USA in world politics... but the ressource poor country will still support all liberation forces in ressource rich areas, untouchable by france and UK because of german nukes and missles...

how china develops after the japanese defeat is open...hopefully NOT RED... japans fate is also interesting. After defeat (not as bad as OTL in casulties) - will it be occupied? I doubt it, it "only" loose their "empire" and the asiatic and island areas...

in 1970 there are 5 super powers.
BIG Number one is the USA,
behind - far behind number 2 is germany
again behind, but not so far is communist russia
followed by decolonisating UK.

Here behind could be either a democratic japan (doubtful), more realistic is france, sometimes around this date get is first nuclear bomb.
itally is far behind france in economic terms, without nukes but chemical and biolgoical weapons
the other european countries will support one of the bigger states...
either UK, Germany or france, maybe also USA.

a lot things could go into another direction, depends on the plot.Personally i see no war in europe, but lots of "threats of war" between france and germany... a bloody short war between germany and poland is ineviable, but i hope and beg for no german-french war after that.
Italy could fall earlier because the facist regime has to many failures and mistakes, but france could support it as a tool against germany.
In the same time UK is shed between the wish to reduce the german influence, support france, stop communism and stop japan.

turning points could be
a.) the danzig-war (germany-poland - in my eyes are inevitable)
b.) the finnish-soviet war
c.) japanese defeat
d.) first nuclear bomb (for me - germany detonate it - AFTER the japanese defeat on a regained marshall island

Unsolved things
a.) Israel - the jewish question will happen... maybe germany will force it -> because poland cause a migration of jews out of poland into germany... and this will cause the germans to get "rid of them" in combination with the original wish of many jewish influencing people to get an own state. With no holocaust you have large influencing jewish groups around europe.
b.) China - will it be communistic or not?
c.) Stalin -will he start a war in europe? I doubt it - but he could use times in that the western europeans are distracted by conflicts
d.) Indian independence -a given - but how and when?

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