Napoleon as a US President

Probably too early if America has yet to fight the war against Britain and is preparing for it, or is R&R from it. With a more warlike Administration, the War of 1812 could have easily started as early as 1807-08. But even in such a case another war against Spain in 1810 seems a tad early, even with the support of Spanish-American revolutionaries. I would guess a couple years might be necessary even for Napoleon's America to win the war, being Britain to the peace table, and negotiate the peace. Then you have the time it takes to build up a casus belli against Spain in the Congress and public opinion. But the Spanish American wars of independence run throughout the 1810s and the beginning of the 1820s so there would plenty of time for the USA to intervene in them even if they are not able and willing to do so at the first shot.

There is plenty of room for the Spanish-American War to begin before 1821 regardless of whether the Anglo-American War begins in 1807-08 or 1811-12. In both cases, it mostly depends on when Bonaparte, the Congress, and US public opinion deem America able and willing to fight. In the first case, the second war might start in 1813-15, in the second case in 1817-19. But if the damage the Jefferson Administration wrought on US military and economy is mostly or entirely averted, and Napoleon can build on what the other Federalist Administrations had prepared, he might indeed start the war with Britain as soon as the Chesapeake–Leopard Affair occurs. America was entirely willing to fight in its wake, and President Bonaparte's answer certainly would not be Jefferson's ill-thought embargo. Even with Napoleon working his own blitzkrieg magic across Canada, I suppose at least a couple years would be necessary for the USA to win the war in North America, persuade Britain peace is necessary, and negotiate a peace treaty. Then add say half a decade of rest and recovery for the USA to rebuild its resources and will to fight, develop a casus belli against Spain about Florida, the Caribbean, and Tejas, get angry about Spanish repression of creole insurrections, build up ties with Spanish-American revolutionaries, etc. If the war against Britain ends in 1809-10, the one against Spain might start in 1814-15. Still more than early enough for the Yankees to look like much-welcome allies and liberators to creole revolutionaries (whose fortunes at the time were at a low in New Spain and New Grenada alike).

To be honest, I don't think there would be one left for a generation or two, apart from the usual occasional clash with hostile Amerindian tribes as the Frontier steadily advances. There'd be the slaveholder would-be secessionists, but the TL assumes they are dealt with in a fairly swift way during the Nullification Rebellion, more like a bigger and more bloody Whiskey Rebellion spanning a few months than anything as destructive as the ACW. As it concerns the Spanish-American War, my best guess is it would last 2-3 years, between defeating the Spanish in New Spain, the Caribbean, and New Grenada, and then going out to crush the last Royalist stronghold in Peru-Bolivia (the revolutionaries in La Plata and Chile were basically successful on their own by the mid-1810s). I'm not sure how Brazil is going to fit in this scenario. As it concerns Russian Alaska, I bet the Tsar would be willing to sell when the USA asks, since the region was not that valuable to Russia and TTL America decisively defeated all other European colonial powers in the Western Hemisphere. 

Apart from the occasional Indian war, and the Nullification Rebellion/mini-ACW, I think most of the remaining 19th century would be a relatively quiet time of consolidation and domestic growth, fairly similar to OTL in this regard if plotted on a larger national scale encompassing all of North America and northern South America and with less racial and sectional strife. That typical 'digestion' phase successful empires experience after a cycle of victorious military expansion. The divisive effects of the slavery issue would be gone, with racial strife dealt with in a relatively painless way by sending most freedmen to unsettled Western territories and a minority back to Africa to form a bigger and stronger Liberia. Integration of the Hispanic territories would take place in a fairly peaceful way (apart from the usual repression of bandits, would-be warlords, hostile Indian tribes, etc.) since most Spanish-speakers would be willing to join the USA.

No doubt Britain, France, and Spain might be hostile to America to some important degree, but probably also fairly reluctant to fight the USA again on its turf, also because they wouldn't be able to exploit any serious internal division, and America would only become stronger and stronger with time. I suppose there would not be any serious reason for the USA to fight again, until it has expanded its settled territory all the way to the West Coast and started to project its strategic and economic interests in the Pacific. Unless perhaps independent South America (Peru-Bolivia, Brazil, La Plata) becomes subject to serious European encroachment, and/or suffers severe instability, and the USA feels fit to intervene. If the slavery issue had not been yet dealt with, I'd totally write a bigger ACW expanding in a world war in the TL during the mid-19th century, with the British, French, and Spanish intervening to support the slaveholder secessionists, and the Germans, Russians, and Italians taking the side of the Union.

To have a civil war, you have to leave the slavery issue festering. It can be done, by preventing slaveholder sectionalism from becoming such a clear and present threat in Bonaparte's time that he is driven and gets the opportunity to settle it in a decisive way. In other words, prevent the Nullification Crisis, or at least don't let it occur during his Administration or come to the point of an armed rebellion. In such a case, by the mid 19th century, you can have the usual scenario of free states (ITTL Canadian, Northern, and Hispanic) vs. slave ones (ITTL Deep South and Caribbean, since I fancy the butterfly of the Upper South embracing emancipation and assimilating in the free section), quite possibly with the WWI-style expansion I described. Apart from this, I cannot think of any good reason for TTL America to experience such deep-seated divisions that they have to be settled on the battlefield.

The Mexican, Central American, and Gran Colombian territories are going to join the Union peacefully since most of their inhabitants are pro-US due to the way they got independence. Assuming Bonaparte can restrain his troops in behaving well during the invasion of Canada, and I say he does, most Canadians are going to make themselves content with being US citizens in fairly short order. Neither section is going to be discriminated by WASP prejudice since they join the American experiment during its formative period, making it multi-cultural from the beginning, and Bonaparte won't allow any such nonsense. Not to mention the transformative precedent of one of the greatest American heroes and leaders being a second-generation Italian-American. Once they get statehood, both the Canadians and the Hispanics are going to find their place in the US system and learn to play the American political game. The various sections of Canada shall become French-speaking or linguistically-mixed extensions of the closest OTL US regions (the Maritimes with New England, Middle Canada with the Midwest, Western Canada with the Prairies and West Coast). The Greater Antilles shall become a Spanish-speaking or linguistically-mixed extension of the Deep South, northern Mexico shall be the same for Texas or the Southwest, the most urbanized portions of central-southern Mexico, Central America, and Gran Colombia shall become kinda like southern Florida/California, with the most rural ones being more like OTL Puerto Rico or a Spanish-speaking South, and so on.

Once Bonaparte dies or retires after such a long rule, there's inevitably going to be some political backlash, but in all likelihood it is going to be settled peacefully at the ballot box by the Democratic-Republicans getting their long-awaited chance to be politically dominant and implementing their preferred policies for a while, probably in combination with the rise of Jacksonian democracy. Quite possibly they get to write the two-term limit in the Constitution, although if Bonaparte changed the Presidential term to 6 years that may easily stick, and/or quite possibly they make it a limit for consecutive terms only. At some point, America is going to have to deal with the issue of peonage and social inequality in the Hispanic section, but since US rule is going to provide political stability, liberal democracy, economic development, and industrialization to the area, such issues are probably be going to be settled peacefully by social reform, apart from the occasional bout of civil disorder turning violent. Pretty much the same is likely going to happen as it concerns the social problems caused in urban areas by industrialization, much as it happened IOTL with the Progressive Era and New Deal reforms. All of these events may easily be the cause for a serious political realignment, but in all likelihood nothing more traumatic than that.

Well, Pax Americana and US democracy and prosperity at least for the sizable portion of the Western Hemisphere that gets included in the USA since the early 19th century. I've eyeballed this would mean North America and northern South America according to period US strategic reach. It would stretch such reach somewhat, but perhaps it might include Peru-Bolivia too, since ITTL it may well get liberated from Spanish rule by US and New Grenada revolutionary forces, and so join US sphere of influence and be put on a trajectory to political union with the USA. That is, if the La Plata and Chilean revolutionary forces don't do the deed and get there first. It might go both ways, since IOTL the area was liberated by a pincer movement coming from Gran Colombia and La Plata. Independent South America is probably going to face the same issues as OTL, although greater and closer US influence might make a positive difference: e.g. it might help La Plata to remain united and emerge as a federal union that is able to avoid post-independence civil wars and fight off British and Brazilian encroachment in the Banda Oriental and Rio Grande do Sul regions.

Then again, once internal development makes the USA able to expand its strategic reach in the Pacific and across the Western Hemisphere, a strong drive to achieve full Pan-American political unity may emerge both in the USA and independent South America. Both sides would then be able to see inclusion of a large number of Latin Americans in the US experiment was a remarkable success beneficial to all involved, so why not expand it all the way down to Tierra del Fuego? It might happen during the late 19th century either by a peaceful Pan-American political process similar to the way the EU expanded IOTL, or by the USA intervening in some kind of conflict. This seems especially relevant for independent Spanish South America. Brazil might follow the same path, or get more alienated from the USA if like OTL it becomes monarchical and pro-slavery, in opposition to US republicanism and TTL early abolitionism. Alternatively, a La Plata/Southern Cone federal union might remain independent because of distance but become a close ally and 'sister republic' of the USA.

US territorial and sphere of influence expansion across Latin America may easily cause Anglo-American antagonism, since the British may well get alienated by US protectionism and economic influence cutting their trade off or at least preventing it from dominating an increasing slice of Latin American markets. Another possible cause of antagonism between the USA and the British Empire would be ncreasing US economic influence and strategic projection in the Pacific and East Asian region once US settlement reaches the West Coast. These are among the reasons why I expect ITTL the Anglo-American relationship might easily turn much less friendly than OTL, quite possibly up to the point of the USA siding against the British Empire and its allies in any equivalent of the World Wars.

By the way, ITTL the vast size of the Union, and dominant Federalist-Bonapartist influence in its early life, are going to make the USA absolutely enthusiastic about infrastucture building. At the beginning, this is going to mean paved roads and a lot of canals; slightly later, quite a lot of railroads and telegraph; later still, a lot of airports, hydraulic projects, and other macro-engineering stuff.

The Nicaragua Canal was somewhat easier to build as far as I know, so I'd expect they build it first, more or less as soon it gets technologically feasible (i.e. when dynamite gets invented). But I assume for this kind of North/Pan American USA, interoceanic trade would get so important and abundant that they end up building both the Nicaragua Canal and the Panama Canal. Say the former in the late 19th century, the latter in the early 20th century, and the latter's expansion project in the mid 20th century.

Yep, as far as I know, the Nicaragua Canal would be rather like the Suez one, so it can be done in the 1860s-70s, while the Panama one needs the giant locks, so it likely gets delayed to the OTL schedule or so. But a few decades' distance between the two projects is fine since it allows the economic and strategic usefulness of a twin canal to emerge and persuade the American government to finance both projects.